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FOREWORD 
This report represents a joint research 
effort by the International Food Policy Re-
search Institute and the Institute for Devel-
opment Studies at the University of Nairobi, 
under a research permit from the Office of the 
President in Kenya. 
The International Food Policy Research 
Institute and the Institute for Development 
Studies share a concern to see development 
of agricultural trade as a means of achieving 
accelerated economic growth. Trade among 
developing countries is of particular interest 
as a means of accelerating growth in a world 
where the growth of the industrialized coun-
tries has slowed dramatically. Kenya's par-
ticular location and agricultural base sug-
gest that the potential is great for trade with 
the oil-exporting countries in the region, 
especially the Gulf States, Iran, and North 
Africa. Such trade is small at present. This 
report attempts to understand the constraints 
on development of that trade potential. 
Michael Schluter examines both the in-
ternational and domestic constraints gov-
erning expansion of Kenya's food and bev-
erage exports. Subsidized exports of beef, 
sugar, and dairy products from high-income 
countries make it difficult for developing 
countries to raise domestic prices to boost 
local production, thus undermining develop-
ment of the export potential of these prod-
ucts. With respect to domestic constraints, 
shortages of capital for infrastructural de-
velopment suggest an export strategy based 
on high-value rather than high-volume crops. 
Equity considerations suggest a focus on 
crops produced in the smallholder sector. 
Both high-value and smallholder crops, 
however, make particular demands on avail-
ability of trained manpower. Many minor 
high-value crops that could contribute to 
the diversity of exports require a sustained 
research effort to achieve the volume and 
quality for exports to be viable. The collection, 
processing, and payment of hundreds of 
thousands of small-scale producers and the 
marketing system needed to provide linkages 
between the international market and those 
producers also require large numbers of 
trained personnel. This points to a special 
role for the donor community in helping to 
provide the manpower training needed to 
develop an agricultural-export-based devel-
opment strategy in Kenya. 
Schluter's analysis is based on his eight 
years of residence in Kenya from 1974 to 
1982, working both in the commercial sector 
and in economic research. His extensive 
practical knowledge of how institutions work 
at the grass roots is reflected in this study, 
which should be of practical use to those 
concerned with policy analysis and for-
mulation in Kenya. 
John W. Mellor 
Director, IFPRI 
Kabiru Kinyanjui 
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SUMMARY 
Although Kenya lacks the industrial raw 
materials and skilled workers required to 
promote industrial exports, it has excellent 
potential for producing a wide variety of agri-
cultural commodities. As the need for foreign 
exchange increases, Kenya will probably be 
compelled to seek to expand its agricultural 
exports, rather than to continue to pursue its 
present goal of attaining self-sufficiency. 
Specific food-importing countries were 
selected for the study because markets for 
agricultural products are highly differen-
tiated, and prices often depend on taste 
preferences in the importing country. And, 
by focusing efforts to expand exports in a 
specific market, economies of scale can 
often be realized in freight, marketing, and 
credit costs. The oil-exporting countries are 
an obvious choice as a market for Kenya. 
Imports of most products grew by more than 
70 percent from 1971-73 to 1976-78, whereas 
growth in many other markets stagnated 
during the same period. Because 97 percent 
of the oil exporters' agricultural imports in 
1978 were food commodities and beverages, 
the study concentrates on these products. 
Analysis of markets among the oil ex-
porters shows that in 1978, 37 percent of 
the total value of imports was cereals and 21 
percent was meat; sugar, oilseeds, and dairy 
products had 10 percent each. Of the coun-
tries considered, the largest regional markets 
in order of importance were the Gulf States, 
Iran, North Africa, West Africa, and Indonesia. 
Between the first oil shock (1971-73) and the 
second (1976-78) imports of meat products 
increased five to six times. Imports of maize, 
oilseeds, dairy products, rice, and oranges 
also grew rapidly. 
Eight possible exports from Kenya are 
examined to analyze the international and 
domestic constraints that might prevent 
Kenya from realizing its export potential to 
these markets. The selected items are coffee, 
tea, sheep and goats, sugar, maize, pulses, 
and horticultural crops. The methodology 
uses a disaggregated nominal protection 
coefficient. For each commodity, the do-
mestic border price is compared with the 
export parity price, which is defined as the 
price in the export market less duty, freight, 
and insurance costs. The main components 
of the domestic border price are the producer 
price, transport costs, and marketing margins. 
The potential for reducing each cost com-
ponent is analyzed, especially the potential 
for reducing the farmgate price by intro-
ducing new technology. 
For cof fee and tea, the constraints arise 
both from the international market and the 
domestic marketing system. Because the 
demand for cof fee and tea in Kenya's tradi-
tional markets is highly inelastic, Kenya will 
have to go to nontraditional markets to in-
crease exports. Returns on cof fee exports 
will be significantly lower in the oil-exporting 
countries than in the countries that presently 
receive Kenya's exports. However, the addi-
tional export volumes could be produced on 
existing area even at the returns available in 
these markets if the efficiency of the small-
holder marketing systems could be improved 
so that producers receive a substantially 
higher proportion of the export value, and 
more quicldy, than under the present system. 
Among meat products, the prospects for 
beef and sheep and goats differ markedly. 
Subsidized beef exports from the European 
Community have lowered international prices 
to the point where it is no longer possible to 
stimulate production for export in Kenya by 
raising domestic prices. Projections of EC 
beef surpluses suggest this situation will 
continue through the 1980s. In contrast to 
beef, the potential for sheep and goats is 
substantial. Even though Kenya's exchange 
rate was overvalued in 1982, sheep and lamb 
prices in the Gulf States were 30 percent 
higher than Kenya's domestic border prices, 
but the government ban on food exports pre-
vented this differential from being realized. 
A long-term research project on sheep and 
goats has provided the technological basis 
for substantial improvements in productivity, 
although higher prices will be needed to 
provide the incentives for farmers to apply 
improved management practices. 
For maize and sugar, exportable surpluses 
have to come largely from Western and Rift 
Valley provinces, where these crops compete 
9 
for high quality land with assured rainfall. 
Because these provinces are 800 kilometers 
from the port, more than 50 percent of the 
domestic border price of maize is the cost of 
handling and transport from producer to 
port. Although Kenya has ideal growing 
conditions for maize, the cost of capital for 
infrastructural development makes it im-
possible to develop competitive exports of 
this bulky, low-value commodity. For sugar, 
if indirect taxation of about 13 percent is 
deducted from the border price, Kenya's 
domestic border price is nearly 20 percent 
below the World Bank's estimated long-
term equilibrium price in international mar-
kets. However, the capital costs of developing 
processing plants for additional white sugar 
capacity are so high that Kenya should 
probably try to develop production of jaggery, 
a brown sugar product that is less capital-
intensive and more employment-creating. 
This would release part of existing white 
sugar capacity for export. 
Pulses and horticultural crops are the 
other two commodities considered. For beans, 
international prices were almost double do-
mestic border prices for several major vari-
eties during much of the period 1971-81. 
However, Kenya's product is of low quality. 
It is not standardized for color or size, and it 
is often subject to 1 percent weevil damage, 
which excludes it from most of the world 
market. The absence of strong vertical link-
ages in the information chain from the world 
market back to the research and extension 
system accounts for the failure to develop 
export quality. For mangoes, there is sub-
stantial potential for export, but uncertainties 
of pest control lower expected returns on 
investment. Resources available for research 
into minor crops like mangoes are inade-
quate, and scarce supplies of improved 
planting material from government nurseries 
also restrict area expansion. 
Finally, some of the institutional problems 
associated with Kenya's food and beverage 
exports are considered. "Who should export?" 
is not a trivial question in Kenya. Expatriate-
controlled companies and Asian traders 
(citizens primarily of Indian descent) have 
the market information, technical knowledge, 
and working capital required, but their in-
terests are not necessarily those of the na-
tional government. Parastatals and coopera-
tives lack export know-how and often have 
severe management problems because there 
are no effective systems of accountability. 
Local African-owned businesses generally 
lack both export know-how and adequate 
working capital, and many Kenyan policy-
makers believe they contribute to social 
stratification. 
Both beverage and food exports create 
political difficulties for the government. 
Ninety percent of cof fee production and 50 
percent of smallholder tea production come 
from two provinces in central Kenya, whereas 
sugar and marketed maize production are 
concentrated in western Kenya. Changes in 
the relative prices of food and cash crops 
have important implications for the regional 
distribution of income. Also, with nearly 50 
percent of gross export earnings and nearly 
75 percent of net export earnings coming 
from coffee and tea exports, international 
price fluctuations create substantial insta-
bility in the domestic economy. Exports of 
food products with a high price elasticity of 
demand reduce domestic consumption by 
raising prices. Because key groups of con-
sumers are often highly articulate, food ex-
ports are perceived as politically hazardous. 
The report concludes that an agricultural 
export strategy should concentrate on high-
value, low-volume crops, as this minimizes 
demands on high-cost domestic infrastruc-
ture. However, this emphasis requires a greater 
allocation of resources to agricultural research 
as many minor crops with export potential at 
present receive little attention. Vertical link-
ages between export markets and the farmer 
will also have to be developed. Existing 
marketing channels have limited institutional 
capacity to convey information about market 
size, price movements, and quality specifi-
cations to the research station, extension 
staff, or the farmer. Finally, it will be impor-
tant to increase price incentives and per-
suasion through the input supply and ex-
tension agencies. This will necessitate a new 
or revitalized set of marketing institutions 
that will aggressively seek to increase farm 
productivity. It will be largely the willingness 
and ability to create these new institutions 
within a progressive price and policy frame-
work that will determine the success of an 




Potential for Food Exports 
Until recently there has been little rec-
ognition in Kenya of the potential to export 
food. The emphasis in food policy, as reflected 
in the National Food Policy Paper of 1981,1 
is toward self-sufficiency, defined as a do-
mestic balance in production and consump-
tion. Although a brief mention is made of 
food export potential in the paper, it is 
hedged with caveats regarding financial 
viability. To achieve self-sufficiency by 1989, 
high growth rates in production of many 
major foodstuffs will be necessary. However, 
the choice of 1976 as the base year in these 
estimates, when production was unusually 
low, has probably exaggerated the rates of 
growth required to attain self-sufficiency.2 
Periodic domestic shortages of basic foods, 
such as maize and milk, which require large 
imports, reinforce the view that Kenya can 
hope for no more than self-sufficiency in 
food as a target. 
But, setting self-sufficiency as a goal 
may be inappropriate on two grounds. First, 
if Kenya has a comparative advantage in 
production of export crops rather than food 
crops, national income could be increased 
significantly by increasing export crop pro-
duction and importing food crops. Such an 
export-based agricultural strategy would also 
provide employment as most export crops, 
such as coffee, tea, and horticultural crops, 
are more labor-intensive than maize and 
wheat, the main food staples.3 The potential 
to increase rural employment through shifts 
in the cropping pattern has been spelled 
out for the Indian context,4 These income 
and employment advantages may be offset 
by concerns about national security if there 
are administrative or other problems asso-
ciated with guaranteeing adequate supplies 
of quality food staples from imports. 
Second, a narrow food production focus 
is inappropriate if there is high aggregate 
supply elasticity in agriculture, so that pro-
duction of both food and export crops can 
be raised simultaneously. Several factors 
indicate that Kenya could achieve growth 
rates of 4 percent (which is required if there 
is population growth of 3.5 percent, per 
capita income growth of 2.5 percent, and 
income elasticity of demand of 0.2 percent). 
Although such high growth rates have seldom 
been achieved in Asia, the yield gap in 
Kenya is usually much larger. That is, the 
average yield in Kenya is typically much 
smaller than that of the best farmer, while 
the average yield in Asia is only slightly 
lower.5 Largely as a result of administrative 
and other institutional constraints, fertilizer 
consumption was stagnant in Kenya during 
the period 1971 - 81, whereas it increased two 
and a half times in India during the same 
decade.6 
The problems of output marketing in 
Kenya have also been greater than in most 
parts of Asia. As is the norm in Africa, the 
government in Kenya has taken over almost 
all of the grain trade, whereas governments 
in Asia have attempted only limited inter-
vention. In addition, monopsonist purchas-
1 Kenya, National Assembly, Sessional Papers, 1981, Paper No. 4, "National Food Policy." 
2 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Agricultural and Rural Development Review and 
Programming Mission for Kenya, Mission Findings and Recommendations (Rome: FAO, 1981), p. 40. 
3 Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Central Development and Marketing Unit, Yields, Costs and Prices 1982 (Nairobi: 
Government Printer, 1982), pp. 116-128. 
4 Gunvant M. Desai and Michael Schluter, "Generating Employment in Rural Areas," in Seminar on Rural Development 
for the Weaker Sections (Bombay: Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, 1973). 
5 Reasons for the yield gap in Eastern Africa are discussed in Michael Collinson, "Technological Potentials for Food 
Production—Eastern and Central Africa," a paper prepared for the Conference on Accelerating Agricultural Growth 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, August 29 to September 1,1983 (mimeographed), especially pp. 37-39. 
6 Gunvant M. Desai, Sustaining Rapid Growth in India's Fertilizer Consumption: A Perspective Based on Composition of Use. 
Research Report 31 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1982), pp. 9 and 15. 
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ing rights have been given to cooperatives 
or parastatals for most major agricultural 
commodities. The lack of trained manpower 
and the poor systems of internal account-
ability in these institutions result in many 
disincentives to farmers. Consequently there 
is a large, untapped potential for aggregate 
supply increase if the output marketing 
system were decontrolled. However, the 
political complexities of making changes in 
the agricultural marketing system should 
not be underestimated. 
Why Focus on Agriculture? 
Three main arguments support a primary 
focus on agriculture as the key to growth 
and export earnings in Kenya. The first is the 
small absolute size of the manufacturing 
sector. In 1981, manufacturing still accounted 
for only 13.4 percent of GNP, 4 percent of 
total exports (excluding petroleum products), 
30 percent of wage employment, and less 
than 10 percent of total employment in the 
economy.7 Even if the 6 percent per year 
growth rate of employment in manufacturing 
achieved during the period 1972-77 could 
be sustained throughout the period 1981-
2000, so that it increased nearly four times— 
from 1 million to 4 million workers—it would 
still absorb only 50 percent of the expected 
6 million new entrants to the labor force.8 
Second, the local value added in foreign 
exchange terms tends to be much higher for 
agricultural than industrial products. For 
most developing-country manufactured ex-
ports, generally 60 to 70 percent of the cost 
(at world prices) goes for raw materials and 
intermediate inputs, to which must be added 
the import component in transport, electricity, 
and other infrastructure.9 In contrast, in 
Tanzania the foreign exchange component 
in production, processing, and transport (to 
f.o.b.) for 1981/82 was less than 30 percent 
for all smallholder export crops except tea 
and a maximum of 50 percent for estate-
produced sisal. Only in the case of relatively 
low-value food crops like wheat and estate 
sugarcane, harvested mechanically, did the 
proportion exceed 50 percent.10 So the ab-
solute value of manufactured exports prob-
ably has to be twice the value of agricultural 
exports to achieve a given amount of net 
foreign exchange earnings. 
The third advantage of a focus on agri-
cultural exports is the income distribution 
effect. The employment opportunities and 
income distribution benefits of a strategy of 
growth led by agriculture have been shown 
in the economic literature to be much greater 
than with a strategy led by industry.11 More-
over, manufacturing businesses are still 
largely controlled by the European and Asian 
communities.12 The capital and the tech-
nological know-how required for large-scale 
manufacturing production make entry diffi-
cult for African businessmen, whereas the 
potential for African businessmen to partici-
pate in the processing and export of agricul-
tural commodities is substantial. 
Food Versus Nonfood 
Agricultural Exports 
Nonfood agricultural exports such as 
beverages and industrial raw materials appear 
to offer significant advantages over food 
products as developing-country exports. Sub-
stantial domestic demand for food products, 
which generally have a high price elasticity 
of demand, increases fluctuations in the 
supply available for export markets. And the 
export of products consumed by the poor 
may directly put at risk the availability and 
7 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 1981 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1982). 
8 Kenya, Working Party on Government Expenditures, Report and Recommendations of the Working Party (Nairobi: 
Government Printer, 1982), p. 80. 
9 Donald B. Keesing, Trade Policy for Developing Countries, World Bank Staff Working Paper 353 (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 1979), p. 101. 
10 Michael Sackett and Michael Schluter, Estimates of the 1981/82 Import Requirements for the Production. Processing and 
Marketing of Major Crops in Mainland Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam: Marketing Development Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Tanzania, 1981). 
11 For example, see John W. Mellor, The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Developing World (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976). 
12 Although there has been some growth of Kenyanization since 1968, the basic structures are generally believed to 
be unaltered. National Christian Council of Kenya, Who Controls Industry in Kenya? (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing 
House, 1968). 
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price of essential food products, which 
could materially affect the real incomes of 
poor people. Also, the domestic political 
risks in exporting commodities with a high 
price elasticity at home are generally greater 
than exporting those with a low price elas-
ticity. 
However, there may be substantial do-
mestic demand for some cash crops as raw 
materials for local industry. During the period 
1976-80, 15 percent of officially marketed 
maize production was exported and only 12 
percent of cotton production was.13 Thus, a 
focus on cash crop exports may not increase 
the reliability of supplies, avoid hurting the 
poor, or reduce political instability. Further-
more, a focus on nonfood exports may not be 
an advantage in foreign exchange terms. 
Strongly negative terms of trade in the period 
1962-77 were associated more with indus-
trial raw materials, especially jute, sisal, and 
rubber, and products with a low elasticity of 
demand, such as tea, than with food prod-
ucts.14 
The Role of Agricultuve in 
Kenya's Exports 
During the period 1970-80, Kenya's agri-
cultural exports grew from U.S. $150 million 
to $700 million in current prices (Table 1), 
and increased 80 percent at constant 1975 
prices.15 In gross export earnings, the share 
of agricultural exports declined from 7 5 per-
cent of total exports in 1970 to 65 percent in 
1979, and to just 51 percent in 1980. However, 
in 1980 two-thirds of nonagricultural export 
earnings were from oil products, which were 
imported in crude form and exported as re-
fined products, so that the local value added 
was small. They rose sharply in value follow-
ing price rises by the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC). If the 
import content is 85 percent for oil exports, 
50 percent for other nonagricultural exports 
including manufactured goods, and 30 per-
cent for agricultural products, the proportion 
Table 1—Value of agricultural commodities exported by Kenya, 1970-80 
Commodity 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
(KSh million) 
Cof fee 445.3 390.8 495.5 715.7 768.5 704.0 1,867.0 4,087.2 2,495.2 2,214.0 2,163.0 
Tea 254.1 237.5 328.3 339.3 387.5 459.0 635.2 1,435.6 1,263.7 1,257.0 1,160.0 
Fruit and vegetables 78.0 70.7 94.1 101.8 110.1 155.3 282.3 405.1 361.5 405.8 474.5 
Sugar 2.4 3.7 2.2 7.0 9.0 9.9 152.7 83.2 11.4 77.1 270.3 
Animal products 
(meat and skins) 48.3 80.3 117.9 116.2 103.6 123.8 301.6 189.8 222.0 291.9 238.5 
Cotton and wool 32.0 28.9 32.0 44.3 37.0 34.4 34.1 24.7 57.2 37.3 86.5 
Cereals and pulses 23.3 8.8 4.0 119.0 64.2 129.8 58.3 94.3 60.6 147.7 38.9 
Oilseeds 10.6 9.7 9.8 8.0 10.1 12.9 16.4 27.1 27.3 42.4 27.2 
Dairy products 6.8 2.4 26.2 22.6 15.7 8.4 15.4 16.6 42.6 50.2 5.7 
Other agricultural 
products 167.0 185.3 238.8 316.6 612.0 488.6 389.9 505.7 412.0 485.8 537.1 
Total agricultural 
products 1,067.8 1,018.1 1,348.8 1,853.5 2,117.7 2,126.1 3,752.9 6,869.3 4,953.5 5,005.2 5,001.7 
Petroleum products 163.5 177.4 178.8 189.8 543.8 746.5 889.6 1,675.2 1,389.3 1,560.0 3,254.1 
Other nonagricul-
tural products 200.8 268.2 284.2 409.4 597.4 506.8 733.3 916.4 1,056.5 1,158.7 1,608.5 
Total exports 1,432.1 1,463.7 1,811.8 2,452.7 3,258.9 3,379.4 5,375.8 9,460.9 7,399.3 7,723.9 9,864.3 
Source: Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise Department, Annual Trade Report, 1970-
80 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970-80). 
Note: The figures in the table are Kenya's domestic exports. Reexports are excluded. 
13 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1981, 
pp. 58 and 102. 
14 Cathy L. Jabara, Terms of Trade for Developing Countries, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report 161 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1980). 
15 The deflator used is the OECD-North GDP deflator in World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 30. 
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of net export earnings derived from agricul-
ture in 1980 rises from 51 percent to 74 per-
cent of the total (see Figure 1). Other non-
agricultural exports did not exceed 16 percent 
of the gross value of exports at any time 
during the period 1970-80. 
Kenya did not succeed in diversifying its 
agricultural exports significantly away from 
coffee and tea during this period (Table 1). 
Coffee's share grew from 30-40 percent to 
40-50 percent of the gross value of agricul-
tural exports between the first and second 
halves of the 1970s, and tea has continued to 
provide an additional 20-25 percent. For both 
crops the tonnage exported has grown by 
more than 80 percent. The share of fresh and 
processed fruit and vegetables has grown 
slightly from 7 percent to 9 percent of total 
exports during the decade, and sugar has 
ceased to be a major import item and become 
a potential export item. Animal products, 
including beef, animal skins, and wool, are 
also significant export items, constituting 
about 5 percent of total agricultural exports. 
Other small export items that have made up 
more than 1 percent of total agricultural 
exports in some or most years are cotton, 
maize, pulses, oilseeds (mainly sesame and 
sunflower), and dairy products. Maize was a 
significant export item in just two years, 
1973 and 1979; in some other years it was 
imported in large quantities. This report 
aims to identify the international and do-
mestic constraints that have inhibited diver-
sification and growth of Kenya's agricultural 
exports. 
Figure 1—Estimates of Kenya's gross and net export earnings, 1980 
Source: Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise Department, Annual Trade Report. 1970-80 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970-80). 
Notes: Gross foreign exchange earnings are defined as the total foreign exchange earned from physical exports. 
Net foreign exchange earnings are defined as gross foreign exchange earnings less the value of imported 
products that are used in the production, processing, and transportation to port of physical exports. The 
following percentages of import content are assumed: for agricultural products, 30; for petroleum products, 
85; and for other nonagricultural products, 50. 
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3 
METHODOLOGY FOR EXAMINING 
KENYA'S EXPORT POTENTIAL 
Reasons for a Market-Specific 
Focus 
It is generally assumed that the demand 
for Kenya's export products is infinitely elas-
tic. This means that a single export price can 
be used for computing measures of export 
potential. However, many of the products 
exported by Kenya face sharply differentiated 
markets. The International Coffee Agreement 
limits exports to member countries to a fixed 
quota; the prices of exports to nonquota 
countries, which include most of the oil 
exporters, are often 60 percent below those 
in quota markets.16 The highly inelastic de-
mand for tea in traditional export markets 
results in a large gap between the average 
revenue and the marginal revenue earned 
from increased exports, and for Kenya to 
export to new markets, a different processing 
technique would have to be used, which 
changes the type of tea produced. 
Different countries or regions demand 
specific qualities, sizes, grades, varieties, and 
types of a particular commodity. For example, 
Kenya has the potential to export fresh beef 
by airfreight to the Middle East, but not 
frozen cuts. Products such as pulses with 1 
percent insect damage may have no market 
in Western countries, but they may still be 
acceptable in other developing countries 
with less stringent quality standards. Because 
there is seldom a costless movement from 
one quality or grade to another within the 
commodity, exporters are often forced to 
specialize in production of particular grades 
for particular markets. 
When product markets are sharply dif-
ferentiated, it makes it difficult to study all 
export possibilities. The volume of data 
required to study so many permutations of 
product specifications and markets makes it 
infeasible to cover them all. Two approaches 
may therefore be adopted. The first is to 
choose a small subset of commodities and 
to examine all possible markets for those 
commodities to determine which countries 
offer the highest return. The second is to 
examine the products with potential for a 
specific market. The important economies 
of scale that can be realized by concentrating 
on certain markets constitute the main 
argument for a study focused on markets 
rather than on commodities. These arise in 
the areas of freight, overcoming barriers to 
entry, and market development. 
The economies of scale in freight costs 
are substantial. A national market focus 
lowers costs to the individual exporter. Such 
costs may be a significant part of the total 
cost of an exported item. This is particularly 
true of agricultural and food products, which 
are typically of low value and high volume. 
They are often highly perishable or involve 
special handling costs such as refrigeration. 
For small countries like Kenya, the ability to 
initiate trade to a certain market depends on 
being able to reach the critical minimum 
volume or value that makes it feasible to 
charter a steamer or aircraft to a particular 
destination. This applies particularly to 
Kenya's meat and horticultural exports to 
the Middle East and West Africa. Research 
may also be needed to determine the optimal 
storage and handling conditions for trans-
porting agricultural exports to specific mar-
kets.17 The problem of freight links is par-
ticularly acute in intra-African trade, owing 
to the low volumes and lack of infrastructural 
facilities. As bulk increases, there are further 
opportunities to realize economies of scale 
16 Co f fee Board of Kenya, Annual Report, Balance Sheets and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ending 30th September 1982 
(Nairobi: CBK, 1983), p. 14. 
17 For example, see International Trade Centre, "Export Development and Diversification. Packaging and Transportation 
of Perishable Produce by Sea from Kenya with Special Reference to Selected Vegetables, Pineapples and Mangoes," 
Project No. KEN/05/60, Geneva, March 1978 (mimeographed). 
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through larger carriers, bulk handling facili-
ties, and lower insurance costs. 
There are also economies of scale in 
marketing. Monopolies or oligopolies among 
distributors in importing countries often 
mean that new suppliers cannot enter the 
market unless they can offer a range of 
goods to the importer that matches the range 
offered by traditional suppliers. New sup-
pliers have to match credit terms, which is 
particularly difficult for soft currency coun-
tries in competition with countries with con-
vertible currencies. Because governments 
account for a large proportion of total ex-
penditures on goods and services, it is im-
portant to try to capture at least a portion of 
this market. Often, tendering for government 
contracts cannot be attempted without the 
ability to supply relatively large quantities 
and a range of products rather than a single 
item. 
Transaction costs associated with market 
development also argue for focus on a spe-
cific market. Bureaucratic requirements gov-
erning imports, such as quality conditions, 
packaging, labeling, and customs formalities, 
are often so complex that an official repre-
sentative in the importing country is essential 
for establishing trading links. Lack of trained 
manpower to perform these functions in 
each nation and insufficient exportable 
surpluses to defray these overhead costs 
make it necessary to limit the number of 
countries that are the focus of an export 
drive. In addition, it is essential to establish 
a reputation for steady supplies and reliable 
quality: until a market foothold is established, 
new suppliers have to sell their product at 
discounted prices. Once the learning costs 
have been incurred for a particular market, 
the transaction costs of opening up new mar-
kets and the need for continuity of supply in 
exports make it desirable to stay in a particular 
market, unless the quantity available for 
export increases dramatically. 
Taking into account differentiated prod-
ucts and markets does not make it possible 
to avoid restrictive assumptions altogether. 
It is necessary to assume an infinitely elastic 
demand for the specific quality of the prod-
uct in the market under consideration. In 
Kenya's case, for the products and time 
frame considered, this was not reasonable 
because Kenya's market share was no more 
than 13 percent for any product in any 
country studied (see Chapter 4). However, it 
could be a restrictive assumption over the 
long term if export volumes increase rapidly 
to these markets. 
Problems in Measuring 
Export Potential 
A common method of examining agricul-
tural export potential is to list all commodities 
with apparent export potential and then to 
rank them by the effective protection coef-
ficient (EPC) or the domestic resource cost 
(DRC). The EPC uses the value added for a 
commodity to show whether there is positive 
or negative protection, whereas the DRC 
ranks commodities by the true opportunity 
cost of producing one unit of foreign ex-
change from them. By examining the full 
range of commodities a country may export, 
it is possible to determine those which the 
country produces at lowest cost relative to 
the estimated long-term international price 
trend and thus to determine priorities for 
long-term export development. 
In Africa, data limitations make it difficult 
to provide accurate estimates of these coef-
ficients for use in policymaking. The first set 
of problems is concerned with establishing 
actual inputs and outputs for a given com-
modity. There is a high degree of agroclimatic 
variation within small parts of Africa. The 
large zones of similar climate and topography 
that exist in the Indo-Gangetic plain, for 
example, do not exist in Kenya. There are 
large differences in yields between adjacent 
districts growing the same crop in Kenya, as 
well as differences over time, so that a na-
tional yield generally has little meaning. 
Although the DRC is a marginal concept, 
average values are often used in practice 
owing to the difficulty of accurately measur-
ing marginal values. However, the gap be-
tween marginal and average costs may be 
substantial, as it is for tea (see Chapter 4). In 
addition, data on costs of cultivation are 
often scanty even for the major crops. There 
are many demands on the small group of 
trained and experienced research personnel 
able to go out and collect the data. Guesses 
have to be made about the physical quanti-
ties of inputs used in production, so that 
estimates like the DRC are accurate for 
single locations at best and have a wide 
margin of error. 
A second problem with the DRC and EPC 
is that ranking commodities by their export 
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potential for a given level of technology may 
be of limited usefulness if there is potential 
for rapid technological change. In Africa, 
estimates of potential yields using currently 
available technology are often much higher 
than actual yields, whereas in Asia potential 
yields are only slightly higher than actual 
yields.18 Thus, a given policy intervention to 
increase fertilizer use, seed quality, or mar-
keting channels can dramatically change 
average yields used for DRC estimates in a 
short time. Similarly, changes in technology 
in processing or transport sectors can dra-
matically alter the DRC. For example, trucks 
may be substituted for bullocks in transport-
ing sugarcane, or facilities for the bulk 
handling of grains may be introduced. The 
DRC, then, has to be qualified by state-of-
technology assumptions. 
A third problem with the DRC is the diffi-
culty of accurately measuring the social 
opportunity cost of resources. As Bruno 
points out, in Israel, "in actual government 
practice, and in the absence of better infor-
mation, labor was usually valued at its 
market price, capital was imputed at a fixed 
rate of interest based mainly on the estimated 
marginal cost of foreign borrowing—" 1 9 In 
practice, the World Bank also advises con-
sultants to use market prices for labor and 
capital as a surrogate.20 Whereas such ap-
proximations may provide reliable estimates 
for Israel, where unemployment is low and 
capital markets are relatively developed, 
they may not hold up so well in Africa. Given 
the lack of data for accurate confirmation of 
the true seasonal opportunity cost of labor 
in different regions or any objective measure 
of the opportunity cost of capital, in con-
junction with the lack of physical input 
coefficients, there is no way to obtain ac-
curate estimates of DRC or EPC coefficients 
for most commodities in Kenya. 
Methodology 
This paper uses a disaggregated form of 
the nominal protection coefficient (NPC). 
For a number of commod5ties not being 
exported as a result of the government's ban 
on food exports, the coefficient is 1.0 or less 
than 1.0, so there is negative protection. The 
methodology used is similar to that of the 
NPC21 and is based on a comparison of the 
domestic price at the border with the export 
parity price, also at the border, although 
there is no attempt to introduce a shadow 
rate of exchange. 
NPCj = P?/Pj\ (1) 
where 
NPCj = nominal protection coefficient of the 
ith commodity; 
Pf = domestic price of the ith commodity 
at the border (f.o.b.); and 
P^ = export parity price of the ith com-
modity, with the export parity price 
being the international market price 
in the market under study multi-
plied by the official rate of exchange, 
less import tariffs, and less freight 
and insurance costs. 
The next step is to disaggregate both the 
domestic price and the export parity price so 
that each of the major cost components can 
be examined separately. Given the importance 
of processing costs, transport costs, mar-
keting margins, and indirect taxes in the 
domestic price, the numerator can be ex-
panded as: 
Pf = Pf + Ri + Ui + M i + T?, (2) 
where 
Pf = price received by the farmer for a unit 
of the ith commodity; 
Ri = processing cost of a unit of the ith com-
modity; 
Uj = domestic transport and handling costs 
(both road and rail) for the ith com-
modity, including interest charges for 
the period the crop is in transit from 
farm to port; 
18 Collinson, "Technological Potentials for Food Production," pp. 37-39. 
19 Michael Bruno, "Domestic Resource Costs and Effective Protection: Clarification and Synthesis," Journal of Political 
Economy 80 (January-February 1972): 22. 
20 Pasquale L. Scandizzo and Colin Bruce, Methodologies for Measuring Agricultural Price Intervention Effects. World Bank 
Staff Working Paper 394 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980), p. 16. 
21 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
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Mj = marketing margin for a unit of the ith 
commodity; and 
Tf = direct and indirect taxes paid in pro-
duction, processing, and transport of 
the ith commodity. 
Mj can be estimated as a residual by re-
writing equation (2) as: 
M i = P f - ( P f + Ri + Ui + Tf ) . (3) 
In different situations each of these cost 
components can be a large proportion of the 
domestic price. Bates estimates a marketing 
margin coefficient (mj), although he does 
not define this formally, which seems to show 
marketing margins as a proportion of the 
export parity price:22 
m, = M,/Pj\ (4) 
Although these margins are sometimes ig-
nored in calculating the NPC on the grounds 
that they are likely to be small23 Bates argues 
that they can represent up to half the export 
parity price 24 which is confirmed by analysis 
in this report. 
The transport component may also be 
substantial. In many studies Pf and Pj3 are not 
adjusted for measurement at the same loca-
tion, so that the domestic transport com-
ponent is not taken into account. For agri-
cultural commodities that are bulky and 
perishable, this may significantly bias the 
results. On the definition ui = Uj/Pj5, this 
analysis estimates umaize = 0.35, that is, 35 
percent of the domestic border price for 
maize is the internal transport and handling 
cost from farm to port. 
The denominator of equation (1) can also 
be decomposed into its major constituent 
parts. 
P? = Pf - F, - D, - I,. (5) 
where 
Pf = price in the export market under study 
for the ith commodity; 
Fj = freight cost of the ith commodity to the 
market under study; 
Dj = tariffs on the ith commodity in the mar-
ket under study; and 
Ij = insurance costs for the ith commodity 
in transit to the market under study. 
A second subscript j, where j = 1, . . . , n 
could be added to identity (5) for different 
markets 1 n, as each of the variables in 
the identity refers to prices and costs in a 
specific market. 
In practice the export parity price is dif-
ficult to estimate. The relevant price for analy-
sis of export potential over the medium term 
is the expected price in base-year terms for 
the specific commodity in the specific market 
being considered. This should be compared 
with trends in prices of major competing 
crops in those markets, but it is difficult to 
obtain reliable price projections even for the 
specific commodities being studied. How-
ever, some attempt is made to examine the 
probable trend in international prices and 
the major factors likely to affect that price 
for each commodity considered. 
The insurance costs were not included 
in the analysis, as they generally represent 
less than 1 percent of the export parity prices. 
Freight costs, however, are an important de-
terminant of the export parity price. For 
example, prices of chilled meat by airfreight 
in the Gulf States have both different export 
parity prices and freight costs than frozen 
meat by refrigerated seafreight to the same 
market. 
Thus, the NPC is used in the analysis in its 
expanded form, 
NPQ = (Pf + Rj + + Mj + Tj)/ 
(Pf - F, - D, - I,). (6) 
After calculating the NPC, the next step 
is to relax the restrictive assumption of fixed 
technology and costs in production. Specifi-
cally, the analysis examines the potential to 
raise farmers' net returns by increasing 
22 Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1981). 
23 For example, see Scandizzo and Bruce, Methodologies for Measuring Agricultural Price Intervention Effects, p. 13. 
24 Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa, pp. 137-145. 
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production or by lowering input prices at 
the farm gate. The latter may be achieved 
either by reducing marketing margins in the 
input distribution network or by reducing 
indirect taxation on agricultural inputs. 
Disaggregation of the NPC allows a focus 
on the major components of costs, which is 
advantageous in a policy context. Because 
of limitations of time in studying such a 
wide range of commodities, it was not pos-
sible to examine every parameter in equation 
(6), but only those that were deemed of 
greatest importance for the specific com-
modity. Although the analysis is partial, 
some generalizations are possible based on 
a comparative study of the export potential 
of a number of different commodities. 
The analysis, then, follows this sequence. 
First, export parity prices net of freight costs 
are compared with domestic border prices. 
Then the major factors governing the do-
mestic border price are examined, and the 
potential to lower processing, transport, and 
marketing margins is analyzed. Finally the 
potential to lower producer costs by lowering 
input costs or by shifting the production 
function through technological change is 
considered. 
The analysis is limited to just eight agri-
cultural commodities. Development of these 
exports over the medium term will require 
substantial resource allocations to agricul-
ture, with some negative consequences for 
other parts of the economy. In particular, 
the study recognizes the importance of 
manpower training to provide the personnel 
required for agricultural research and the 
administration of the marketing system. 
There will also be a substantial need for 
working capital at the farm level to raise 
yields, using presently available technology. 
Given the high rate of return on that working 
capital and the rapidity with which such 
returns can be realized on investment in 
agricultural inputs, the working capital needs 
are probably not a significant constraint. 
The report does not attempt to examine the 
intersectoral resource allocation implica-
tions of an agricultural-based export strategy, 
but only whether a range of commodities 
with export potential exists and which of the 
commodities shows the greatest potential. 
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4 
POTENTIAL MARKETS AMONG THE OIL EXPORTERS 
Selection of Oil-Exporting 
Countries 
There are four main reasons why the oil 
exporters were selected for the study: in-
crease in demand, geographical proximity, 
ecological similarities, and hard currency 
payments. 
The 1978 oil price increases passed as 
much as 1 percent of gross world product 
from oil consumers to oil producers.25 Al-
though real oil prices cannot be expected to 
stay at 1978 levels, they are unlikely to de-
cline dramatically in the medium run.26 The 
increase in the revenues of the oil-exporting 
countries led to large increases in agricul-
tural imports, as governments distributed 
part of the increased revenues to lower-
income groups. From 1971-73 to 1976-78 
the volume of imports increased 300 to 800 
percent for most commodities. These rates 
of growth contrast sharply with growth rates 
in other markets. In the European Community 
(EC), for example, annual rates of growth of 
imports for 1970-80 were generally less than 
3 percent per year: beef rose 2.7 percent; 
coffee, 2.6 percent; and coarse grains, 0.1 
percent; while tea declined 1.1 percent; 
wheat, 1.1 percent; and sugar, 3.7 percent.27 
Geographic proximity of markets is im-
portant owing to potential savings in freight 
costs for agricultural exports. Kenya has a 
marked freight-cost advantage over other 
suppliers because of its close proximity to oil 
exporters in North Africa and the Gulf States 
regions. This is especially important for 
products that must be airfreighted to maintain 
quality, such as chilled lamb or beef and 
fresh fruits and vegetables. 
Consumer preferences among types and 
grades of food products are often influenced 
by those locally available, which in turn are 
a consequence of the ecology of the region. 
Thus, consumers in the Middle East may 
prefer mangoes to apples and pay a premium 
for lean sheep raised under arid conditions 
over fat New Zealand lambs. This gives de-
veloping* country producers some competi-
tive advantage over Western suppliers in 
developing-country markets. 
Many of the oil-exporting countries have 
convertible currencies, whereas trade with 
most other developing countries has to 
overcome tough import restrictions. This 
makes the oil exporters a much easier market 
for Kenya to develop. As developing coun-
tries often do not give import licenses for 
high-value agricultural commodities, trade 
between developing countries can only take 
place on a bilateral basis. For example, an 
exchange of Kenyan pulses for Indian rice 
would require a bilateral agreement, as 
import restrictions in both countries would 
not permit allocation of hard currency for 
these products. There appears to be great 
potential for such exchanges. 
Bilateral "soft currency" trade, however, 
depends on complex bureaucratic agree-
ments rather than markets. This has obvious 
disadvantages. It is impossible to restrict 
bilateral trade to commodities that are not 
traded in hard currency markets, and the 
impact of additional demand on domestic 
prices is bound to affect resource alloca-
tions at the farm level. The negotiation and 
monitoring of agreements requires the most 
scarce resource in African countries—highly 
trained and experienced manpower. Thus, 
this trade tends to encourage personal op-
portunism, especially in countries that have 
not yet developed internal audit systems to 
provide effective accountability. Finally, 
bilateral agreements fail to provide the 
seller with the flexibility to import exactly 
what he wants from where he wants. Al-
25 Economist. March 6, 1982, p. 12. 
26 World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. World Bank Report 814/82, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C. 
World Bank, 1982). 
27 Ibid. 
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though Deepak Nayyar concludes that bi-
lateral trade agreements on the whole were 
beneficial for India,28 it is doubtful if they 
would be for Kenya despite their apparent 
trade-expanding potential. Thus, there are 
significant advantages to focusing expansion 
of trade on those developing countries with 
convertible currencies. 
Only those oil-exporting countries that 
offer special potential as markets for Kenya's 
exports are analyzed. The oil-exporting coun-
tries of Latin America were excluded because 
of the high freight costs and because broader 
cultural and economic factors make them 
more likely to favor trade with the United 
States or other Latin American countries. In 
1980, the year for which most recent data are 
available, Kenya's exports to the whole of 
Latin America constituted only 1.4 percent 
of total exports.29 The U.S.S.R. was also 
excluded because it is geographically dis-
tant, and trade links at present are negli-
gible. Thus, the oil-exporting countries con-
sidered in this analysis are the Gulf States of 
Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; Nigeria 
and Gabon in West Africa; Libya and Algeria 
in North Africa; Iran; and Indonesia. 
The Gulf States are geographically close 
to Kenya, and common political interests 
vis-a-vis the Western and Eastern blocs may 
assist in developing markets in this area. 
Angola and Egypt were excluded because 
they export so little oil. Kenya developed 
significant trade with Iran prior to its current 
political difficulties, and with its relatively 
large population of 40 million, it is likely to 
again become a major market in the future. 
Indonesia is also a country with potential as 
a trade partner because it has a large popu-
lation of more than 150 million; it is indus-
trializing rapidly; and, as a consequence, it 
is generating a rapidly growing demand for 
certain food items.30 
Agricultural Imports of the 
Oil Exporters 
Selection of Commodities and Data Sources 
All commodities listed in the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) trade data were examined for 
the selected oil-exporting countries. Any 
commodity with a total import value to 
those countries of more than U.S. $180 mil-
lion in 1978—more than 2 percent of total 
agricultural imports to the selected coun-
tries—was considered a major item. Other 
commodities were grouped as "other items" 
within each of the seven major commodity 
categories (see Table 2). 
The structure of Kenya's exports was 
analyzed on the basis of the Annual Trade 
Report, prepared by the Ministry of Finance. 
These were complemented by individual 
commodity and country studies where these 
were available, particularly for commodities 
where international marketing constraints 
were a major factor inhibiting export growth. 
Several studies have been carried out on the 
Middle East markets, both for specific com-
modities31 and for Kenya's export potential 
to those markets.32 However, these studies 
do not consider domestic supply constraints 
in Kenya and tend to examine short-term 
rather than long-term potential. 
The first step of the analysis is to examine 
the structure of demand in 1978 for all agri-
cultural products in the oil-exporting coun-
tries selected for the study. This shows the 
relative importance of different commodity 
groups in total agricultural imports of these 
countries after adjustment to the first major 
oil price increase. Price trends for a number 
of major commodities were examined for 
the period 1975-81 to see if the use of 1978 
would bring distortions into the analysis. 
28 Deepak Nayyar, India's Exports and Export Policies in the 1960's (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
29 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 1981. 
30 International Food Policy Research Institute, Food Needs of Developing Countries, Projections of Production and 
Consumption to 1990, Research Report 3 (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 1977), especially p. 77. 
31 See, for example, International Trade Centre, The Market for Fresh Horticultural Products in Selected Gulf Countries 
(Geneva: ITC, 1980); and the Arab Organization of Agricultural Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, "The Market for Livestock and Meat in the Arabian Peninsula and the Role of Supplies from 
Neighboring African Surplus Regions," FAO Near East Regional Office, Cairo, November 1979 (mimeographed). 
32 Industrial Market Research, The Potential for Increasing Kenyan Exports to Selected Middle East Countries (London: IMR, 
1980). 
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Table 2—Major and minor items imported by selected oil-exporting countries, by 
commodity group, 1978 




Beverages and spices 
Dairy products 
Oilseed products 
Fruit and vegetables 
Nonfood agricultural products 
Other itemsd 
Wheat, rice, maize, and barley 
Total raw sugar equivalent 
Beef products,3 live sheep and 
goats, fresh meat and poultry 
Tea, coffee, and cocoa 
Dry milk, condensed and 
evaporated milk, butter, and 
cheese and curds 
Soybeans and soybean oil 
Oranges, tangerines and Clem-
entines, and apples 
Wool, tobacco, cotton, 
and natural rubber 
Hops, honey, and forestry 
products 
Rye, oats, malt, and bran milling 
products 
Dried meat, pig products, offal , eggs, 
animal fats and oils, and frozen meatb 
Pepper, pimento, and vanilla 
Coconut and palm products, sun-
flower oil, cottonseed oil, ground-
nuts and groundnut oil, sesame, 
olive oil, oilseed cakes, and 
margarine0 
Bananas, lemons and limes, 
pears, grapes, raisins, 
other citrus, onions, 
potatoes, and tomatoes 
Jute, sisal, silk, castor oil, 
linseed, and linseed oil 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
Notes: Major items are those commodities that made up more than 2 percent of the imports of the oil-exporting 
countries in 1978; these imports had values exceeding U.S. $186 million. Imports of the minor items were 
less than that. 
The selected oil-exporting countries include the Gulf States of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria, Gabon, Libya, Algeria, Iran, and Indonesia. 
a Beef products include fresh bovine meat, live bovine cattle, canned meat and prepared meat. This assumes that 
both canned and prepared meat are primarily beef products. 
b The quantity of frozen meat not falling into other specific categories is extremely small. 
c Margarine is assumed to be based primarily on oilseeds. 
d The commodities in this category do not fit any of the other categories easily. 
Oilseeds, and perhaps rice, may appear 
slightly more important than is warranted by 
the long-term trend, whereas the prices of 
sugar, wheat, and perhaps cotton may be 
below the long-term trend. In general, how-
ever, 1978 does not seem to have been a year 
of unusual price distortions.33 
The rate of growth in demand from just 
before the first oil price shock to just before 
the second shock is then considered. Spe-
cifically, the period 1971-73 is compared 
with the period 1976-78, when the major 
part of the adjustment to the first increase in 
oil prices had taken place. Unfortunately, 
data are not yet available nor has the adjust-
ment process proceeded far enough to see 
the impact on demand generated by the 
second major increase in oil prices from the 
end of 1978 to early 1981. Rates of growth 
for each commodity during the period 1965-
78 were not estimated, although data are 
available, because the data show a major 
discontinuity between the early 1970s and 
the late 1970s for most products in most of 
the oil-exporting countries. The increase in 
foreign exchange availability after the first 
oil price increase led to a large increase in 
food imports. 
33 World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends, pp. 31-79, 88-89. 
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Major Import Categories 
Out of a total of U.S. $9.3 billion in agricul-
tural imports in 1978, almost $9 billion or 97 
percent were food products; nonfood items 
were only 3 percent of these imports (Table 3). 
Analysis of the major commodities im-
ported into this group of countries is shown 
in Table 3. Cereals, mainly rice and wheat, 
were by far the largest item, amounting to 
nearly 36 percent of total imports. Meat 
products came after cereals: the largest 
single meat product was beef, followed by 
sheep and goats and fresh poultry meat. 
Imports of sheep and goat meat were slightly 
greater in value than imports of live sheep 
and goats. 
After meat, sugar, milk products, and oil-
seed products were almost equal. Each of 
these constituted imports into the selected 
countries of about $ 1 billion in 1978 or about 
10 percent of total imports. Milk products 
were primarily dry, condensed, and evaporated 
milk rather than butter and cheese. The chief 
oilseed products were soya beans and soya 
oil, but imports of other oilseeds, including 
groundnuts, sunflower, sesame, and cotton-
seed combined were considerably larger than 
soya products. 
Beverages made up 5 percent and hor-
ticultural crops 4 percent of total imports in 
1978. Coffee and tea were the most important 
beverages with a total value of more than 
$400 million. However, the high price of 
cof fee in 1978, following the Brazilian frost 
of 1977, somewhat exaggerates its long-term 
value. The major horticultural products were 
citrus fruits and apples. Of the nonfood 
items, the most important were cotton, wool, 
tobacco, and rubber. 
Size of the Market 
Table 4 shows that the Gulf States con-
stituted approximately a third of the total 
market of the selected countries. For individ-
ual countries, the largest four—each with 
imports of more than $ 1 billion—were Nigeria, 
Algeria, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia. 
For all regions except Iran, cereals were 
the most important item, constituting more 
than half of total imports for West Africa 
and Indonesia, but only about a third for 
North Africa and the Gulf States (Table 5). 
Among the cereals, rice was by far the largest 
item for West Africa, Indonesia, and Iran, 
whereas wheat was most important for North 
Table 3—Value of agricultural com-
modities imported by selected 
oil-exporting countries, 1978 
Value Percent 
of of Total 
Commodity Imports Imports 
(U.S. $ million) 
Cereals 3,376 36.3 





Other cereal products 60 
Meat products 1,932 20.8 
Beef products (live bovine, 
fresh, chilled, and frozen) 822 
Live sheep and goats and 
sheep meat 545 
Fresh poultry meat 321 
Other animal products 244 
Sugar (total raw equivalent) 1,049 11.3 
Dairy products 942 10.1 
Dry milk 302 
Condensed and evaporated 
milk 291 
Butter 170 
Cheese and curds 179 
Oilseed products 907 9.7 
Soybeans and soybean oil 327 
Other oilseed products 580 
Beverages and spices 476 5.1 
Cocoa products 10 
Tea 187 
Cof fee 262 
Spices 17 
Fruit and vegetables 312 3.3 
Oranges and tangerines 106 
Apples 83 
Other fruit and vegetables 123 
Nonfood agricultural products 315 3.4 
Wool 103 
Tobacco 41 
Natural rubber 23 
Cotton 138 
Other 10 
Total 9,309 100.0 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
Notes: The selected oil-exporting countries include 
the Gulf States of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
and Nigeria, Gabon, Libya, Algeria, Iran, and 
Indonesia. 
Africa and the Gulf States. Meat, including 
live animals, constituted a quarter of the 
total agricultural imports for the Gulf States 
and 21 percent for Iran, but less than 10 
percent of imports for North and West African 
countries. Sugar was a major import item in 
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Table 4—Shares of selected oil-exporting 
countries and regions in total 
imports of agricultural com-
modities, 1978 
Value Each Region's 
of Share of 
Region/Country Imports Total Imports 
(U.S. $ million) (percent) 
Gulf States 3,150 33.8 
Saudi Arabia 1,327 
Iraq 802 
Kuwait 453 




Iran 1,923 20.7 
North Africa 1,640 17.6 
Algeria 1,199 
Libya 441 
West Africa 1,429 15.4 
Nigeria 1,391 
Gabon 38 
Indonesia 1,167 12.5 
Total 9,309 100.0 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
all the regions considered, with imports into 
each region valued at about $200 million in 
1978, or between 8 and 15 percent of their 
total agricultural imports. Dairy products 
were also a major import item in all areas, 
especially West and North Africa and the 
Gulf States. Oilseed imports were larger than 
imports of dairy products for Iran and North 
Africa, but of less importance in West Africa, 
which largely produces its own oilseed 
crops, and in the Gulf States with relatively 
small populations. Fruit and vegetables were 
6 percent of total agricultural imports into 
the Gulf States and Iran, but of little signifi-
cance in other areas. Only in Indonesia and 
Iran did nonfood agricultural commodities 
make up more than 5 percent of total agri-
cultural imports in 1978. 
Import Demand for Individual 
Commodities 
For rice, the major import demand is from 
Indonesia, with 36 percent of total imports, 
and West Africa, with 26 percent (Table 5). 
For other cereals, mainly wheat, the major 
areas of demand are the Gulf States and 
North Africa, each of which takes a third of 
the total. The value of import demand for 
sugar is split almost evenly between the f ive 
regions, whereas the demand for both beef 
and sheep and goats (live and meat) is highly 
concentrated in the Gulf States and Iran. 
Imports of beverages and spices are also 
highly concentrated with 43 percent in the 
Gulf States and 43 percent in North Africa. 
There are imports of dairy products in all the 
regions, but they are twice as large in the 
Gulf States as in any other area; they are also 
Table 5—Values of agricultural commodities imported by selected oil-exporting 
countries, by commodity group and region, 1978 
Commodity Group West Africa North Africa Gulf States Iran Indonesia Total 
(U.S. ! 6 million) 
Cereals (excluding rice) 327 568 572 182 97 1,746 
Rice 423 18 347 250 592 1,630 
Sugar 202 207 234 233 173 1,049 
Dairy products 193 179 364 145 61 942 
Oilseed products 95 202 193 322 95 907 
Beef products3 117 71 472 160 6 822 
Sheep and goats 6 44 271 224 545 
Beverages and spices 2 207 202 63 2 476 
Nonfood agricultural 
products 5 53 12 115 130 315 
Fruit and vegetables 33 158 110 11 312 
Total 1,370 1,582 2,825 1,804 1,167 8,744 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
3 Includes fresh bovine meat as well as chilled and frozen meat. 
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substantial in both North and West Africa. 
All regions also imported oilseeds in 1978, 
with the major areas of demand being Iran, 
36 percent; North Africa, 22 percent; and the 
Gulf States, 21 percent. For fruit and vege-
tables, almost half the demand in value was 
in the Gulf States, with Iran the other major 
importer at 35 percent. Almost 80 percent of 
the nonfood agricultural imports go to In-
donesia and Iran. 
The increase in the volume of imports for 
various products from 1971-73 to 1976-78 
for all these regions taken together is shown 
in Table 6. The largest increases were for 
meat products—poultry, beef, and sheep 
meat all increased five times or more. Soya 
products and oranges and tangerines in-
creased three to four times. Imports of some 
dairy products, such as butter and cheese, 
nearly trebled. Imports of rice, barley, coffee, 
sugar, and live sheep and goats all approxi-
mately doubled. Imports of tea and cocoa 
showed relatively modest increases of 25 to 
40 percent. Among nonfood items, the largest 
increases were for cotton, which increased 
two and a half times, and wool, which 
doubled. 
Growth of Demand by Region 
and Commodity 
The percentage increase in the volume 
of imports for each commodity in each region 
for 1971-73 to 1976-78 is shown in Table 7. 
Taking the major commodities first, the 
main increases in wheat imports were in 
West Africa and the Gulf States, where 
imports doubled during this period. Increases 
in rice imports were substantial in West Africa 
and Iran, but also large in the Gulf States, 
where they almost doubled, and in Indonesia. 
Maize imports, starting from a small base 
and used mainly as livestock feed except in 
West Africa, more than trebled. Imports of 
beef products, of much greater importance, 
also showed a large increase in all regions. 
In contrast, the increase in imports of live 
bovine animals and live sheep and goats 
was concentrated mainly in Iran, whereas 
fresh poultry imports increased dramatically 
in all areas except North Africa. Tea imports 
increased between 50 and 100 percent in all 
regions except North Africa, while North 
Africa was the only region to register a large 
increase in cof fee imports. The increase in 
the imports of dairy products is remarkable, 
as it affects all products in all regions, with 
Table 6—Increase in the volume of se-
lected agricultural commod-
ities imported by selected oil-
exporting countries, 1971-73 
and 1976-78 
Commodity 1971-73 1976-78 Increase 
(1,000 metric tons) (percent) 
Cereals 
Wheat 3,998 6,810 70 
Rice 1,480 3,299 123 
Maize 208 799 284 
Barley 391 816 109 
Sugar 1,235 2,321 88 
Meat products 
Beef (fresh, 
chilled, and frozen) 14 106 637 
Sheep meat (fresh, 
chilled, and frozen) 17 104 500 
Fresh poultry 26 192 649 
Beverages 
Cocoa 3 3 25 
Tea 62 85 37 
Cof fee 30 61 104 
Dairy products 
Dried milk 80 188 136 
Condensed and 
evaporated milk 143 286 100 
Butter 32 89 175 
Cheese and curds 23 87 190 
Soybeans and 
soybean oil 111 404 265 
Fruit 
Oranges and 
tangerines 101 348 245 
Apples 88 166 89 
Nonfood agricultural 
products 
Wool 14 29 98 
Tobacco 17 25 52 
Natural rubber 26 18 - 3 0 
Cotton 36 86 140 
Pulses 66 121 83 
(1,000 head) 
Live bovine cattle 404 339 -16 
Live sheep and goats 3,681 6,739 83 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
Note: The selected oil-exporting countries include 
the Gulf States of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
and Nigeria, Gabon, Libya, Algeria, Iran, and 
Indonesia. The increase indicated may differ 
from the figures given because of rounding. 
increases varying between 45 and 450 percent 
depending on the product and the region. 
Only the imports for cheese and curds show 
a more dramatic increase than this. In 
contrast to milk products, growth of imports 
of soya products was confined to Indonesia 
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Table 4—Shares of selected oil-exporting 
countries and regions in total 
imports of agricultural com-
modities, 1978 
Value Each Region's 
of Share of 
Region/Country Imports Total Imports 
(U.S. $ million) (percent) 
Gulf States 3,150 33.8 
Saudi Arabia 1,327 
Iraq 802 
Kuwait 453 




Iran 1,923 20.7 
North Africa 1,640 17.6 
Algeria 1,199 
Libya 441 
West Africa 1,429 15.4 
Nigeria 1,391 
Gabon 38 
Indonesia 1,167 12.5 
Total 9,309 100.0 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
all the regions considered, with imports into 
each region valued at about $200 million in 
1978, or between 8 and 15 percent of their 
total agricultural imports. Dairy products 
were also a major import item in all areas, 
especially West and North Africa and the 
Gulf States. Oilseed imports were larger than 
imports of dairy products for Iran and North 
Africa, but of less importance in West Africa, 
which largely produces its own oilseed 
crops, and in the Gulf States with relatively 
small populations. Fruit and vegetables were 
6 percent of total agricultural imports into 
the Gulf States and Iran, but of little signifi-
cance in other areas. Only in Indonesia and 
Iran did nonfood agricultural commodities 
make up more than 5 percent of total agri-
cultural imports in 1978. 
Import Demand for Individual 
Commodities 
For rice, the major import demand is from 
Indonesia, with 36 percent of total imports, 
and West Africa, with 26 percent (Table 5). 
For other cereals, mainly wheat, the major 
areas of demand are the Gulf States and 
North Africa, each of which takes a third of 
the total. The value of import demand for 
sugar is split almost evenly between the five 
regions, whereas the demand for both beef 
and sheep and goats (live and meat) is highly 
concentrated in the Gulf States and Iran. 
Imports of beverages and spices are also 
highly concentrated with 43 percent in the 
Gulf States and 43 percent in North Africa. 
There are imports of dairy products in all the 
regions, but they are twice as large in the 
Gulf States as in any other area; they are also 
Table 5—Values of agricultural commodities imported by selected oil-exporting 
countries, by commodity group and region, 1978 
Commodity Group West Africa North Africa Gulf States Iran Indonesia Total 
(U.S. $ million) 
Cereals (excluding rice) 327 568 572 182 97 1,746 
Rice 423 18 347 250 592 1,630 
Sugar 202 207 234 233 173 1,049 
Dairy products 193 179 364 145 61 942 
Oilseed products 95 202 193 322 95 907 
Beef products3 117 71 472 160 6 822 
Sheep and goats 6 44 271 224 545 
Beverages and spices 2 207 202 63 2 476 
Nonfood agricultural 
products 5 53 12 115 130 315 
Fruit and vegetables 33 158 110 11 312 
Total 1,370 1,582 2,825 1,804 1,167 8,744 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
a Includes fresh bovine meat as well as chilled and frozen meat. 
2 4 
substantial in both North and West Africa. 
All regions also imported oilseeds in 1978, 
with the major areas of demand being Iran, 
36 percent; North Africa, 22 percent; and the 
Gulf States, 21 percent. For fruit and vege-
tables, almost half the demand in value was 
in the Gulf States, with Iran the other major 
importer at 35 percent. Almost 80 percent of 
the nonfood agricultural imports go to In-
donesia and Iran. 
The increase in the volume of imports for 
various products from 1971-73 to 1976-78 
for all these regions taken together is shown 
in Table 6. The largest increases were for 
meat products—poultry, beef, and sheep 
meat all increased five times or more. Soya 
products and oranges and tangerines in-
creased three to four times. Imports of some 
dairy products, such as butter and cheese, 
nearly trebled. Imports of rice, barley, coffee, 
sugar, and live sheep and goats all approxi-
mately doubled. Imports of tea and cocoa 
showed relatively modest increases of 25 to 
40 percent. Among nonfood items, the largest 
increases were for cotton, which increased 
two and a half times, and wool, which 
doubled. 
Growth of Demand by Region 
and Commodity 
The percentage increase in the volume 
of imports for each commodity in each region 
for 1971 -73 to 1976-78 is shown in Table 7. 
Taking the major commodities first, the 
main increases in wheat imports were in 
West Africa and the Gulf States, where 
imports doubled during this period. Increases 
in rice imports were substantial in West Africa 
and Iran, but also large in the Gulf States, 
where they almost doubled, and in Indonesia. 
Maize imports, starting from a small base 
and used mainly as livestock feed except in 
West Africa, more than trebled. Imports of 
beef products, of much greater importance, 
also showed a large increase in all regions. 
In contrast, the increase in imports of live 
bovine animals and live sheep and goats 
was concentrated mainly in Iran, whereas 
fresh poultry imports increased dramatically 
in all areas except North Africa. Tea imports 
increased between 50 and 100 percent in all 
regions except North Africa, while North 
Africa was the only region to register a large 
increase in cof fee imports. The increase in 
the imports of dairy products is remarkable, 
as it affects all products in all regions, with 
Table 6—Increase in the volume of se-
lected agricultural commod-
ities imported by selected oil-
exporting countries, 1971-73 
and 1976-78 
Commodity 1971-73 1976-78 Increase 
(1,000 metric tons) (percent) 
Cereals 
Wheat 3,998 6,810 70 
Rice 1,480 3,299 123 
Maize 208 799 284 
Barley 391 816 109 
Sugar 1,235 2,321 88 
Meat products 
Beef (fresh, 
chilled, and frozen) 14 106 637 
Sheep meat (fresh, 
chilled, and frozen) 17 104 500 
Fresh poultry 26 192 649 
Beverages 
Cocoa 3 3 25 
Tea 62 85 37 
Cof fee 30 61 104 
Dairy products 
Dried milk 80 188 136 
Condensed and 
evaporated milk 143 286 100 
Butter 32 89 175 
Cheese and curds 23 87 190 
Soybeans and 
soybean oil 111 404 265 
Fruit 
Oranges and 
tangerines 101 348 245 
Apples 88 166 89 
Nonfood agricultural 
products 
Woo l 14 29 98 
Tobacco 17 25 52 
Natural rubber 26 18 -30 
Cotton 36 86 140 
Pulses 66 121 83 
(1,000 head) 
Live bovine cattle 404 339 -16 
Live sheep and goats 3,681 6,739 83 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
Note: The selected oil-exporting countries include 
the Gulf States of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
and Nigeria, Gabon, Libya, Algeria, Iran, and 
Indonesia. The increase indicated may differ 
from the figures given because of rounding. 
increases varying between 45 and 450 percent 
depending on the product and the region. 
Only the imports for cheese and curds show 
a more dramatic increase than this. In 
contrast to milk products, growth of imports 
of soya products was confined to Indonesia 
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Table 7—Percentage increase in the volume of imports, by commodity and oil-
exporting region, 1971-73 to 1976-78 
Commodity Gulf States North Africa West Africa Iran Indonesia Total 
(percent) 
Cereals 
Wheat 116 78 132 26 26 70 
Rice 92 28 8,974 729 65 123 
Maize 205 442 932 267 356 284 
Barley 96 41 221 109 
Sugar 28 51 174 164 318 88 
Meat products 
Beef (fresh, chilled, and frozen) 531 286 1,978 938 312 632 
Sheep meat (fresh, chilled, 
and frozen) 300 489 195 499 388 
Fresh poultry 623 6,714 2,023 348 649 
Live bovine cattle 187 1,221 
Live sheep and goats 49 614 83 
Beverages 
Cocoa 57 1,023 25 
Tea 46 62 96 54 37 
Cof fee 283 232 104 
Dairy products 
Dried milk 166 274 77 187 73 136 
Condensed and evaporated milk 150 69 112 465 136 100 
Butter 170 152 334 153 353 175 
Cheese and curds 162 157 128 1,806 43 190 
Soybeans and soybean oil 49 128 65,795 265 
Fruit 
Oranges and tangerines 62 25 1,018 907 245 
Apples 52 134 1,430 18 89 
Nonfood agricultural products 
Wool 117 98 
Tobacco 46 29 118 72 52 
Natural rubber 14 1,733 
Cotton 50 188 140 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
and Iran, which were also the countries with 
the most rapid increase in imports of fruit. 
In sum, three important conclusions for 
defining Kenya's agricultural export strategy 
emerge. First, 97 percent of agricultural im-
ports into the selected oil-exporting coun-
tries in 1978 were food or beverage products. 
Thus, to increase agricultural exports to 
these countries will require that Kenya in-
crease exports of coffee and tea or food prod-
ucts in competition with domestic demand. 
Second, there is a large and rapidly rising 
demand among the oil-exporting countries 
for a range of labor-intensive products, 
including coffee, poultry, sugar, and dairy 
products. There is also a large and rising 
demand for products that require extensive 
land use, particularly beef, sheep and goat 
meat, and fruit. Because Kenya has areas 
suitable for both intensive and extensive 
cropping, Kenya can seek to expand exports 
for both groups of commodities. 
And third, according to the dual criteria 
of a product being more than 10 percent of 
total agricultural imports and having rapid 
growth during the period 1971 -73 to 1976-78, 
the most promising products appear to be 
cereals (rice and wheat), beef, sheep and 
goats, dairy products, coffee, and oilseeds. 
Both maize and horticultural products showed 
very high rates of growth but started from a 
small base. Tea's share of total imports is 
small and it has not grown as rapidly as most 
other items. 
Kenyan Products with Potential 
for Oil-Exporter Markets 
In 1980, Kenya's exports to the oil-export-
ing countries were valued at KSh 232 million, 
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or 2.4 percent of total exports.34 In compari-
son, 40 percent of Kenya's total exports went 
to Western Europe and 17 percent to neigh-
boring African countries. The more important 
markets for Kenya among the oil exporters 
in 1980 were Saudi Arabia, with imports of 
KSh 50 million; the United Arab Emirates, 
KSh 38 million; and Nigeria, Oman, Iraq, and 
Iran, which each imported between KSh 20 
million and KSh 35 million. Exports to Algeria 
and Libya together were only K Sh 3.4 million. 
Exports to Iran clearly declined after 1976 
because of its political upheavals. Exports 
to Nigeria and Indonesia began and have 
grown rapidly during the last f ive years, but 
they are still a small part of Kenya's total do-
mestic exports. A study of total imports of 
the Gulf States in 1978 showed that Kenyan 
products were less than 1 percent of total 
imports in that year in each of the six coun-
tries studied. Only in the case of cof fee to 
Kuwait did Kenya have a market share of 
more than 10 percent for any product in any 
of the countries studied 35 
Agricultural products make up a smaller 
share of exports to oil-exporting countries 
than their share in Kenya's total exports: 
during the period 1970-80 Kenya primarily 
exported nonagricultural products to the oil-
exporting countries. Kenyan exports to the 
seven major importers (Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, 
Nigeria, and Indonesia) had a value of KSh 191 
million in 1980. More than 70 percent of 
these exports were nonagricultural products. 
The major items were cement (KSh 23 mil-
lion) and kraft paper (KSh 8 million). Another 
22 percent was cof fee and tea. Other agricul-
tural products constituted just 6 percent of 
total exports to those countries. 
Kenya's total domestic exports of most 
major agricultural commodities are small 
relative to the value of imports of those 
commodities into selected oil-exporting 
countries in 1978 (Table 8). The only products 
for which Kenya's total exports exceed the 
imports of the selected countries were cof fee 
and tea. For all other products except fruits, 
vegetables, and pulses, Kenya's total exports 
of the products constituted less than 5 per-
cent of the oil-exporting countries' imports 
in 1978. Therefore, except for coffee, tea, 
and perhaps some horticultural products, the 
key constraint to export expansion appears 
to lie on the supply side, rather than in limita-
tions of market size or market saturation. 
Even for cof fee and tea, the small market 
share suggests considerable scope for Kenya 
to increase exports. 
The present structure of Kenya's agricul-
tural exports is not well suited to the import 
demands of oil-exporting countries. Kenya's 
two chief exports, cof fee and tea, which to-
gether constitute less than 4 percent of the 
oil-exporting countries' agricultural imports, 
experienced slow growth rates in those coun-
tries relative to most other food products in 
the mid-1970s. Those agricultural imports 
that have risen rapidly in oil-exporting coun-
tries but are exported from Kenya only in 
small quantities include beef, sugar, and 
sheep and goat meat. Other commodities that 
Kenya does not export at all are rice, wheat, 
dairy products, and soya products. 
For further commodity analysis, this 
study focuses on those products that Kenya 
is already exporting, even if they do not 
appear to have the best prospects from the 
viewpoint of the selected countries' imports. 
This is for three reasons. First, the rate of 
growth of demand for all food commodities, 
even the slowest growing, in the oil-exporting 
countries is so high relative to demand 
growth for almost any commodity in other 
parts of the world that it is attractive for 
Kenyan exporters. Second, as already pointed 
out, Kenya's share of the market for all the 
products considered is so small at present 
that market share is unlikely to be a con-
straint, even for products for which imports 
are low or slow growing. Third, Kenya imports 
some of the products imported by oil-export-
ing countries, such as rice, wheat, and dairy 
products. To develop exports of these prod-
ucts will be a slow process as high rates of 
growth will be required even to bridge the 
domestic demand gap. For example, the 
National Food Policy Paper estimates that to 
reach self-sufficiency by 1989 will require 
annual compound rates of growth during 
34 The Kenyan shilling (KSh) was worth approximately U.S. $0.07 in December 1983. 
Export values are from Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise Department, Annual 
Trade Report. 1980 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1980). 
35 Industrial Market Research, The Potential for Increasing Kenyan Exports. 
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Table 8—Value of selected agricultural commodities exported by Kenya as a pro-
portion of imports by selected oil-exporting countries, 1976-78 
Average Value Average Value Kenya's Exports 
of Kenya's Exports of Imports by as a Percentage 
of Selected Oil-Exporting of Oil Exporters' 
Commodity Commodities Countries Imports 
(U.S. $ million) (percent) 
Cof fee 356.9 199.3 179 
Tea 140.9 133.9 105 
Fruit and vegetables 44.3 262.1 17 
Raw sugar 10.4 920.4 1 
Bovine meat (including live animals) 1.3 65.9 2 
Sheep and goat meat (including 
live animals) 210.5 
Cotton 2.5 120.2 2 
Oilseeds (excluding soybeans) 3.0 307.3 1 
Dairy products (milk, cheese, butter) 3.2 790.3 
Cereals 3.7 129.2 3 
Pulses 5.2 67.0a 8 
Sources: Data on Kenya's exports are from Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise 
Department, Annual Trade Report. 1976-78 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1976-78). Data on the imports of 
oil-exporting countries are from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Trade Yearbook 
Tape," Rome, 1978. Exchange rate data are taken from Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Develop-
ment, Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 1980 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1980), p. 43. 
Notes: The average exchange rate was U.S. $1 =KSh 7.89 for December 1975, December 1976, December 1977, and 
December 1978. 
The selected oil-exporting countries include the Gulf States of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria, Gabon, Libya, Algeria, Iran, and Indonesia. 
a This is for 1978 alone. 
the period 1980-89 of 14 percent for wheat 
flour, 16.4 percent for rice, and 5.6 percent 
for milk.36 
The eight largest agricultural export com-
modities from Kenya in the period 1976-78 
are examined. In order of importance, these 
are coffee, tea, fruit and vegetables, beef, 
sheep and goats, sugar, pulses, and maize. 
Meat is included but skins are not, because 
the market for skins is almost totally in 
Europe, whereas the demand for all kinds of 
meat is large and growing in the selected oil-
exporting countries. 
Some of the commodities included in 
this list are likely to cause surprise. For 
example, a 1977 study predicted that Kenya 
might be importing beef by the mid-1980s.37 
However, this study confirmed Kenya's ex-
port potential for beef, and small changes in 
the rate of growth of output would be suffi-
cient to generate significant export surpluses. 
Sheep and goat meat, which has never con-
stituted a significant export item, is another 
example. There has been rapid growth in pro-
duction, and a solid base has been laid for a 
large increase in flock productivity (see 
Chapter 6). Kenya also seems to have com-
parative advantage in maize production; the 
reasons why maize exports cause losses to 
the Treasury are analyzed in Chapter 7. 
Several agricultural products have been 
omitted that one might expect to find in-
cluded in a study of Kenya's agricultural 
export potential, notably dairy products, 
fresh poultry meat, cotton, and pyrethrum. 
Dairy products were omitted because Kenyan 
imports totaled K Sh 104 million in 1980, not 
counting concessional imports, and because 
domestic demand for the marketed surplus 
is rising rapidly as a result of a school milk 
36 Kenya, National Assembly, Sessional Papers. 1981. Paper No. 4, "National Food Policy," p. 49. 
37 This study was not accepted by the government, but is valuable as a source of data on the industry. Chemonics 
International, Consulting Division, "Livestock and Meat Industry Development Study, Final Report," Nairobi, March 
1977 (mimeographed). 
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scheme and urban population growth. Also, 
the growing surpluses of milk products in 
the European Community and other coun-
tries are likely to result in world prices 
substantially below production costs in the 
major producing countries. Exports of surplus 
milk products, subsidized by the European 
Community, may reach 7.56 million metric 
tons by 1985.38 Production of poultry meat 
has been discouraged by low domestic beef 
prices and the high costs of animal feed. 
Future potential, therefore, depends largely 
on policies adopted toward beef and maize. 
Cotton is not included because imports into 
oil-exporting countries other than Indonesia 
are negligible. Wool is not included because 
it is generally regarded as a by-product of 
meat production in Kenya, except for highly 
specialized products such as mohair from 
Angora goats.39 Pyrethrum is excluded be-
cause there is little demand for it in oil-
exporting countries. 
Each of the high-potential crops and 
animal products will now be examined in-
dividually to identify critical constraints on 
export growth, both in international markets 
and in domestic supply relations. 
38 All tons referred to in this report are metric tons. 
Timothy E. Josling, Mark Langworthy, and Scott Pearson, Options for Farm Policy in the European Community. Thames 
Essays 27 (London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1981), p. 69. 
39 A. John De Boer, Sheep and Goat Development Project. Kenya: Production Economics (Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations/United Nations Development Programme, 1981). 
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BEVERAGE EXPORTS: COFFEE AND TEA 
Coffee 
The International Market 
The volume and value of Kenya's cof fee 
exports from 1975/76 to 1979/80 are shown 
in Table 9. During this five-year period 
Kenya's exports to all nonquota markets, 
including the oil exporters, never exceeded 
6.8 percent of total exports in either volume 
or value, and they were as low as 1.7 percent 
in 1975/76. Kenya's exports to the selected 
oil-exporting countries made up about 1 per-
cent of its total exports in four out of five 
years. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia have been the two principal oil-
exporting countries importing Kenya's coffee. 
But even in Saudi Arabia, Kenya's share was 
only 13 percent of the value of total cof fee 
imports in 1977, compared with India's share 
of 65 percent.40 Coffee exports to the selected 
oil-exporting countries were sold for only 60 
percent of the overall average export price 
of cof fee in 1975/76 and 77 percent in 1976/ 
77, but in 1977/78 and 1978/79 they brought 
3 to 4 percent more than the average export 
price.41 However, this was before the reintro-
duction of quotas by the International Coffee 
Organization in 1982. 
Under the 1980 International Coffee 
Agreement, the main producing and con-
suming countries agreed to limit the volume 
of cof fee allowed to enter the main consum-
ing countries in order to maintain prices 
between specified limits. Each producing 
country is given a quota for its exports to 
these markets and must sell any surplus 
production to countries outside the agree-
ment. Kenya's quota, which is adjusted an-
nually, was about 70,000 tons in 1981 /82, so 
that Kenya has to sell the balance of its pro-
duction, about 20,000 tons a year, to non-
quota markets. This compares with average 
sales of only 3,250 tons per year to these mar-
kets during the period 1976-80. Nonquota 
markets include most OPEC countries, and 
also Eastern Europe, China, and other devel-
oping countries that do not produce coffee. 
Similar rates of increase are required by all 
the major coffee-producing countries. The 
alternative to nonquota market sales is 
domestic storage, which makes it difficult 
for the Coffee Board of Kenya to finance 
payment to producers. The intense competi-
tion for sales in nonquota markets means 
that average prices realized in these markets 
generally were 40 percent of those obtained 
in quota markets in 1981/82, although part 
of this differential is a consequence of the 
lower quality of cof fee sold to nonquota 
markets.42 Thus marginal revenue from ex-
panded cof fee production is substantially 
lower than average revenue. 
There are two main reasons for the low 
sales of cof fee in the past to oil-exporting 
countries. First, Kenya's cof fee is of particu-
larly high quality, and Western Europe and 
North America and other quota markets 
have been willing to pay a higher premium 
for quality than oil-exporting countries. 
Second, some countries, such as the Gulf 
States and Nigeria, have traditionally pur-
chased cof fee from neighboring countries, 
Ethiopia and the Ivory Coast. 
It is not clear whether the International 
Coffee Agreement is in Kenya's long-term 
interests. The opportunity costs of resources 
for Kenya's smallholders are probably lower 
than those of the Latin American estates. If 
this is so, then a price war with Latin America 
would probably be to Kenya's advantage in 
the long run, despite the high costs in the 
short run. Also, the freeze on new beverage 
projects by the World Bank is probably 
against the interests of Kenya and Africa 
generally. Kenya should press the multilateral 
agencies for a study to estimate how its 
40 Industrial Market Research, The Potential for Increasing Kenyan Exports. 
41 Cof fee Board of Kenya, Annual Report. Balance Sheets and Statement of Accounts, various issues (Nairobi: CBK, various 
years). 
42 Cof fee Board of Kenya, Annual Report. Balance Sheets and Statement of Accounts. 1982. pp. 14-15. 
3 0 




European Community 50,911 
European Free Trade Association3 14,458 




Oil-exporting countries 392 
Others0 950 
Total 1,342 
Total exports 80,565 
1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 
(metric tons) 
57,936 55,384 55,642 61,624 
11,315 10,728 10,243 12,575 
8,883 7,071 3,808 3,369 
3,672 4,564 1,715 1,469 
81,806 77,747 71,408 79,037 
703 942 659 874 
3,162 4,774 1,802 2,052 
3,865 5,716 2,461 2,926 
85,671 83,463 73,869 81,963 
Source: Co f fee Board of Kenya, Annual Report, Balance Sheets and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ending 30th 
September, 1976-80 (Nairobi: CBK, 1977-81). 
Note: The international co f f ee year runs from October 1 to September 30. 
"The European Free Trade Association includes Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
b Other quota markets include Australia, Cyprus, Ireland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and Yugoslavia. 
c Other major nonquota markets to which Kenya has exported include China, Egypt, Greece, Jordan, Syria, Taiwan, 
and East Bloc countries. 
long-term costs from international agree-
ments of this type compare to the costs of 
other developing countries, so that it can 
seek compensation from those developing 
countries that gain the most from such 
agreements. 
Domestic Production Structure 
Of the two major cof fee types, Kenya at 
present produces only the relatively high 
value, highland, Arabica type. The lower 
value, lowland, Robusta type is still in the 
experimental stage in Western Kenya, but is 
produced under similar ecological conditions 
in adjacent areas of Uganda and Tanzania. 
Since 1977/78 the proportion grown and 
processed on larger estates has dropped to 
less than 40 percent, while 60 percent comes 
from smallholders (Table 10). Smallholder 
production is processed in small local co-
operative society factories, which are part of 
a broader cooperative structure that has co-
operative unions as the middle tier and a 
cooperative bank and a centralized milling 
plant in Nairobi at its apex. 
The hulling plant is run by the Kenya 
Planters Cooperative Union (KPCU). The 
crop is then sold at auction to about 40 
private exporters who arrange international 
shipment. The exporters pay the Coffee Board 
by banker's check within seven days of the 
auction. Proceeds from the auctions are 
paid into a pool for that year (October 1 to 
September 30) and average prices are cal-
culated for each grade. This evens out weekly 
price fluctuations. A small partial payment 
is made by the Coffee Board almost as soon 
as delivery is received by the KPCU. Further 
interim payments are made on a quarterly 
basis. 
The Coffee Board passes the funds back 
to the estates directly through the KPCU, but 
funds for the smallholder must pass not just 
through the KPCU, but through the Coopera-
tive Bank, the local cooperative unions, and 
the cooperative societies. Within a single 
society, different factories may make different 
deductions. Each link deducts its costs before 
passing the funds down the chain, so that 
the farmer's payment is not a fixed price but 
a residual after deducting domestic costs 
from the international price.43 
43 For a description of the co f fee marketing chain, see the advertisement by the Kenya Planters' Cooperative Union, 
"Ensuring Farmers Get Their Money" in the Daily Nation. August 10, 1983, p. 4. 
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510 1,015 719 
628 1,322 896 
735 1,089 857 
627 1,048 765 
638 1,317 864 
844 1,782 1,199 
730 1,091 971 
736 920 810 
729 1,252 895 
756 1,057 848 
539 1,023 667 






Payments to Farmers by CBKa 
Overall 
Overall Pool at 
Constant Prices0 
( pe rcent ) 
1970/71 39 12 
1971/72 24 10 
1972/73 40 8 
1973/74 26 3 
1974/75 21 3 
1975/76 20 2 
1976/77 18 1 
1977/78 24 3 
1978/79 43 4 
1979/80 32 2 
1980/81 22 3 


















































Source: Cof fee Board of Kenya, Annua! Report, Balance Sheets nnri 
September. 1974-81 (Nairobi: CBK, 1975-82). """ Slatem^t of Accounts for the Year Fnriin ™ , 
Notes: The international co f fee year runs from October 1 to Senternhpr ™ tu 
Deliveries to the CBK are reported by the cof fee mill There i , J ™ f B K i s t h e Coffee Board of 
cannot credit to a particular producer. This is countedas " s w e e p Z s M n * 3 f t e r m '1 ' in§ t t he min 
the data were not available. weep ings and miscellaneous " Wherp n 7 111 , v " c r e n.a. appears 
These are the total pool payments f ° r t l l e coffee year. 
b Grades 1-5 include grade 6 for 1970/71-1975/76. 
c These are deflated by the Nairobi middle-income consumer price index (1969 = loo) 
Production, area, yields, quality, and pro-
ducer payments for 1970/71-1981/82 are 
shown in Table 10. Although estate yields 
are generally more than 50 percent higher 
than smallholder yields, the proportion of 
production in Grades 1 to 3 is generally 20 to 
40 percent for small farmers, but only 2 to 4 
percent for estates. The 50 percent increase 
in total production during the period 1974/75-
1976/77 resulted primarily from increased 
yields, which in turn came primarily from 
higher international prices, although the 
production figures for estates may be slightly 
exaggerated by some smuggling of cof fee 
from Tanzania and Uganda. This suggests 
high short-run supply elasticity as farmers 
apply more fertilizers, chemicals, and labor 
for weeding and pruning to the existing tree 
stock. The producer payments data show 
pool payments to all producers made by the 
Cof fee Board of Kenya. The long marketing 
chain to the smallholder means that he 
32 
receives substantially less than the pool 
payment recorded by the Cof fee Board. After 
the boom of 1976/77, even pool prices in 
1980/81 were lower in real terms than at any 
point since data became available in 1972/73 
(Table 10). 
The area sown with co f f ee and co f f ee 
production both rose sharply in the late 
1970s. Kenya's production of clean (hulled) 
coffee increased from 60,000 tons in 1971/72 
to 92,000 tons in 1979/80 (Table 10), and 
production is likely to continue to increase 
in the 1980s, although at a slower rate than 
in the 1970s, as a consequence of new plant-
ing following the 1976/77 boom in co f f ee 
prices. Although the area planted with mature 
cof fee increased by only 6,500 hectares 
between 1976/77 and 1978/79, it increased 
by 10,000 hectares from 1978/79 to 1981/82. 
This increase occurred almost entirely in 
the smallholder sector. In 1979 there were 
an additional 26,000 hectares of co f f ee 
plants under two years old and 9,000 hectares 
of new planting. Enough seedlings for another 
7,500 hectares were issued by the govern-
ment and still more seedlings came from 
private nurseries, which are not included. It 
appears that co f f ee area in production will 
increase by about 10 percent per year up to 
1985.44 
Increased production from greater area 
sown with cof fee will be offset by two factors. 
First, much of the increased area is in dis-
tricts like Machakos in Eastern Province 
where agroclimatic conditions are not as 
suitable as those in traditional co f f ee areas, 
so production per hectare will be lower. In 
1979/80, 33 percent of the 8.9 million seed-
lings sold to farmers by commercial and 
union or society controlled nurseries were 
sold to Machakos District45 And second, 
the sales of chemicals to control co f f ee 
berry disease and other diseases appear 
highly sensitive to changes in producer 
payments by the Cof fee Board. For example, 
sales of these chemicals by two leading 
suppliers in 1981/82 fell about 30 percent 
from 1980/81, after the producer price paid 
by the Co f fee Board fell for the fourth suc-
cessive year (Table 10)46 Production gains 
may be somewhat offset by higher incidence 
of disease. 
The area and production of co f f ee by dis-
trict in 1982 for both the estates and small-
holders are shown in Table 11. (The provinces 
and districts are shown in Figure 2.) Ninety 
percent of total production and 89 percent 
of smallholder production came from Central 
and Eastern provinces—more than half from 
Central Province alone. The most important 
districts in total production are Kiambu, 
with 38 percent of total production, and 
Muranga, with 17 percent, whereas the two 
largest districts in smallholder production 
are Meru, with 23 percent of total small-
holder production, and Muranga, with 21 
percent. However, the major future potential 
probably lies in other parts of the country, 
especially in Robusta production in Western 
Kenya. 
Yield varies greatly between districts. 
Estate yields in Nyeri are less than half those 
in Kiambu, but more than twice those in 
Nakuru. The low yields in Nakuru, which 
average 250 kilograms per hectare, may be 
due in part to the low standards of manage-
ment by local companies and cooperatives 
that have recently purchased estates. For 
smallholders, yields in Muranga and Kirinyaga 
are more than double those of Meru and 
Machakos, reflecting in part higher rainfall 
but probably also standards of management 
and levels of input application. Smallholder 
yields even in Muranga are only 67 percent 
of estate yields, while in Kiambu they are 
just 36 percent of estate yields. These data 
underline the potential to raise production 
by raising yields on both estates and small-
holdings. 
Several factors suggest that Kenya can 
produce Arabica co f f ee on smallholdings 
for less than the current price in nonquota 
markets if problems in the delivery and 
payment system can be resolved. Payment 
delays, transaction costs, and uncertainty 
about deductions all contribute to high 
marketing costs. 
Payments are made quarterly, and an 
annual crop's deliveries are paid for over 
several separate payment days at 3-month 
44 Cof fee Board of Kenya, Annual Report. Balance Sheets and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ending 30th September 1976 
(Nairobi: CBK, 1977); Cof fee Board of Kenya, Annual Report. Balance Sheets and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ending 
30th September 1979 (Nairobi: CBK, 1980); and Cof fee Board of Kenya, Annual Report. Balance Sheets and Statement of 
Accounts for the Year Ending 30th September 1980 (Nairobi: CBK, 1981). 
45 Cof fee Board of Kenya, Annual Report. Balance Sheets and Statement of Accounts. 1980. p. 9. 
46 Personal communication, two leading agrochemical suppliers in Nairobi, March 1982. 
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Table 11—Coffee area, production, and yield, by province and district, 1982 
Smallholders Estates 
Province/District Area3 Production Yield Area Production Yield 
(1,000 (1,000 (kilograms/ (1,000 (1,000 (kilograms/ 
hectares) metric tons) hectare) hectares) metric tons) hectare) 
Central Province 38.6 27.9- 723 25.9 32.7 1,263 
Kiambub 11.0 5.2 471 21.0 27.4 1,308 
Muranga0 12.6 11.0 875 3.4 4.2 1,235 
Nyeri 7.5 5.6 747 1.5 1.1 586 
Kirinyaga 7.5 6.1 815 
362 Eastern Province 45.0 18.9 420 0.5 0.2 
Meru 31.3 12.3 393 
Embu 6.1 3.7 612 
Machakos 7.6 2.9 379 0.5 0.2 362 
Rift Valley Province 5.9 1.2 203 
Nakuru 3.8 1.0 251 
Trans Nzoia 2.1 0.2 101 
Nyanza Province 7.5 3.6 482 
Kisii 7.5 3.6 482 
Western Province 4.5 1.7 378 
Bungoma 3.4 1.4 380 
Kakamega 1.1 0.3 245 
Others 1.9 0.6 294 1.4 0.4 360 
Total 97.5 52.5 539 33.6 34.4 1,023 
Percent Percent of 
Total of Total Smallholder 
Province/District Area Production Yield Production Production 
(1,000 (1,000 (kilograms/ (percent) 
hectares) metric tons) hectare) 
Central Province 64.5 59.5 922 68 55 
Kiambub 32.0 32.6 1,019 38 10 
Muranga0 16.0 15.2 950 17 21 
Nyeri 9.0 5.6 747 6 11 
Kirinyaga 7.5 6.1 815 1 12 
Eastern Province 45.5 19.1 420 22 36 
Meru 31.3 12.3 393 14 23 
Embu 6.1 3.7 612 4 7 
Machakos 8.1 3.1 383 4 6 
Rift Valley Province 5.9 1.2 203 1 
Nakuru 3.8 1.0 251 1 
Trans Nzoia 2.1 0.2 101 
Nyanza Province 7.5 3.6 482 4 7 
Kisii 7.5 3.6 482 4 7 
Western Province 4.5 1.7 378 2 3 
Bungoma 3.4 1.4 380 2 3 
Kakamega 1.1 0.3 245 
Others 3.3 1.0 303 1 
Total 131.0 86.9 663 100 100 
Source: Cof fee Board of Kenya, Annual Report. Balance Sheets and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ending 30th September 
1982 (Nairobi: CBK, 1983). 
3 Area indicates area sown with mature coffee. 
b For estates, the Kiambu district includes Limuru, Thika, Ruiru, Donyo Sabuk, and Kabete. 
c For estates, Muranga includes Mitubiri and Makuyu. 
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cooperative society.47 As explained earlier, 
payments take so long because they must 
pass through such a long chain from the 
Coffee Board to the farmer. Delays also 
occur because district and provincial coop-
erative officers have to authorize cash being 
drawn to make farmers' payments.48 With a 
rate of inflation of about 15 percent per year, 
this delay represents at least a 20 percent 
fall in the real price paid to the farmer on the 
delayed part of the payment. 
Transaction costs for a smallholder are 
high. To deliver small quantities of cherry 
(ripe cof fee berries) often means long waits 
in queues, sometimes far into the night. The 
farmer has little recourse if he is told to 
regrade. Obtaining payment sometimes in-
volves several more days of waiting in line. 
These additional fixed costs for the small-
holder arise because he is only allowed to 
sell to the cooperative society where he is 
registered, which consequently enjoys all 
the privileges of a monopsonist. 
Farmers are not able to reconcile deliver-
ies and payments because of the spreading 
out of payments discussed earlier. The system 
is further complicated by credit and ad-
vances. The field survey in 1977 listed the 
following deductions from payments to cof-
fee farmers in Embu and Kirinyaga districts:49 
cooperative union cess (7.5 percent); deduc-
tion for advances of fertilizers and chemicals 
from the local society; deduction for con-
sumption loans obtained by the farmer from 
the society; deductions to pay off loans from 
the Intensive Agricultural District Program 
(IADP) and other loans given to the farmer 
by the society; and deductions for operating 
the local cooperative society, such as run-
ning expenses for the factory and other 
cooperative society activities. 
The key problem is that the smallholder 
is given no written statement to enable him 
to reconcile his account with the society, so 
he has no way of being sure that payments 
match deliveries. Lack of payment reconcil-
iation information makes it impossible to 
measure accurately the deductions made 
from an individual farmer's account and 
thus the percentage of the value of the crop 
received by the farmer. Estimates are usually 
based on the proportion of the value of the 
crop received by the Cooperative Bank, 
assuming that the remainder reaches the 
farmer after deduction of the union cess and 
the society's overhead. 
What the societies received is not even a 
reliable guide to what smallholders actually 
received. The InternationalCoffee Organiza-
tion estimates that in the period 1973/74-
1975/76 estates in Kenya received close to 
90 percent of the export value of their cof fee 
after deducting processing costs, but small-
holders received only 59-63 percent, and 
deductions by unions and societies trebled 
in those three years.50 Even these estimates 
of what reaches smallholders may be too 
high in view of delays and uncertainty about 
society deductions. 
Several pointers indicate that union and 
society deductions may be substantial. Loans 
made by the Cooperative Bank in Nairobi to 
a cooperative union in a coffee-growing area 
for any rural development purpose are secured 
on the basis of the cof fee crop. Thus, default 
on an IADP loan by a union, for example, 
may result in deductions from cof fee pay-
ments to the union by the Cooperative Bank. 
This then results in reduced payments or 
further delays to farmers. With no effective 
bookkeeping control in most societies, it is 
also possible that deductions made by the 
union or society's management may be used 
for personal expenditures, as many newspaper 
articles have alleged.51 Since much of the 
money owed to the farmers has been used 
for other purposes, the only way for coopera-
tives to meet payment obligations for past 
deliveries is to use cash available from the 
next deliveries. Therefore, the outstanding 
amount as a result of payment delays is not 
accumulating somewhere in the system. 
This is what makes the problem of lagging 
payments so intractable. 
If farmers were paid the full market value 
of their crop—after deducting competitive 
47 Michael Schluter, "Rural Development in the Diocese of Mount Kenya East," a report prepared for the Diocese of 
Mount Kenya East, Embu, June 1977 (mimeographed), p. 3. 
48 Daily Nation, advertisement, "Ensuring Farmers Get Their Money." 
49 Schluter, "Rural Development in the Diocese of Mount Kenya East," p. 3. 
50 International Cof fee Organization, Coffee in Kenya. 1977 (London: ICO, 1978), pp. 24, 50, 52. 
51 See, for example, the Daily Nation. March 1, 1982, p. 3; April 22, 1982, p. 1; and April 15, 1983, p. 6. 
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processing, transport, and administrative 
costs—in cash on delivery of the cherry, the 
producer price could be raised substantially 
without any change in the international 
market price or adjustment in the exchange 
rate. Reform of the payment system for small-
holders requires examination of the prob-
lems of the cooperative movement as a 
whole, which is discussed in Chapter 9. 
To increase production from existing 
cof fee area will be difficult without reform 
of the marketing and payment systems. 
However, based on yield response from 
1974/75 to 1976/77 (Table 10), the short-
term supply response to higher prices could 
be as much as 50 percent over three years. 
This would raise average smallholder yields 
from the 1981/82 level of 539 kilograms per 
hectare to the 1976/77 level of 844 kilograms 
per hectare. Even this is still a long way be-
low average estate yields of 1,252 kilograms 
per hectare in 1979/80 or of 1,782 kilograms 
per hectare in 1976/77. 
Increased production depends partly on 
increased use of fertilizers and pesticides. 
Labor is the other major input, for pruning, 
weeding, and mulching, as well as for picking. 
The opportunity cost of labor is high in most 
coffee-growing areas, as there is competi-
tion for labor for tea picking. Coffee zones 
generally are below and adjacent to tea 
zones, and employment opportunities always 
exist in tea zones, even in nonpeak seasons. 
Because there are two growing seasons in 
Kenya, opportunities for work in dairying or 
the cultivation or harvesting of crops such 
as maize, pulses, forage, and horticultural 
crops exist during much of the year. Thus an 
increase in coffee production would probably 
reduce dairy and horticultural crop produc-
tion in the cof fee zones. 
Another way to raise cof fee production 
in Kenya in the long term is through new 
planting. Since this is now allowed by the 
International Coffee Agreement, the key 
question is whether to produce more Arabica 
in the traditional highland areas or to produce 
Robusta cof fee in the lowland areas of 
Western Kenya. In Central Kenya approxi-
mately 17 percent of total cultivated area 
and more than 25 percent of the official 
cof fee zone area was already planted with 
cof fee in 1974/75.52 Thus, expanding cof fee 
area in the cof fee zone may mean using 
more marginal land. Gross foreign exchange 
earnings from Arabica and Robusta are likely 
to be similar, the higher Robusta yields 
being offset by lower prices. A study has 
shown, however, that in Tanzania 25 percent 
of the gross foreign exchange earnings of 
the Arabica crop must be plowed back in 
imported inputs for production, processing, 
and transport, but only 10 percent of the 
earnings from the Robusta crop must be, 
despite the much greater distance of Robusta 
growing areas from the coast.53 So net foreign 
exchange earnings per hectare would prob-
ably be greater from Robusta production. 
Emphasis on new Robusta production would 
probably also decrease the variability of total 
production because it is less susceptible to 
cof fee berry disease. In Western Kenya the 
opportunity cost is defined by returns to 
sugar and maize, which are discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
Tea 
The International Market 
There has been a steady increase in 
Kenya's tea area, production, and exports 
during the last 10 years, as shown in Table 
12. Area increased from 40,000 to 75,000 
hectares from 1970 to 1979, and exports 
have increased at a compound growth rate 
of more than 11 percent per year during this 
period. This rate of production growth is 
likely to slow to 7.5 percent during the period 
1980-85, with export growth of 10 percent, 
which compares favorably with export growth 
projections of 6.3 percent for China, 1.6 
percent for Sri Lanka, and -0.4 percent for 
India.54 In 1980 Kenya's production still con-
stituted only 5 percent of the world total and 
her exports only 8 percent of total world 
trade in tea.55 The world market in tea, how-
ever, is highly differentiated by type and 
quality; Kenya's share in the specialist quali-
52 Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Rural Survey 1974-75. Basic Report 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1977), p. 79. 
53 Sackett and Schluter, Estimates of the 1981/82 Import Requirements. 
54 World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, p. 47. 
53 Ibid., p. 47. 
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Table 12—Tea production, area sown, yields, and smallholder payments, 1971-82 
Production Area Sown 
Year Smallholders Estates Total Smallholders Estates Total 
(million kilograms) (1,000 hectares) 
1971 8.1 28.2 36.3 20.5 22.8 43.3 
1972 13.1 40.2 53.3 26.5 23.3 49.8 
1973 15.1 41.5 56.6 31.2 23.6 54.8 
1974 16.2 37.3 53.5 34.6 24.1 58.7 
1975 17.9 38.8 56.7 37.2 24.3 61.5 
1976 21.5 40.5 62.0 41.4 24.5 65.9 
1977 30.7 55.6 86.3 43.6 24.9 68.5 
1978 34.8 58.6 93.4 46.9 25.2 72.1 
1979 37.6 61.6 99.2 48.9 25.4 74.3 
1980 34.0 55.9 89.9 50.7 25.9 76.6 
1981 35.8 55.1 90.9 52.7 26.2 78.9 
1982 39.9 56.1 96.0 54.7 26.4 81.1 
Average Payment to Smallholders b 
Yields of Mature Tea3 Total in Constant 
Year Smallholders Estates National First Second Total 1969 Prices0 
(kilograms/hectare) (KSh/kilogram of green leaf) 
1971 874 1,356 1,207 0.88 0.55 1.43 1.32 
1972 1,071 1,885 1,588 0.88 0.99 1.87 1.59 
1973 1,027 1,900 1,542 0.88 0.33 1.21 0.91 
1974 905 1,673 1,328 0.88 0.52 1.40 0.90 
1975 873 1,699 1,309 0.88 0.72 1.60 0.90 
1976 811 1,741 1,245 0.88 2.54 3.42 1.74 
1977 985 2,352 1,575 1.00 1.38 2.38 1.08 
1978 1,004 2,433 1,591 1.00 1.33 2.33 0.96 
1979 1,011 2,531 1,613 1.00 1.75 2.75 1.02 
1980 821 2,278 1,364 1.00 1.50 2.50 0.82 
1981 821 2,217 1,327 1.00 1.51 2.51 0.73 
1982 851 2,230 1,331 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sources: Data provided by the Kenya Tea Board; Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), Annual Report and 
Statement of Accounts, 1980/81 (Nairobi: KTDA, 1981); KTDA, Annual Report and Statement ofAccounts. 1981/82 
(Nairobi: KTDA, 1982); and Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Economic Survey. 1979-82 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1979-82). 
Note: Where n.a. appears, the figure was not available. 
3 Yields per hectare are estimated by dividing production by the total area sown with tea four years before to allow for 
time taken for the tea bush to mature after planting. 
b Average payments to smallholders are given for fiscal years, so the 1971 figures are for 1971/72 and so forth. 
c Constant prices are estimated by averaging the upper, middle, and lower income groups under "Nairobi Annual 
Retail Price Increases, 1970-82," in Economic Survey. 1979-82. 
ties it produces is much higher. Kenya prob-
ably would benefit from an international tea 
agreement limiting new planting and pro-
duction, but no agreement has yet been 
reached.56 
The major growth in tea consumption 
and imports is among the developing coun-
tries. The developing countries' share of 
world imports is expected to grow from about 
40 percent of world imports in 1980 to 50 
percent in 1995.57 Tea imports of the selected 
oil exporters grew by 37 percent, from 
62,000 tons to 85,000 tons, between 1971-
73 and 1976-78 (Table 6). Although this 
growth is slow compared with imports of 
other products by the oil exporters, it is rapid 
56 C. P. Tyler, "The Interests of East Africa in an International Tea Agreement," Discussion Paper 25, Institute of 
Development Studies, Nairobi, March 1977 (mimeographed). 
57 World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, p. 47. 
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relative to the growth of imports in other 
markets. Imports into the largest market— 
the United Kingdom—fell by 14 percent be-
tween 1971 -73 and 1977-79. Iraq is the largest 
market among the selected countries with 
imports close to 30,000 tons in the period 
1977-79, followed by Iran with 20,000 tons 
and Libya with 10,000 tons. The market 
doubled in Iran from 1970-72 to 1977-79 
and increased by about 50 percent in Iraq, 
but it appears to have been erratic in Libya. 
Sri Lanka is the largest supplier to Iraq, 
Iran, and Libya, supplying 55 percent of the 
164,000 tons of tea sold to the three coun-
tries combined in the period 1977-79, although 
it exports only 20 percent of world marketed 
production.58 Only in Iraq have East African 
teas made an inroad, with the market share 
increasing from 0.003 percent in 1977 to 3.8 
percent in 1979. Imports by other oil-exporting 
countries are minimal. Indonesia is a tea 
exporter, Nigeria's tea imports are insignifi-
cant, and the population of the Gulf States is 
so small that the demand for tea is also small. 
From 1976 to 1980 there was little change 
in the direction of Kenya's exports 59 In 1976 
and 1980 five countries accounted for more 
than 85 percent of Kenya's total exports: the 
United Kingdom, Pakistan, the United States, 
Canada, and Egypt. The United Kingdom 
took 48 to 60 percent in each of the f ive 
years and was the largest buyer. Pakistan and 
Egypt together accounted for 15 to 30 per-
cent of total exports in each year from 1975-
79. Kenya's exports to the United Kingdom 
in 1979/80 were about 45,000 tons, which 
was close to 25 percent of total imports by 
the United Kingdom in those years. 
The high degree of product differentia-
tion in the international tea market is prob-
ably the main reason why Kenya has been 
unable to penetrate the markets of Iraq, Iran, 
and Libya. Kenya now produces only teas 
processed by the cut, tear, and crush (CTC) 
method, whereas consumers in these coun-
tries prefer lowland, orthodox teas. The CTC 
processing method results in smaller frag-
ments of leaf, which appear bright in the 
cup. Orthodox teas have larger fragments, a 
bolder taste, and appear black in the cup. 
CTC teas generally command a 20 percent 
higher price in auction than orthodox teas. 
In 1975 as much as 30 percent of Kenya's 
production was orthodox teas, but factories 
have converted their production to CTC teas 
in response to higher prices for CTC tea in 
international markets. The Kenya Tea De-
velopment Authority has encouraged the 
conversion because it eliminates the need 
to differentiate payments to farmers accord-
ing to factory. The orthodox tea manufactur-
ing machinery has been stored in the fac-
tories, so that reversion to partial orthodox 
tea manufacture would be simple if market 
conditions warranted it. 
Tea exports to oil-exporting countries can 
be increased in several ways. Kenya could 
launch a major marketing initiative in the 
target countries to popularize CTC teas in 
order to create additional demand. Marketing 
could focus on Nigeria, where tea consump-
tion is growing from a small base and a pred-
ilection for either CTC or orthodox teas has 
not been formed, and Iran and Iraq. This is 
likely to take a long time, as creating or 
changing consumer preferences seldom 
happens rapidly. The second option would 
be to shift part of production from CTC teas 
to orthodox teas. This might lower returns 
while Kenya established a market in orthodox 
tea markets, but in the medium term, high 
quality orthodox tea prices would probably 
be close to those of CTC teas. 
Domestic Production Potential 
The structure of the industry is similar to 
cof fee in some respects. The estates, totaling 
approximately 20,000 hectares in 1980, are 
generally owned by large, foreign-owned 
corporations. They account for nearly 50 per-
cent of total production. Production goes 
from the factories of the estates straight to 
auction in Mombasa. The smallholders, to-
taling approximately 55,000 hectares and 
143,000 growers in 1982, are organized by 
a parastatal, the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority, which is responsible for input 
distribution, collection of leaf, farmers' pay-
ments, processing, and delivery to auction 
in Mombasa.60 In contrast to coffee, the pay-
ments tunnel is short, with just the Tea 
Development Authority between the auction 
58 International Tea Committee, Annual Bulletin of Statistics (London: ITC, 1981). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Kenya Tea Development Authority, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1981/82 (Nairobi: KTDA, 1982), p. 18. 
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and the smallholder. As with coffee, small-
holder yields are typically 33 to 50 percent 
smaller than those of the estates, but the 
area is much greater and growing more 
rapidly (Table 12). Production is heavily 
concentrated in certain regions, with half of 
total production from Kericho and Nandi 
districts and a further 25 percent from 
Central Province. Half of smallholder pro-
duction is from Central Province, with 45 
percent from Kisii, Kericho, Meru, and Embu 
districts (see Table 13). 
If Kenya is to maintain its share of exist-
ing CTC markets, but at the same time seek a 
share of the oil exporters' markets for ortho-
dox teas, then production will have to in-
crease. The greatest potential to expand 
production is from existing tea area, where 
bushes are already established but the pro-
portion harvested is low due to labor short-
ages. No systematic data are available to 
estimate the proportion unharvested, but 
observations in field reports repeatedly note 
this point. A field survey in 1976/77 estimated 
that only 50 percent of potential yield was 
harvested, the other half being left on the 
bush.61 This suggests high short-run supply 
elasticities. The large yield differences be-
tween smallholders and estates noted in 
Table 12 confirm this observation. 
The main reasons why so much tea 
remains unpicked appear to be the cost of 
labor and the payment system for farmers. 
In explaining the lower yields of smallholders 
in Kenya, Ram observed the critical shortage 
of labor on small farms in areas west of the 
Rift, which also depend heavily on hired 
labor.62 He notes that farmers under the Tea 














(million (percent) (1,000 (million (percent) (kilograms/ 
kilograms) hectares) kilograms) hectare) 
Rift Valley Province 50.1 52 7.9 5.1 14 590 
Kericho 34.4 36 6.7 4.7 13 701 
Nandi 15.6 16 1.3 0.4 1 294 
Subukia 0.1 
Central Province 25.6 27 20.4 18.3 52 889 
Kiambu 8.3 9 4.6 3.2 9 685 
Muranga 7.4 8 8.2 6.3 18 764 
Nyeri 6.0 6 4.8 4.9 14 1,023 
Kirinyaga 3.9 4 2.9 3.9 11 1,350 
Nyanza Province 13.7 14 10.3 6.6 19 637 
Kisii 7.3 8 9.3 5.9 17 637 
Sotik 6.4 7 1.0 0.7b 2 601 
Eastern Province 5.5 6 7.6 4.9 14 646 
Meru 4.1 4 5.8 3.4 10 591 
Embu 1.4 1 1.8 1.5 4 822 
Western Province 0.7 1 1.8 0.6 2 301 
Kakamega 0.7 1 1.8 0.6 2 301 
Total 95.6 100 48.9 35.3 101 734 
Source: Unpublished data provided by the Kenya Tea Board. 
Notes: Percentages do not always add up to the subtotals or totals because of rounding. Made tea is the manufactured 
product when it leaves the factory. Green leaf is the tea after it is plucked from the bush and before it is pro-
cessed. 
a Data for smallholders exclude settlement schemes at Lessos, Chepsir, and Cherangani, which produced 0.18 
million kilograms in 1982. 
b Data relate to settlement schemes. 
61 Schluter, "Rural Development in the Diocese of Mount Kenya East," p. 3. 
62 C. S. Venkata Ram, "Tea in the Small Grower's Sector—A Study in Kenya "Planter's Chronicle(Calcutta), 1981, pp. 203-206. 
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Development Authority show a marked ten-
dency to pick more in the second half of the 
month, which he attributes to their anxiety 
to meet a monthly target, and he also notes 
high deliveries on days when schools are 
closed so that farmers' children are able to 
assist in picking. 
The way payments are made to producers 
becomes the second critical factor in in-
creasing production from a policy perspec-
tive. At present, farmers are given an initial 
payment at the end of each month and a final 
payment after the end of the year, when it is 
possible to calculate an average market 
value for each grade net of processing and 
marketing costs. Farmers' payments rose 
dramatically in 1975/76 in real terms, but 
since then they have fallen continuously so 
that their value in 1981/82 was less than half 
their value in 1971/72 (Table 12). Figure 3 
shows an index of payments to cof fee and 
tea growers. The percentage of payments 
made to farmers at the end of the month was 
less than 50 percent in every year after 1971/ 
72 except 1972/73 and 40 percent or less for 
every year between 1978/79 and 1981/82. 
Any shift in the proportion from the first to 
the second payment, any increase in deduc-
tions from the crop, or further delays in 
payment reduces marginal returns, and thus 
Figure 3—Indexes of tea and coffee payments to growers, 1971/72-1981/82 
2001 
1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 
1 1 
1980/81 1981/82 
Sources: Derived from data in Cof fee Board of Kenya, Annual Report, Balance Sheet, and Statement of Accounts for the 
Year Ending 30 September. 1974-81 (Nairobi: CBK, 1975-82); Kenya Tea Board, unpublished data; Kenya Tea 
Development Authority, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. 1980/81 (Nairobi: KTDA, 1981); KTDA, 
Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1981/82 (Nairobi: KTDA, 1982); and Kenya, Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey. 1979-82 (Nairobi: Government 
Printer, 1979-82). 
Note: The indexes were derived using constant 1969 prices. 1977/78 equals 100. 
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the quantity picked. Also, the amount of the 
first payment is crucial in determining how 
much capital the farmer has to hire labor for 
harvesting. 
The opportunity cost of labor in picking 
tea is determined by returns from the major 
competing enterprises—potatoes, maize, and 
dairy production. The dramatic maize shortage 
in 1980 increased maize prices in tea growing 
areas to about K Sh 800 per bag, or more than 
seven times the official purchase price of 
the National Cereals and Produce Board 
(NCPB). At the same time, there was a dramatic 
increase in potato prices. As a consequence, 
field visits indicated that tea growers shifted 
labor into maize and potato production. 
This may account for the drop in national 
smallholder tea yields by 15 percent from 
1,000 kilograms per hectare in 1978 and 
1979 to 850 kilograms per hectare in 1981 
and 1982 (Table 12), although rainfall may 
also have been a factor. 
Future research could examine this hy-
pothesis by analyzing whether monthly de-
liveries of tea to factories in the smallholder 
zones dropped most markedly in 1981/82 
and 1982/83 in months of peak labor demand 
for food crops. Uncertainty about future 
maize prices and availability helps maintain 
maize and potato area for several years fol-
lowing a single year of maize shortages so 
that tea exports may be affected for an ex-
tended period. From a policy perspective, 
this underlines the central importance of 
stable maize prices and availability as a 
foundation for sustained growth of agricul-
tural exports. 
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MEAT PRODUCTS: BEEF AND SHEEP AND GOATS 
In Kenya, beef cattle and sheep and goats 
are primarily raised by smallholders, although 
nomadic pastoralists provide a significant 
proportion of the surplus for urban con-
sumption or export (Table 14). In range areas 
the major production decision is between 
beef and sheep-goat production; in large 
and small farm areas it is between beef, 
sheep and goats, dairy stock, and oxen. 
Competition is for scarce pasture land, but 
also for labor, management resources, and 
capital. 
A parastatal, the Kenya Meat Commission 
(KMC), provides a floor to the market for all 
red meat, with prices fixed by the govern-
ment.63 Private slaughterhouses are allowed 
to compete. The KMC has had a monopoly 
on meat exports in the past, but all exports 
have been banned since 1980. The govern-
ment prefers to export meat rather than live 
animals because the slaughtering and pro-
cessing of meat increases domestic value 
added and provides employment. The KMC, 
like many parastatals, has had severe finan-
cial problems, which have resulted in pay-
ment delays to farmers. The Ministry of 
Livestock Development is reponsible for 
overall direction of the industry, including 
issuing licenses and providing inspection of 
slaughterhouses and supervising the KMC. 
Table 14—Number of cattle, number slaughtered, and beef output, by type of farm 
and location, 1970 and 1975 
Number of Cattle Number Slaughtered Beef Output 
Type of Farm and Location 1970 1975 1970 1975 1970 1975 
(1,000 head) (1,000 metric tons) 
Range 2,907 1,980 219 201 23.2 19.3 
Northern3 1,571 1,250 136 121 14.9 12.1 
Southernb 1,336 730 83 80 8.3 7.2 
Small farms 5,251 7,167 612 951 71.1 101.4 
Coastal0 300 370 32 55 3.2 5.0 
Eastern"1 1,090 1,523 109 183 12.6 19.0 
Central Province 482 1,081 57 139 8.7 19.3 
Rift Valleye 1,145 1,106 128 181 14.9 18.8 
Nyanza Province 1,478 2,327 155 264 17.2 26.4 
Western Province 756 760 131 129 14.5 12.9 
Large farms f 558 550 121 133 20.9 21.8 
Total 8,716 9,697 957 1,295 115.2 142.6 
Source: Chemonics International, Consulting Division, "Livestock and Meat Industry Development Study, Final 
Report," Nairobi, March 1977 (mimeographed). 
Note: Beef output includes the weight of meat and offal, which is equivalent to carcass cold dressed weight. 
a The northern range is made up of the following districts: Lamu, Tana River, Isiolo, Marsabit, Turkana.Samburu, and 
West Pokot. It also includes North Eastern Province. 
b The southern range is made up of Narok and Kajiado districts. 
c The coastal region is made up of Kilifi, Kwale, and Taita districts. 
d The eastern region is made up of Machakos, Kitui, Embu, and Meru districts. 
6 The Rift Valley is made up of Nandi, Kericho, Elgeyo Marakwet, and Baringo districts. 
f The large farm regions are Nakuru, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, and Laikipia districts. 
63 For a definition of the Kenya Meat Commission's functions, see Kenya, Laws of Kenya, The Kenya Meat Commission 
Act, Chapter 363 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1972). 
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It is also responsible for all extension ser-
vices, including provision of veterinary ser-
vices to smallholders, control over cattle 
movements between districts to prevent the 
spread of disease, and animal breeding for 
smallholders. Some private breeding is still 
important, however. 
Beef 
Markets Among the Oil Exporters 
As stated earlier, the potential for export-
ing beef to oil-exporting countries is large. 
During the period 1971-73 to 1976-78, beef 
imports by oil-exporting countries, excluding 
live bovine animals, increased six times, from 
50,000 tons to more than 300,000 tons. The 
largest markets for beef imports in 1978 were 
the Gulf States and Iran, which together im-
ported more than U.S. $1 billion of beef in 
that year. There were also significant mar-
kets in North and West Africa of more than 
U.S. $ 100 million each; and Libya has been a 
major importer of Kenyan meat in the past.64 
Demand in all regions trebled from 1971 -73 
to 1976-78 and increased about 20 times in 
West Africa and 9 times in Iran (Table 7). 
Thus, all of the selected oil-exporting coun-
tries, perhaps with the exception of Indonesia, 
appear to offer Kenya excellent opportunities 
to expand beef exports. (Indonesia has a 
small part of the beef imports of the selected 
countries; it had less than 1 percent of the 
value in 1978.) Kenya's proximity to the Gulf 
States, in particular, is a definite advantage 
over major competitors such as Australia 
and New Zealand because live animals and 
chilled meat command a premium of at least 
20 percent over frozen beef in these mar-
kets.65 In 1978 the airfreight rate for chilled 
meat was 40 percent lower from Nairobi to 
Jeddah than from Sydney to Jeddah, and the 
seafreight rate was 50 percent lower for live 
lambs (including feed cost and mortality)66 
Kenya's Production and Exports 
KMC cattle and calf purchases and Kenya's 
beef exports from 1970 to 1980 are shown in 
Table 15. Kenya's exports ranged from about 
5,000 to 8,000 tons per year in 1970-77, but 
declined sharply in 1978-80. They amounted 
to just 663 tons in 1980. This resulted mainly 
from a sharp drop in the KMC meat purchases 
from about 200,000 head per year in 1970-72 
to less than 70,000 in 1978-80. The decline 
in official purchases does not necessarily 
reflect a decline in total production. For 
example, between 1970 and 1975, when the 
KMC purchases fell by 32 percent, production 
is estimated to have grown by 23 percent 
from 115,200 tons to 142,600 tons (Table 14). 
With exports at 5 percent of total beef output 
in 1970 and 1975 (Tables 14 and 15), there 
seems to have been a large increase in do-
mestic consumption in the early 1970s. The 
Ministry of Livestock Development estimates 
that production has stagnated or even fallen 
since the mid-1970s, so that, with rapid 
population growth, per capita consumption 
has declined by more than 4 percent per year 
since 197567 Against this background of 
rapidly growing imports by oil-exporting 
countries and falling exports and stagnant 
production in Kenya, what potential exists 
for Kenya to increase beef exports to the 
Middle East? This requires a study of the 
international market to determine whether 
exports can be used to raise local prices paid 
to producers so as to stimulate production if 
Kenya adopts a beef export strategy. 
The International Market for Beef 
Kenya could export significant quantities 
to the EC under the Lome Convention at 
prices of about $3,500 per ton, or double 
1982-83 prices in the Middle East. The total 
Second Lome Convention beef quota for the 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) coun-
tries exporting to the EC has been fixed at 
64 Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Marketing Development Project, Background Marketing Briefs for the Agricultural Price 
Review 1981/82 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981). 
65 Kenya Meat Commission, personal communication, June 1982. 
66 Arab Organization of Agricultural Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
"The Market for Livestock and Meat in the Arabian Peninsula," p. 7. 
67 Kenya, Ministry of Livestock Development, Animal Production Division, Annual Report for 1979 (Nairobi: Govern-
ment Printer, 1980). 
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Cattle and Calf Canned Beef Total Bee 
Purchases Meat Exports3 Exports Exports 
(1,000 head) (metric tons) 
197.9 1,798 3,131 4,929 
210.3 2,380 3,493 5,873 
199.1 3,542 4,128 7,670 
155.0 3,567 2,004 5,571 
159.5 3,231 2,599 5,830 
134.1 3,711 3,646 7,357 
228.5 2,719 5,778 8,497 
158.1 4,029 4,039 8,068 
68.0 1,254 1,070 2,324 
67.7 529 1,341 1,870 
55.9 112 551 663 
Sources: Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 
1979 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1979); Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. /9S0(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1980); Kenya, Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 1981 (Nairobi: 
Government Printer, 1981); and Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise 
Department, Annual Trade Report. 1970-80 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970-80). 
3 These include fresh, chilled, and frozen meat. 
38,100 tons since January 1981. Countries 
participating are Botswana, Kenya, Madagas-
car, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. As ACP ex-
ports did not exceed 20,000 tons in 1981 and 
are unlikely to in 1982, Kenya could probably 
obtain a larger quota to meet the gap between 
present ACP exports and the total ACP quota 
into the EC. Exports from ACP countries enter 
at the same price as is offered to European 
producers. 
EC regulations forbidding beef imports 
from areas thought not to be free of foot-
and-mouth disease make it most unlikely 
that Kenya will even be able to initiate 
exports to the EC. In mid-1980 the EC further 
strengthened this regulation to state that it 
would not accept meat from areas where 
inoculation against foot-and-mouth disease 
was used to maintain disease-free zones. 
The major factor that has led to the breaking 
down of the disease-free zones in Kenya has 
been the inability to control cattle move-
ment within the country. Such control re-
quires substantial resources, including ve-
hicles and manpower, especially a highly 
disciplined cadre of trained personnel to 
prevent illegal movement. Large areas could 
be fenced as in Botswana, but huge amounts 
of fencing would be required, and for reasons 
discussed below the returns are unlikely to 
warrant such an investment. 
Without access to the EC, Kenya's major 
markets are the oil-exporting Middle East 
countries. However, these markets often 
have the lowest beef prices in international 
trade owing to the structure of the world 
market. The major beef-exporting countries 
are Australia and New Zealand, which have 
access to the United States market as they 
are free of foot-and-mouth disease. Any 
excess production from Australasia that is 
not sent to the United States goes to the 
Middle East. The EC and South America also 
use the Middle East (in addition to the U.S.S.R.) 
as a major market for their growing surpluses. 
And finally, the Middle East is an important 
market for other African countries with vet-
erinary problems owing to its nonrestric-
tive animal health import controls. Because 
of the number of countries that are compet-
ing to export beef to the Middle East, prices 
are lower in these markets. 
The EC's position has changed from one 
of net imports of 720,000 tons in 1970 to net 
exports of 310,000 tons in 1980, with net 
exports of 660,000 tons projected by 1990.68 
These projections assume that Spain and 
Portugal will join the EC and become an 
additional source of demand, so surpluses 
may be even greater if their accession is 
delayed beyond 1990. 
68 World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, pp. 86-87. 
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The EC surpluses have arisen as a con-
sequence of price support policies and slow 
growth of consumption. Consumption within 
the EC increased only 3 percent from 1976 
to 1980, from 6.54 million tons to 6.75 million 
tons.69 To dispose of the surpluses, the EC 
has offered large subsidies to EC exporters 
to make up the difference between the 
market price and the price of stocks inside 
the EC. The market price for each potential 
export market is fixed on a monthly basis to 
guarantee that the exporter will not suffer a 
loss. Only in this way has it been possible for 
the EC to increase its market share so dra-
matically since 1978 in a somewhat de-
pressed world market. Major suppliers of 
chilled and frozen bovine meat to Saudi 
Arabia in 1978, for example, were Australia, 
with 42 percent of the market; Argentina, 12 
percent; the United States, 12 percent; India, 
8 percent; and New Zealand, 8 percent.70 
Even with an upturn in the economies of the 
countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
reduced production when the world beef 
cycle reaches its next low, the EC is likely to 
continue to subsidize exports for a pro-
tracted period. However, small adjustments 
to reduce the beef subsidy appear likely as 
the cost escalates further.71 
Declining international beef prices make 
it difficult to raise the price paid to the local 
producer in Kenya. The U.S. import price for 
frozen, boneless cuts (f.o.b. port of entry) 
declined from U.S. $2,884 per ton in 1980 to 
U.S. $2,475 in 1981 72 This is still higher than 
the average price for 1975-77, which was 
U.S. $1,471 per ton at current prices. Recent 
trend data from the Middle East countries 
are not available. However, the KMC estimates 
a price of about U.S. $2,000 c and f Jeddah, 
or U.S. $ 1,700 f.o.b. Mombasa, for high quality 
beef in mid-1982.73 Estimates from Botswana 
suggest U.S. $ 1,700 c and f Iran port, or U.S. 
$1,400 Botswana port, for lower-priced cuts 
of Botswanan beef.74 At an exchange rate of 
U.S. $1 equals KSh 10.5, and a bone-in factor 
of KSh 1.3, this reduces the export parity 
price of Kenyan beef to KSh 15.35 per kilo-
gram for high-quality cuts or KSh 11.30 for 
low-quality cuts. Allowing for local process-
ing costs of K Sh 2.0 per kilogram there is no 
margin left for the KMC overhead even at 
the low June 1981 producer prices of KSh 
13.30 for prime and KSh 10.0 for standard-
grade beef (Table 16). Even for chilled meat 
delivered by airfreight, the return after de-
ducting additional freight costs is not suf-
ficient to cover the KMC overhead. Assuming 
that no substantial increase in the inter-
national beef price is likely in the near 
future, particularly in view of continued 
large EC production, lower local costs of 
production would be required in order to 
make Kenyan beef competitive in the Middle 
East market at the artificially low prices now 
prevailing. 
Policies and Programs to Raise 
Kenya's Beef Production 
Several studies have identified ways to 
increase Kenyan beef production:75 
Means 
Develop areas with high 
potential 
Develop range 
Improve animal health and 





ties for marketing 










69 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, The World Market for Bovine Beef at 16 December 1981 (Geneva: GATT, 1982), 
p. 47. 
70 Industrial Market Research, The Potential for Increasing Kenyan Exports. 
71 Josling, Langworthy, and Pearson, Options for Farm Policy in the European Community. 
72 World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. Table 6, p. 88. 
73 Kenya Meat Commission, personal communication, June 1982. 
74 Personal communication with V. von Massow, a research scholar from Gottingen University, who was doing 
research on beef in Botswana, May 1982. 
75 Chemonics International, Consulting Division, "Livestock and Meat Industry Development Study;" and C. Karue, 
"Livestock Production Trends in Kenya: Meat Production," a paper presented at the National Council of Science and 
Technology Workshop on Food Policy Research Priorities, Nairobi, June 1982 (mimeographed), p. 19 ff. 
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Table 16—Producer prices for beef set by the Kenya Meat Commission, 1969-81 
Fair Average 
Year Prime Beef Quality Beef Standard Beef Commercial Beef 
(KSh/kilogram carcass dead weight) 
1969 3.41 3.30 2.75 2.40 
1970 3.49 3.32 2.73 2.38 
1971 4.06 3.76 2.85 2.47 
1972 4.43 4.08 3.02 2.63 
1973 4.77 4.42 3.46 3.00 
1974 5.29 4.96 4.13 3.64 
1975 5.98 5.57 4.74 4.12 
1976 6.68 6.49 4.79 4.18 
1977 7.47 7.35 5.19 4.54 
1978 8.23 8.08 6.76 5.37 
1979 8.25 6.95 5.45 
1980 11.80a 11.65a 8.00 6.25 
June 1981 13.30 13.00 10.00 7.50 
Sources: Data for 1969-78 are from Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 1979 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1980); data for 1979 and 1980 are from 
Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Central Development and Marketing Unit, Yields. Costs and Prices 1982 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1982); and data for 1981 are from Kenya Meat Commission. 
Note: For 1972 to 1976 there are a few cents dif ference between these data and those cited in Chemonics Inter-
national, Consulting Division, "Livestock and Meat Industry Development Study, Final Report," Nairobi, 
March 1977 (mimeographed). 
a Includes a KSh 2.00 bonus above the price published in the Kenya Gazette. 
In the first item, development of potential 
includes rearing male dairy calves to 2-3 years 
and fattening dairy animals prior to slaughter. 
Most beef comes from small farms that are 
located in areas with high potential (see 
Table 14). 
Each of these methods to increase pro-
duction would require a substantial increase 
in the real beef price. A significant change in 
the ratio of beef to milk prices would be 
essential if fodder is to be diverted from its 
present use primarily as feed for dairy 
animals to feed for beef cattle. However, the 
Ministry of Livestock Development has de-
clared that dairy animals have priority over 
beef in high-potential areas.76 
The price of beef also determines levels 
of investment in ranches in the semiarid and 
arid areas. Only U.S. $6 million of the U.S. $22 
million provided under a World Bank loan 
for livestock development through the Agri-
cultural Finance Corporation was actually 
disbursed during the period 1976-80. One of 
the main reasons appears to have been the 
unattractive economic returns to investment 
in beef production at prevailing prices.77 
Increased rates of culling still offer some 
potential for increasing production but only 
in the northern areas, as culling rates in the 
traditional Maasai tribal areas are already 
close to the optimum.78 Improved veterinary 
services depend primarily on allocations of 
increasingly scarce government funds. If, to 
overcome the budgetary constraint, the gov-
ernment allows increased private-sector par-
ticipation in delivery of veterinary services 
so that farmers have to pay the market price 
for these services, the beef price will again 
become a constraining factor. 
Several major studies in the 1970s em-
phasized the potential role of feedlots as a 
labor-intensive way to increase beef pro-
76 Personal communication with the head of the Development Planning Division, Ministry of Livestock Develop-
ment, Nairobi, March 1982. 
77 Agricultural Finance Corporation, personal communication, 1981. 
78J. M. White and S. J. Meadows, Evaluation of the Contribution of Group and Individual Ranches in Kajiado District to 
Economic and Social Development (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981). 
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duction.79 However, they all stressed the 
importance of low maize prices relative to 
prevailing international prices and the sen-
sitivity of feedlot returns to the beef/maize 
price ratio. Almost all of the 14 feedlots in 
the country were empty during the period 
1978-83, which indicates that a substantial 
improvement in the ratio would be required 
to induce major investment in this area. 
Although either slightly lowering the do-
mestic maize price or adjusting the exchange 
rate to raise the shilling value of the interna-
tional beef price might make a minor im-
provement, the change in the ratio is unlikely 
to be sufficient. Moreover, a recent study 
has shown the number of steers available 
annually from the North Eastern Province 
for fattening is much smaller than originally 
thought, although these data have yet to be 
confirmed.80 
Although small quantities of beef could 
possibly be exported to EC-linked markets 
like Reunion, this analysis suggests there is 
little potential for substantial beef exports 
to oil-exporting countries in the foreseeable 
future. The structure of the international 
market, and in particular the recent emer-
gence of the EC as a major beef exporter, has 
depressed international prices. This has 
made it impossible to increase local prices 
to stimulate local production without the 
KMC being compelled to export at a loss. 
Indeed, losses are inevitable for the KMC on 
exports to these markets even at present 
local prices. However, the increase in pro-
duction necessary to generate the surplus 
required will be difficult if not impossible 
to obtain without such a price increase. 
Higher returns can be obtained from sheep 
and goat production in the range areas and 
from dairying in the highland areas. Esti-
mates of the Ministry of Livestock Develop-
ment show that gross margins in 1982 were 
nine times higher for dairying than for beef 
production in "intensified small-scale com-
mercial livestock farming systems."81 One 
major negative side effect of artificially de-
pressed beef prices has been lower poultry 
prices, which has discouraged employment 
generation in the poultry industry. 
Sheep and Goats 
The International Market 
Imports of sheep and goats, both live 
and as meat, into the selected oil-exporting 
countries were valued at U.S. $545 million in 
1978, and imports grew from 1971 - 73 to 1976-
78 by 83 percent for live animals and by nearly 
500 percent for meat. The Gulf States and Iran 
were the major areas of demand. Separate 
estimates of imports by selected oil-exporting 
countries, compiled by Chemonics Inter-
national in 1977, confirm these observations. 
They estimate imports of sheep and goat 
meat into the Gulf States, excluding Iran, 
will rise from 106,000 tons in 1980 to 270,000 
tons by 1990.82 This does not include im-
ports of live animals, although there has 
been a particularly large and growing de-
mand for live lambs in Saudi Arabia at the 
time of the Hajj pilgrimage season. A study 
by the Arab Organization for Agricultural 
Development (AOAD) and FAO estimates 
imports of all types of red meat into Arabian 
peninsular states will increase 43 percent 
from 535,000 tons in 1978/79 to 766,000 
tons in 1983/84, so that African suppliers 
can potentially expand exports by up to 
250,000 tons, depending on the growth of 
local production.83 
Two aspects of the market give important 
advantages to nearby African countries. The 
AOAD-FAO study affirms that "The Arabian 
consumer has a natural preference for locally 
slaughtered fresh meat. Climate, tradition 
and religion... accentuate this preference."84 
79 W. Schaefer-Kehnert, "Economic Aspects of Intensive Beef Cattle Feeding in Kenya," International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Regional Mission in East Africa, Nairobi, March 1981 (mimeographed); and Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/World Bank, The Outlook for Meat Production and Trade in the Near 
East and East Africa. Livestock Development Country Studies, vol. 2 (Rome: FAO, 1977), p. 113. 
80 J. M. White and S. J. Meadows, An Estimate of the Supply oflmmatures from Kenya's Northern Rangelands, Livestock 
Development Project, Report 193a KE, Phase II, forecast 1980 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1974). 
81 Kenya, Ministry of Livestock Development, Animal Production Division, Costs-Prices 1982 for Livestock (Nairobi: 
Government Printer, January 1982). 
82 Chemonics International, Consulting Division, "Livestock and Meat Industry Development Study." 
83 Arab Organization of Agricultural Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
"The Market for Livestock and Meat in the Arabian Peninsula," Chapter 7. 
84 Ibid., p. 7. 
As a consequence, chilled meat is heavily 
discounted against live animal weight equiv-
alent, and frozen meat is discounted even 
further. Estimates of the price differential 
given by the study for February 1979 are 
shown in Table 17. In Riyadh, for example, 
the differential between frozen and chilled 
sheep and goat meat was 83 percent, and the 
differential between fresh meat from live 
African stock and frozen was nearly 280 
percent. These differentials do not just 
reflect consumer preference for fresh meat, 
but also consumer preference for range-fed, 
lean animals of African stock, which are 
similar to local indigenous stock. Because 
the fat on Australian sheep is sold at salvage 
Table 17—Carcass meat prices in Arabian and African retail markets, February 1979 
Beef 
Fresh 






















Sheep and Goat Meat 
F r e s h Fresh 
Local/Middle African Indian Australian Camel Frozen 
City Frozen Chilled Eastern Stock Stock Stock Stock Meat Chicken 
(U.S. $/kilogram) 
Kuwait 3.10b 5.50 2.20" 2.20 
Qatar 3.60 2.60b 
Abu Dhabi 3.60a 3.60a 
Dubai 5.70 5.20 3.15 3.90 
Riyadh 1.80b 3.30 6.00 5.00a 4.50a 3.00a 
Jeddah 1.60b 3.30b 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 
Sana'a 3.70" 4.90a 13.00 2.10 
Hodelda 8.80" 7.50a 2.00a 
Khartoum 3.00 1.60 
Mogadishu 3.00 1.80 
Source: Arab Organization of Agricultural Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, "The Market for Livestock and Meat in the Arabian Peninsula and the Role of Supplies from 
Neighboring African Surplus Regions," FAO Near East Regional Office, Cairo, November 1979 (mimeographed). 
Notes: The prices are converted to U.S. dollars using the bank exchange rates of February 1979. The subsidies vary. 
In Kuwait they are U.S. $0.55 (1.50 dinar) per kilogram of carcass at the point of slaughter for local and 
imported sheep and goats and U.S. $0.28 per animal of imported stock (this is the subsidy of cattle slaughter 
discounted as of early 1977). Qatar uses the subsidized import price of Australian sheep in order to 
standardize butcher calculation within the control price system. The present subsidy is about U.S. $0.45 per 
kilogram or 40 rials/head. The United Arab Emirates has heavily subsidized import and distribution 
schemes exclusively for the Ramadan period. These currently involve a subsidy of U.S. $1.00-$2.00 per 
kilogram of carcass derived from live or chilled imports. Saudi Arabia has a subsidy, paid to importers, of 
U.S. $0.60 per kilogram of frozen "bone-in" mutton and lamb meat and U.S. $0.83 per kilogram of the same 
meat chilled. 
a This is the government control price, unsubsidized. 
b This is the government control price, subsidized. 
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value, whereas the fat on East African fat-
tailed sheep is appreciated by the consumer 
at a price equal to that of meat, the figures 
shown in Table 17 need a further downward 
adjustment of 15 to 20 percent for Australian 
supplies.85 Clearly, consumer preference 
gives Kenya a substantial advantage over 
Australia and other more distant suppliers. 
Domestic border prices for sheep,- goat, 
and lamb meat are well below the export 
parity price of consignments to these mar-
kets. KMC estimates of price differentials in 
June 1982 are shown in Table 18. For chilled 
exotic-cross lamb, the differential is as high 
as 50 percent, whereas that for chilled local 
sheep is 33 percent. The differential for 
frozen goat meat is lower, because, as ex-
plained earlier, the market discounts frozen 
meat heavily, and the KMC finds it difficult 
to obtain carcasses of consistent quality to 
match the quality of Australian supplies. 
The KMC estimates that the market for chilled 
exotic-cross lamb is at least 5,000 tons per 
year, or nearly three airfreight charters a 
week of 35 tons each. In addition, there is 
potential for live sheep and goat exports, for 
which trials are already in progress.86 An 
FAO study in Kenya in June 1980 estimated 
an export parity price per animal of KSh 545 
or U.S. $50, against a domestic border price 
of KSh 32 0 87 Export markets offer a 70 per-
cent premium over local markets. 
Structure of Domestic Production 
Sheep and goat production in Kenya is 
divided almost equally between the range 
areas and the small farm areas. Out of an 
estimated 15.1 million head of sheep and 
goats in 1980, 8.2 million were in the range 
areas, 6.5 million on small farms, and the 
balance of 0.4 million on large farms.88 
Estimates of the sheep and goat population 
in 1969 and again in 1978 suggest an annual 
increase of 4.4 percent in the sheep population 
and 4.8 percent in the goat population. 
Goats increased from 5.09 million to 8.49 
million, which is higher than the rate of 
human population growth. 
There has been a marked increase in the 
number of sheep and goats slaughtered 
annually. The offtake rate has risen from 15 
percent of the flock in 1969 to 25 percent in 
1978 for sheep, and from 17 percent to 31 
percent for goats,89 which has resulted in a 
large increase in the supply of meat and 
animal skins. Part of this increase in skins 
may reflect skins, or even animals, crossing 
the borders from neighboring countries, 
that is, from Uganda into Western Province 
or from Somalia into North Eastern Province. 
If this were the major source of increase, 
however, one would not expect to find a 
large increase in Eastern Province, which is 
far from the border (Table 19). Thus the 
major source of the increase in skins is 
probably the increased offtake rates, which 
also account for the large increase in meat 
production. This source of increase is not 
yet exhausted, but it cannot continue without 
reducing the size of the national flock. 
There was an almost continuous fall 
from 1971 to 1979 in official purchases of 
sheep and goats by the KMC. Despite the 
large increases in production noted above 
for sheep, purchases of sheep and lambs fell 
from 65,000 to 10,000 and goats from 47,000 
to 2,000 during this period.90 On the basis of 
total offtake estimated from the number of 
skins, the KMC share of slaughtered sheep 
has dropped from 7.4 percent to 0.6 percent, 
and the share of slaughtered goats from 4.7 
percent to less than 0.1 percent from 1972 to 
1979. The main reason for the drop in KMC 
purchases has not been the decline in real 
prices during the period as a whole (Table 
20). However, sharp falls in real prices in 
1975, 1976, and 1977 may account for the 
fall in KMC purchases during those three 
85 Ibid., p. 12. 
86 The study by the AOAD and FAO states that export approval was given in 1978 for 30,000 animals. Live animals 
were still being exported in 1982 by the same company. See "The Market for Livestock and Meat in the Arabian 
Peninsula," p. 12. 
87 E. Reusse, "Consultant's Report on the Potential Export of Kenyan Sheep and Goats to Arabian Markets," Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1980, p. 5 (mimeographed). 
88 Unpublished data provided by the Kenyan Ministry of Livestock Development, Sheep and Goat Development 
Project. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 1979 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1980); and Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 1980 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981). 
Table 18—Est imates o f the d i f f e r ences b e t w e e n expor t parity pr ices and domes t i c 
border prices for sheep and goat products exported to Middle East 




Product Destination and Freight) 
Export Parity Price 
( f o b . ) Domest ic 
Freight Foreign Domest ic Border 
Cost Currency Currency3 Price 
Chilled exotic-cross lamb 
(well formed, 8-13 
kilograms) 
Chilled local-bred sheep 
(14-22 kilograms) 
Frozen goat meat 
Dubai 3,450 
Jeddah 2,550 
Gulf port 1,800° 
'.S. $/metric ton) 
1,000 (air)b 2,450 
700 (air)b 1,850 





Source: Estimates supplied by the Kenya Meat Commission. 
3 An exchange rate of U.S. $1.00 = KSh 10.9 is assumed. 
b It is assumed that 35 tons constitutes a charter shipment, that is, 3,000 lamb carcasses or 2,000 local sheep 
carcasses. 
c Frozen goat meat f rom Australia, of uniform weight and quality, is valued at approximately U.S. $2,100 per ton. 
Table 19—Production of sheepskins and goatskins, by province, 1972-79 
Province 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Nyanza 315 398 377 
Sheep 156 166 165 
Goats 159 232 212 
Western 62 98 91 
Sheep 34 54 46 
Goats 28 44 45 
Central 134 162 238 
Sheep 87 105 149 
Goats 47 57 89 
East 463 636 721 
Sheep 158 194 213 
Goats 305 442 508 
North Eastern 92 138 176 
Sheep 48 77 100 
Goats 44 61 76 
Coast 117 136 142 
Sheep 28 23 28 
Goats 89 113 114 
Rift Valley 535 665 785 
Sheep 225 277 315 




Total sheep 736 896 1,016 
Total goats 982 1,337 1,514 
Total 1,718 2,233 2,530 
(1,000) 
483 514 624 637 567 
212 215 258 253 235 
271 299 366 384 332 
98 195 314 354 248 
40 62 116 105 77 
58 133 198 249 171 
172 204 212 203 239 
104 114 120 116 134 
68 90 92 87 105 
855 1,228 1,034 1,067 1,208 
271 404 378 338 391 
584 824 656 729 817 
236 254 252 401 542 
122 123 135 218 316 
114 131 117 183 226 
158 212 164 266 212 
28 45 45 69 67 
130 167 119 197 145 
677 1,069 1,113 1,275 1,250 
294 457 454 526 516 
383 612 659 749 734 
12 17 54 32 
6 5 20 21 
6 12 34 1 1 
1,071 1,426 1,510 1,645 1,760 
1,603 2,262 2,219 2,612 2,541 
2,674 3,688 3,729 4,257 4,301 
Source: Data provided by the Kenya Ministry of Livestock Development. 
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Table 20—Average dressed carcass weights of sheep and goats and actual and de-
flated prices paid by the Kenya Meat Commission, 1964-79 
Nairobi 
Middle-
Income Sheep Lambs Goats 
Price Index Actual Deflated Actual Deflated Actual Deflated 
Year (1972=1.00) Weight Price Price Weight Price Price Weight Price Price 
(kilograms) (KSh/kilogram) (kilograms) (KSh/kilogram) (kilograms) (KSh/kilogram) 
1964 0.83 13.2 2.68 3.21 17.2 4.99 5.98 12.2 1.06 1.27 
1965 0.83 14.1 3.04 5.68 17.2 5.65 6.85 11.7 1.12 1.36 
1966 0.84 16.3 3.30 3.94 17.7 5.59 6.67 11.0 2.47 2.95 
1967 0.85 15.5 3.56 4.17 17.7 5.74 6.73 10.0 3.46 4.06 
1968 0.86 17.0 3.37 3.90 16.0 5.47 6.32 10.0 3.20 5.70 
1969 0.87 17.0 3.43 3.93 15.0 4.40 6.18 10.0 3.46 3.96 
1970 0.89 17.0 3.73 4.18 14.0 5.34 5.99 10.0 3.51 3.93 
1971 0.93 13.0 3.81 4.11 13.0 5.52 5.94 11.0 3.76 4.05 
1972 1.00 11.0 4.14 4.14 13.0 5.32 5.32 10.0 4.26 4.26 
1973 1.07 11.0 4.69 4.39 16.0 5.61 5.25 10.0 4.96 4.64 
1974 1.25 16.0 5.02 4.02 16.0 7.40 5.93 10.0 5.02 4.02 
1975 1.42 16.0 5.37 5.79 16.0 7.84 5.54 11.0 5.37 3.80 
1976 1.64 16.0 5.13 3.13 16.0 7.84 4.78 12.0 5.13 3.13 
1977 1.96 16.0 5.28 2.69 17.0 7.59 3.87 12.0 5.28 2.70 
1978 2.00 16.0 10.17 5.14 16.0 11.23 5.68 11.0 8.43 4.26 
1979 2.12 16.0 10.58 5.00 14.0 12.00 5.67 11.0 8.71 4.11 
Source: A. John De Boer, Sheep and Goat Development Project. Kenya: Production Economics (Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations and the United Nations Development Programme, 1981). 
Note: Weights are figured in kilograms of cold dressed weight. 
years. The KMC's declining share, then, 
suggests that prices have been rising more 
rapidly in unofficial markets than in official 
markets (KMC). Because the KMC is the only 
official exporter, this trend has discouraged 
exports, although in 1983 a few private 
companies were licensed to export small 
quantities. 
Thus there has probably been a sharp 
increase in consumption of sheep and goat 
meat in Kenya, with one estimate of an 
increase from 3.6 to 4.7 kilograms per capita 
from 1970 to 1975.91 With sheep and goat 
consumption in 1975 estimated at 4.7 kilo-
grams per person in a population of 13 mil-
lion, total consumption in 1975 was 61,000 
tons, which is 43 percent of the estimated 
beef output in that year.92 
Demand for sheep and goat products is 
closely related to the availability and price 
of beef and of pig and poultry meat. Based 
on the middle demand estimate, and on a 20 
percent increase in the real price of beef by 
1990, the demand for sheep and goat meat 
will be 134,000 tons by 1990, or 2.2 times 
that of 1975, so that production must in-
crease by 5.4 percent compounded per year 
just to keep up with the domestic demand.93 
Without any change in the real price of beef, 
production would have to double between 
1975 and 1990 to keep up with domestic 
demand, or increase at a compound growth 
rate of 5 percent per year. To begin to export 
significant amounts of sheep and goat meat 
on top of such large domestic demand pro-
jections will require both a large increase in 
the availability of alternatives at competitive 
prices—beef and white meat—and a suffi-
ciently large increase in productivity, so that 
growth in supply exceeds growth in demand. 
Factors governing growth of beef production 
were considered above, but the problems 
associated with growth of white meat pro-
duction are beyond the scope of this paper. 
91 Chemonics International, Consulting Division, "Livestock and Meat Industry Development Study." 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
The potential to achieve a growth in produc-
tion of more than 5 percent per year for 
sheep and goats will now be considered. 
Policies and Programs to 
Increase Production 
There is little scope to increase sheep 
and goat productivity in the short to medium 
term by increasing the size of the national 
flock. The area of land available for agricul-
tural use is expected to fall from 50.4 million 
hectares to 48.8 million hectares between 
1975 and 1990.94 There are parts of the large 
farm and southern range areas of Tana River, 
Lamu, and Kwale districts where the herds 
appear to be far smaller than the land's carry-
ing capacity. The major constraint on devel-
opment of this land is institutional. It has 
been divided into large farms but neither 
capital inflow nor intensive management 
has been applied to its development. The 
problems in development of the various 
forms of cooperative, private, and group 
ranches have been studied extensively at 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
and elsewhere, but without reform of the 
landholding system, little progress is likely 
to be made.95 
Ways of increasing productivity of the 
existing flock and estimates of their potential 
contributions are shown in Table 21. The 
most important factor is to cut back on 
surplus males in the flocks and to increase 
the number of females. Although the pro-
portion of males in the flocks of the Maasai 
tribe may now be close to the norm of 6 to 7 
percent in some areas, a study in Kajiado in 
1981 suggested that offtake rates for sheep 
and goats in that district could be 20 percent 
higher.96 The northern tribes, such as the 
Samburu and Turkana, are still holding 
close to 40 percent of the adult flock in 
males, but they will probably adjust gradually 
as economic pressures on their communities 
build up.97 Improved marketing arrange-
ments such as auctions, and increased avail-
ability of consumer goods on which the 
pastoralists can spend earnings from live-
stock sales are likely to accelerate this 
process. In recent experiments in Machakos 
and Kitui, auctions have raised prices by as 
much as 50 percent.98 Auctions are also an 
ideal place to provide information and vet-
erinary drugs to nomads and to demonstrate 
the benefits of improved management prac-
tices. For pastoralists to be willing to reduce 
holdings of male animals, however, which 
they keep as a food stock for use in years of 
low food supplies, adequate supplies of 
maize for human consumption must be avail-
able in these remote markets, even in the 
worst drought years. This has important 
implications for national storage policy. 
A second important way to increase flock 
productivity is to increase weight gain per 
unit of feed intake. The FAO work has shown 
that this is primarily a function of disease 
control in both the range and smallholder 
areas.99 Disease control not only increases 
weight gain per unit of feed in an animal but 
also in the subsequent three generations 
produced by that animal. It results in a large 
outward shift of the production function 
relating animal live weight to feed intake 
(see Figure 4). The major diseases requiring 
control are trypanosomiasis (tryps) in goats 
and roundworm infestation in sheep. Control 
of either requires use of imported veterinary 
drugs. Roundworms are controlled by worm-
ing sheep every 10 days to 2 weeks, and tryps 
by dipping goats every 2 weeks. The major 
constraints on disease control, then, are the 
availability of drugs in the field and farmers' 
willingness to administer them as often as 
necessary. 
Because drugs are provided to small-
holders almost exclusively by the veterinary 
department of the Ministry of Livestock 
Development, the increased use of these 
drugs requires larger budgetary allocations 
to the Ministry for drugs, vehicles, and 
personnel. Because departments have been 
94 ibid. 
95 For example, see Robert K. Davis, "Some Issues in the Evolution, Organization and Operation of Group Ranches in 
Kenya," Discussion Paper 93, Institute of Development Studies, Nairobi, 1970 (mimeographed); and Deborah 
Doherty, Factors Inhibiting Economic Development on Rotian Almarcongo Group Ranch. Working Paper 356 (Nairobi: 
Institute of Deve lopment Studies, 1979). 
96 Whi te and Meadows, An Estimate of the Supply of Immatures from Kenya's Northern Rangelands. 





Table 20—Average dressed carcass weights of sheep and goats and actual and de-
flated prices paid by the Kenya Meat Commission, 1964-79 
Nairobi 
Middle-
Income Sheep Lambs Goats 
Price Index Actual Def lated Actual Def lated Actual Def lated 
Year (1972=1.00) We igh t Price Price We ight Price Price Weight Price Price 
(kilograms) (KSh/kilogram) (kilograms) (KSh/kilogram) (kilograms) (KSh/kilogram) 
1964 0.83 13.2 2.68 3.21 17.2 4.99 5.98 12.2 1.06 1.27 
1965 0.83 14.1 3.04 5.68 17.2 5.65 6.85 11.7 1.12 1.36 
1966 0.84 16.3 3.30 3.94 17.7 5.59 6.67 11.0 2.47 2.95 
1967 0.85 15.5 3.56 4.17 17.7 5.74 6.73 10.0 3.46 4.06 
1968 0.86 17.0 3.37 3.90 16.0 5.47 6.32 10.0 3.20 5.70 
1969 0.87 17.0 3.43 3.93 15.0 4.40 6.18 10.0 3.46 3.96 
1970 0.89 17.0 3.73 4.18 14.0 5.34 5.99 10.0 3.51 3.93 
1971 0.93 13.0 3.81 4.11 13.0 5.52 5.94 11.0 3.76 4.05 
1972 1.00 11.0 4.14 4.14 13.0 5.32 5.32 10.0 4.26 4.26 
1973 1.07 11.0 4.69 4.39 16.0 5.61 5.25 10.0 4.96 4.64 
1974 1.25 16.0 5.02 4.02 16.0 7.40 5.93 10.0 5.02 4.02 
1975 1.42 16.0 5.37 5.79 16.0 7.84 5.54 11.0 5.37 3.80 
1976 1.64 16.0 5.13 3.13 16.0 7.84 4.78 12.0 5.13 3.13 
1977 1.96 16.0 5.28 2.69 17.0 7.59 3.87 12.0 5.28 2.70 
1978 2.00 16.0 10.17 5.14 16.0 11.23 5.68 11.0 8.43 4.26 
1979 2.12 16.0 10.58 5.00 14.0 12.00 5.67 11.0 8.71 4.11 
Source: A. John De Boer, Sheep and Goat Development Project. Kenya: Production Economics (Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations and the United Nations Deve lopment Programme, 1981). 
Note: Weights are f igured in kilograms of cold dressed weight. 
years. The KMC's declining share, then, 
suggests that prices have been rising more 
rapidly in unofficial markets than in official 
markets (KMC). Because the KMC is the only 
official exporter, this trend has discouraged 
exports, although in 1983 a few private 
companies were licensed to export small 
quantities. 
Thus there has probably been a sharp 
increase in consumption of sheep and goat 
meat in Kenya, with one estimate of an 
increase from 3.6 to 4.7 kilograms per capita 
from 1970 to 1975.91 With sheep and goat 
consumption in 1975 estimated at 4.7 kilo-
grams per person in a population of 13 mil-
lion, total consumption in 1975 was 61,000 
tons, which is 43 percent of the estimated 
beef output in that year.92 
Demand for sheep and goat products is 
closely related to the availability and price 
of beef and of pig and poultry meat. Based 
on the middle demand estimate, and on a 20 
percent increase in the real price of beef by 
1990, the demand for sheep and goat meat 
will be 134,000 tons by 1990, or 2.2 times 
that of 1975, so that production must in-
crease by 5.4 percent compounded per year 
just to keep up with the domestic demand.93 
Without any change in the real price of beef, 
production would have to double between 
1975 and 1990 to keep up with domestic 
demand, or increase at a compound growth 
rate of 5 percent per year. To begin to export 
significant amounts of sheep and goat meat 
on top of such large domestic demand pro-
jections will require both a large increase in 
the availability of alternatives at competitive 
prices—beef and white meat—and a suffi-
ciently large increase in productivity, so that 
growth in supply exceeds growth in demand. 
Factors governing growth of beef production 
were considered above, but the problems 
associated with growth of white meat pro-
duction are beyond the scope of this paper. 
91 Chemonics International, Consulting Division, "Livestock and Meat Industry Development Study." 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
The potential to achieve a growth in produc-
tion of more than 5 percent per year for 
sheep and goats will now be considered. 
Policies and Programs to 
Increase Production 
There is little scope to increase sheep 
and goat productivity in the short to medium 
term by increasing the size of the national 
flock. The area of land available for agricul-
tural use is expected to fall from 50.4 million 
hectares to 48.8 million hectares between 
1975 and 1990.94 There are parts of the large 
farm and southern range areas of Tana River, 
Lamu, and Kwale districts where the herds 
appear to be far smaller than the land's carry-
ing capacity. The major constraint on devel-
opment of this land is institutional. It has 
been divided into large farms but neither 
capital inflow nor intensive management 
has been applied to its development. The 
problems in development of the various 
forms of cooperative, private, and group 
ranches have been studied extensively at 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
and elsewhere, but without reform of the 
landholding system, little progress is likely 
to be made.95 
Ways of increasing productivity of the 
existing flock and estimates of their potential 
contributions are shown in Table 21. The 
most important factor is to cut back on 
surplus males in the flocks and to increase 
the number of females. Although the pro-
portion of males in the flocks of the Maasai 
tribe may now be close to the norm of 6 to 7 
percent in some areas, a study in Kajiado in 
1981 suggested that offtake rates for sheep 
and goats in that district could be 20 percent 
higher.96 The northern tribes, such as the 
Samburu and Turkana, are still holding 
close to 40 percent of the adult flock in 
males, but they will probably adjust gradually 
as economic pressures on their communities 
build up.97 Improved marketing arrange-
ments such as auctions, and increased avail-
ability of consumer goods on which the 
pastoralists can spend earnings from live-
stock sales are likely to accelerate this 
process. In recent experiments in Machakos 
and Kitui, auctions have raised prices by as 
much as 50 percent.98 Auctions are also an 
ideal place to provide information and vet-
erinary drugs to nomads and to demonstrate 
the benefits of improved management prac-
tices. For pastoralists to be willing to reduce 
holdings of male animals, however, which 
they keep as a food stock for use in years of 
low food supplies, adequate supplies of 
maize for human consumption must be avail-
able in these remote markets, even in the 
worst drought years. This has important 
implications for national storage policy. 
A second important way to increase flock 
productivity is to increase weight gain per 
unit of feed intake. The FAO work has shown 
that this is primarily a function of disease 
control in both the range and smallholder 
areas 99 Disease control not only increases 
weight gain per unit of feed in an animal but 
also in the subsequent three generations 
produced by that animal. It results in a large 
outward shift of the production function 
relating animal live weight to feed intake 
(see Figure 4). The major diseases requiring 
control are trypanosomiasis (tryps) in goats 
and roundworm infestation in sheep. Control 
of either requires use of imported veterinary 
drugs. Roundworms are controlled by worm-
ing sheep every 10 days to 2 weeks, and tryps 
by dipping goats every 2 weeks. The major 
constraints on disease control, then, are the 
availability of drugs in the field and farmers' 
willingness to administer them as often as 
necessary. 
Because drugs are provided to small-
holders almost exclusively by the veterinary 
department of the Ministry of Livestock 
Development, the increased use of these 
drugs requires larger budgetary allocations 
to the Ministry for drugs, vehicles, and 
personnel. Because departments have been 
94 ibid. 
95 For example, see Robert K. Davis, "Some Issues in the Evolution, Organization and Operation of Group Ranches in 
Kenya," Discussion Paper 93, Institute of Deve lopment Studies, Nairobi, 1970 (mimeographed); and Deborah 
Doherty, Factors Inhibiting Economic Development on Rotian Almarcongo Group Ranch. Working Paper 356 (Nairobi: 
Institute of Deve lopment Studies, 1979). 
96 White and Meadows, An Estimate of the Supply of Immatures from Kenya's Northern Rangelands. 





Table 21—Estimated production of edible protein from sheep and goats and the 
effects on total production of improvements in the flock 
Flock Structure 
Adult Adult Share of Flock Slaughtered 
Variable Female Male Young Total Total Adults Female Protein 









1. Existing national f lock in 1975 5,363 
2. Converting surplus males 
to females 6,468 
3. Achieving proper growth 5,363 
4. Offtake of 95 lambs per 100 ewesa 5,363 
5. Combining 2, 3, and 4 above 6,468 
6. Achieving offtake of 120 
lambs per 100 ewesb 6,221 
1,267 5,329 11,959 23 41 
258 6,468 13,194 25 49 
1,267 5,329 11,959 23 41 
1,267 5,363 11,993 42 77 
258 6,468 13,194 47 92 
249 7,780 14,250 53 117 
Source: A. John De Boer, Sheep and Goat Development Project, Kenya: Production Economics (Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations and the United Nations Development Programme, 1981). 
Notes: The estimates in (5) are based on the performance of Red Maasai sheep at the Naivasha National Animal 
Husbandry Research Station. The estimates in (6) are based on the performance of Dorper sheep at the 
Naivasha National Animal Husbandry Research Station, and on a f lock structure reduced by 10 percent to 
allow for increased forage requirements. 
a Five percent of lambs are retained for replacement of lost ewes. 
b Eight percent of lambs are retained for replacement of lost ewes. 
reorganized over the years, with a separate 
Ministry of Livestock Development from 
1979 to 1983, it is difficult to determine what 
long-term changes have been made in allo-
cations to veterinary services in recurrent 
expenditures of the government, and in 
particular those to sheep and goats. But 
there is evidence that allocations for trans-
port for Ministry field officers have dropped 
sharply.100 The share of the total budget 
allocated to veterinary services will have to 
increase, if production is to expand enough 
to ensure a surplus for export. Much of the 
increase should go to vehicles, fuel, and 
drugs. It would be easier to justify foreign 
exchange allocations to the livestock sector 
if the sector could be shown to earn foreign 
exchange itself. This is an argument not 
from economic theory but from political 
reality. 
The third way to raise flock productivity 
is to increase "twinning rates" by improve-
ment in the quality of the breeding stock. 
This is probably the largest potential source 
of increased production from the existing 
flock size (Table 21). The major breed im-
provements for sheep are crosses between 
upgraded Dorper and local Red Maasai 
stock for meat and between Hampshire rams 
and Corriedale ewes for wool and meat in 
highland areas. Improved stock has been 
made available from government research 
stations, but sales are low relative to sales 
from private flocks, which in 1981 had more 
than 12,000 Dorper rams.101 The major 
constraint on developing this source of 
productivity growth is the absence of price 
incentives to encourage pastoralists to pur-
chase the Dorper rams. The problem of 
expanding the sales of improved stock is 
also in part a problem of government re-
sources, because the Ministry of Livestock 
Development is the only institution breeding 
to improve the stock, although many private 
ranches sell young stock of existing im-
proved breeds. Thus a substantial increase 
in the resources allocated to breeding stations 
will be required for a long-term sustained 
100 David K. Leonard, "Administrative Issues in Implementing Kenya's Food Policy." a paper presented at the National 
Food Policy Seminar, July 1982. 
101 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Small Ruminants Project, personal communication, 
October 1981. 
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Figure 4—Mean growth rates of Red Maasai sheep in Naivasha under improved 





Source: Data provided by the Ministry of Livestock Development of Kenya, Small Ruminant Research Project, Kabete, 
Nairobi, 1982. 
increase in flock productivity from improved 
breeds. 
In 1980 an FAO study suggested that 
exports could be initiated slowly by allowing 
the export of just 140,000 sheep and goats 
per year.102 This amounts to only 1.5 percent 
of estimated national consumption of sheep 
and goat meat, or 0.6 percent of total red 
meat consumption. The estimated impact on 
prices was a 5 percent rise in the price of 
sheep and goat meat and a 2 percent rise in 
the price of total red meat supplies.103 The 
study recommends a broad distribution of 
export licenses to private traders, as well as 
to the KMC, and a minimum export price 
control to guarantee returns of foreign ex-
change. 
An alternative approach would be to per-
mit the KMC to export 5,000 tons of chilled 
sheep and goat meat initially, by airfreight, 
102 Reusse, "Consultant's Report on the Potential Export of Kenyan Sheep and Goats." 
103 Ibid., p. 9. 
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but to limit them to the export of male Dorper-
Red Maasai cross animals less than 14 
months old and more than 30 kilograms in 
weight. (It is possible for a trained person to 
distinguish the pure Dorper breed from the 
Dorper-Red Maasai cross.) By limiting exports 
to males of this cross, the breeding stock 
would be protected and ranches, estates, 
and pastoralists would be encouraged to 
breed improved stock. It would also ensure 
that exports would be associated with rising 
productivity and thus help to restrict the 
effect on local prices. 
In summary, Kenya has greater potential 
for supplying markets in the Gulf States and 
Iran with sheep and goats (live or as meat) 
than with beef. As domestic border prices 
were 33 percent below export parity prices 
in 1981/82, local sheep and lamb prices 
could be raised substantially to increase 
producer incentives without threatening the 
competitiveness of the local industry. Also, 
the short period between births, the high 
proportion of twinning under good manage-
ment, and the rapid gain in weight, make the 
supply elasticity higher for sheep and goats 
than for beef. More frequent births also 
make possible faster selection for improved 
breeds. This suggests that exports of sheep 




SUGAR AND MAIZE 
Sugar and maize are examined together 
because a key policy issue in Kenyan agricul-
ture is the balance to be maintained in land 
allocation between these two crops in western 
Kenya. Also, both exemplify the problem of 
exporting relatively low-value, high-volume 
commodities from areas far from the port in 
low-income countries with poorly developed 
infrastructure. 
The structure of production and the 
marketing channels of sugar and maize differ. 
In 1982/83, 27 percent of the sugar produced 
was grown on estates owned and operated 
by the factories, 16 percent on large farms, 
and 57 percent on smallholdings (see Table 
22). Part of the smallholder production is 
marketed through cooperatives, whereas most 
large farms sell directly to the factories. In 
1982/83, 26 percent of the 97,300 hectares 
sown with sugarcane was on factory estates, 
21 percent on farms of individual large 
farmers, and 53 percent on smallholdings, 
which usually belonged to cooperatives or 
settlement projects. More than 25,000 hec-
tares of smallholder sugarcane are registered 
as the Mumias Outgrowers Company.104 
The government owns between 75 and 
100 percent of the equity of each of the six 
main sugar factories.105 Overall coordination 
and control of the industry is exercised by a 
small team in a Nairobi-based parastatal, the 
Kenya Sugar Authority (KSA), which is under 
the Ministry of Agriculture. The head of the 
Crops Production Division in the Ministry is 
also responsible for licensing the 120 or so 
privately owned jaggery (brown sugar) fac-
tories, but these are not permitted within a 
26 kilometer radius of the white sugar fac-
tories to avoid competition with them. 
Maize is also sold to a parastatal, the 
National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), 
formerly the Maize and Produce Board. 
Maize production is highly concentrated in 
10 districts. However, not all maize marketed 
is sold to the NCPB; the proportion varies 
sharply from year to year depending on 
prices paid by the NCPB relative to prices 
in the informal market. The proportion mar-
keted does not increase monotonically by 
farm size, and there are important differences 
between farm-size groups in type of maize 
sold. In 1974/75, 25 percent of the total mar-
keted surplus was produced on farms of less 
than 2 hectares, and 78 percent of this was 
traditional varieties. Only 20 percent of the 
marketed surplus came from farms of more 
than 5 hectares and 73 percent of this was 
hybrid maize (see Table 23). 
The NCPB, which is also accountable to 
the Ministry of Agriculture, is the only legal 
purchaser of maize except what is "sold or 
bartered by a producer in the district in which 
it has been grown, to an individual in the 
same district, for the latter's consumption, 
or that of his family in the said district."106 
Thus in theory the informal market should 
be extremely small. However, for one year in 
1977/78 a maize glut led to a change whereby 
millers and traders were allowed to buy 
directly from farmers, and purchases by 
millers were 40 percent as large as those of 
the NCPB. Until 1979/80, the Maize and 
Produce Board hired local traders to trans-
port the maize to its storage facilities and 
deducted the cost of KSh 3.50 from farmers' 
payments. Since 1980/81, the NCPB has 
established its own collection points and 
has borne the cost of transport from the 
collection centers to its main depots, which 
in effect has raised the price to the grower. 
In years of poor crops, prices paid to farmers 
by private traders are often 200 to 300 per-
cent higher than those paid by the NCPB in 
rural markets.107 The lack of effective police 
supervision in rural areas has permitted this 
substantial informal market to develop. The 
104 Data provided by the Kenya Sugar Authority, August 1983. 
105 Kenya, Working Party on Government Expenditures, Report and Recommendations, p. 94. 
106 Kenya, Laws of Kenya, The Maize Marketing Act. revised ed„ Chapter 338 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1972), p. 7. 
107 Data on maize prices in informal markets have been published monthly since 1977 in Kenya, Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues. 
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Table 22—Sugarcane production, by type of grower, 1978-82 
Farm Type 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982a 
(metric tons) 
Factory estates 626,467 920,595 924,978 839,423 847,422 
Large farms 282,260 379,618 555,927 675,694 496,874 
Smallholders 846,854 1,228,876 1,772,264 1,720,520 1,331,724 
Cooperative societies 351,079 231,680 310,762 260,831 165,530 
Settlement schemes 242,548 386,811 408,348 325,512 266,186 
Total 2,349,208 3,147,580 3,972,279 3,821,980 3,107,736 
Source: Unpublished data from the Kenya Sugar Authority. 
a The figures for 1982 are provisional. 
government fixes maize prices in an annual 
price review. It also decides other important 
parameters, such as who pays transport and 
drying costs, although these are not usually 
included in the price review process. 
Sugar 
Export Market Potential 
Kenya's sugar production tripled between 
1970 and 1980 (see Table 24). As a result, 
Kenya changed from being a net importer of 
21,000 tons in 1970 to being a net exporter 
of 95,000 tons in 1980, despite a large increase 
in consumption during the 10 years. In 1980 
Kenya exported 56,000 tons of "plantation 
white" sugar, with a value of U.S. $28.2 million. 
Of the principal countries buying this sugar, 
Sri Lanka purchased 40,000 tons, Sudan, 
13,000 tons, and Djibouti, 2,500 tons.108 In 
addition, Kenya exported 92,000 tons of 
molasses with a value of U.S. $6.6 million, 
mainly to the United Kingdom. Kenya did 
not export any sugar to the EC: as a traditional 
importer, Kenya received a quota of only 93 
tons under the Lome Convention.109 
There is a potential market for Kenyan 
sugar exports in the oil-exporting countries 
of Africa and the Middle East, but because 
these countries generally import refined 
white sugar, rather than the less refined 
"plantation white" quality, additional capital 
investment in refining capacity would be 
required in those factories that would pro-
duce for the export market. The four major 
oil-producing countries importing sugar are 
Iran, Iraq, Algeria, and Indonesia. In 1979 
these four countries together constituted 10 
percent of the total world market in sugar 
and more than 25 percent of the Third World 
market.110 For Kenya to export to these mar-
kets it would have to compete with the world's 
major exporters of sugar. In 1979 these were 
Cuba, with 25 percent of world exports; 
France, 9 percent; Australia, 8 percent; 
Thailand, 5 percent; and the Philippines, 5 
percent. Note, however, that the major sup-
pliers to Indonesia in this period were all 
Third World countries: India, 33 percent; 
Brazil, 19 percent; and Cuba, 18 percent.111 
Long-Term Prices and Production Costs 
The long-term international sugar price, 
estimated at constant 1981 prices, is U.S. $372 
per ton.112 The World Bank points out two 
factors that could undermine the prospects 
for developing-country exports in the long 
run. The first is the large and growing exports 
of the EC. The EC was a net importer—of 1.76 
million tons in 1975—but became a net ex-
108 Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise Department, Annual Trade Report, 1980. 
109 K. Dankowski, R. Barth, and Guntwin Bruhns, Zucherwirtschaftliches Taschenbuch 1979/80 (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Albert 
Bartens, 1979), p. 41. 
110 International Sugar Organization, Statistical Bulletin, various issues, 1980. 
111 Ibid. 
112 World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. 2: 53. 
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Table 23—Marketed surplus of maize, by farm size group, 1974-75 
Total 































(percent) (1,000 metric tons) (percent) 
Less than 
0.5 79.2 0.72 19.2 10.9 24.8 1.81 38.3 17.2 28.1 4.3 
0.5 - 0.9 143.7 1.51 52.0 112.9 39.6 1.45 42.8 24.5 137.4 20.8 
1 .0 - 1.9 306.2 0.84 46.0 117.9 79.5 1.11 29.4 25.9 143.8 21.8 
2.0 - 2.9 217.2 0.72 44.4 69.8 66.8 0.93 41.2 25.6 95.4 14.5 
3.0 - 3.9 139.5 0.39 32.7 17.8 52.0 0.70 13.0 4.7 22.5 3.4 
4.0 - 4.9 109.1 1.18 62.9 81.0 44.8 1.09 42.6 20.7 101.7 15.4 
5.0 - 7.9 138.8 0.42 45.4 26.3 110.2 1.01 34.3 38.1 64.4 9.8 
8.0 or more 60.9 0.42 35.4 9.0 83.0 1.22 57.0 57.7 66.7 10.1 
Total 1,194.6 0.80 47.6 445.6 500.8 1.10 37.9 214.4 660.0 100.1 
Source: Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Rural Survey 1974-75, Basic 
Report (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1977), 
Note: Vertical and horizontal totals may differ slightly because of rounding. 
a This includes area planted in mixed stand with maize and beans. 
b The percent sold was calculated as all produce not consumed. This slightly exaggerates the quantity sold because a 
small amount is retained for seed. 
porter—of 2.67 million tons—by 1980; net 
exports are estimated to rise to 4.5 million 
tons by 1985 and to 5.8 million tons by 1990. 
In 1980 EC gross exports of 5.1 million tons 
represented nearly 20 percent of gross ex-
ports by main countries and economic re-
gions. 113 
Although the World Bank expects the 
growth of EC exports to slow from 10 percent 
per year in the 1970s to 4 percent per year in 
the 1980s, the EC is expected to keep its share 
of world exports, which is about 20 percent. 
Under the sugar protocol, countries that ex-
ported sugar to the United Kingdom under 
the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement were 
given a duty-free quota of 1.3 million tons 
into the EC when the United Kingdom joined. 
For this reason, EC imports are unlikely to 
fall below this, so that rising production 
surpluses in the EC will be exported rather 
than used to displace imports. Given that 
demand is highly inelastic with respect to 
price, a 10 percent increase in traded world 
sugar supplies may well lower the interna-
tional price by more than 10 percent. 
A second factor detrimental to developing-
country export prospects is the rapid growth 
of production of a sugar substitute made 
from maize, called high fructose corn syrup. 
The United States and Japan are expected to 
increase production of this sweetener from 
2.4 million tons in 1980 to 5.5 million tons in 
1990.114 Largely as a consequence of these 
two factors, the World Bank sees no real in-
crease in international sugar prices up to 
1995 despite expectations of a large increase 
in demand from Third World countries. 
International sugar prices fluctuate greatly 
around the trend. Kenya's price at the factory 
and the world market price are shown in 
Table 25 for the period 1971-80. The world 
price is for raw sugar, which always lies a 
few percentage points below the market price 
for the plantation white sugar that Kenya 
currently produces. In 6 out of the 11 years 
from 1971 to 1981, the international sugar 
price was above the price paid by the gov-
ernment to the factories in Kenya. When the 
cost of transport is added to the factory cost, 
the domestic border price is substantially 
greater. For example, in September 1981, the 
cost of moving sugar to the coast was U.S. $52 
per ton, which was 18 percent of the factory 
113 Ibid., 2: 69 and 70. 
114 Ibid., 2: 60. 
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Table 24—Kenya's sugar production, consumption, and trade, 1970-82 
Area Under Per Capita 
Year Population Production Imports Consumption Exports Cane3 Consumption 
(millions) (1,000 metric tons) (1,000 hectares) (kilograms 
1970 11.2 131 21 162 n.a. 14.5 
1971 11.7 107 72 183 n.a. 15.6 
1972 12.1 90 104 195 43.2 16.1 
1973 12.5 138 77 217 45.2 17.4 
1974 12.9 164 71 224 47.2 17.4 
1975 13.4 160 13 195 48.9 14.6 
1976 13.8 167 45 197 50.2 14.3 
1977 14.3 181 36 224 60.5 15.7 
1978 14.8 238 46 251 66.6 16.9 
1979 15.3 296 13 253 2.0 87.8 16.5 
1980 15.9 401 2 300 94.7 n.a. 18.9 
1981 16.5 367 2 324 69.1 n.a. 19.6 
1982 17.2 307 328 18.3 97.3 19.1 
Source: Unpublished data from the Kenya Sugar Authority. 
Note: Where n.a. appears, the data were not available. 
a Refers to crop year, that is, the 1972 figure is for 1972/73, and so forth. 
cost, or 16 percent of the domestic border 
price (Table 26). 
The relatively high indirect taxation on 
sugar production pushes up the domestic 
costs of production. The major cost com-
ponents in sugarcane production are shown 
in Table 27. Nearly 50 percent of cane cost is 
in transport and field machinery costs, and 26 
percent in fertilizer and chemicals. High 
road taxes contribute to the high transport 
costs. The rate of taxation on 7- and 12-ton 
trucks in early 1982 was 26 percent (Table 
28). This tax encourages intermediate tech-
nology, such as bullock carts, that saves 
Table 25—Kenya's sugar production costs and world sugar prices, 1971-81 
World Price in 
Kenya Exchange Converted Kenya Relation to Kenya 
Year Factory Price3 Rate Factory Price World Priceb Factory Price 
(KSh/metric ton) ( K S h - U.S. $1) (U.S. $/metric ton) 
1971 1,080 7.14 151 99 -52 
1972 1,080 7.14 151 160 +9 
1973 1,230 6.90 178 208 +30 
1974 1,230 7.14 172 653 + 481 
1975 1,860 8.25 225 448 +223 
1976 2,300 8.31 277 253 -24 
1977 2,800 7.95 352 178 -174 
1978 2,800 7.40 378 172 -206 
1979 2,800 7.33 382 212 -170 
1980 2,800 7.57 370 631 +261 
April 1981 3,050 8.45 361 480 + 119 
September 1981 3,050 10.42 293 320 +27 
Sources: Data on the Kenya price at the factory were supplied by the Kenya Sugar Authority. The exchange rate is 
from the selected foreign exchange mean rates in Central Bank of Kenya, Economic and Financial Review 14 
(October-December 1981). The world price is taken from International Sugar Organization, Statistical Bulletin, 
various issues. 
3 The factory price is the price fixed by the government at which the factory sells processed white sugar to the Kenya 
National Trading Corporation. 
b The International Sugar Organization's world price refers to the price f.o.b. or stowed at main Caribbean ports. 
6 0 
Table 26—Estimated costs of moving 
sugar from the farm to the 
port of Mombasa, 1981/82 




Rail transport from sugar 
factory to Mombasa 300 
Wharf and handlingb 18 
Insurance (1 percent of 
f.o.b. value)0 26 
Interest (14 percent of f.o.b. 
value for 1 month)c 31 
Total 549 
Total in U.S. dollars 52.30 
Sources: The cost of bags comes from a personal com-
munication from the Ministry of Agriculture. 
The cost of transport from sugar factory to 
Mombasa was given by Kenya Railways, and 
the wharf and handling charges are taken 
from Kenya Ports Authority, "Tariffs of Rates 
and Charges for Wharfage Handling and 
General Services," Tariff Book No. 2. Effective 1 
July 1982 (Nairobi: Kenya Ports Authority, 
1982). 
3 Sugar is exported in bags. The figure used here is the 
cost of 11 new bags (the number needed for 1 metric 
ton) with polythene liners. Each bag costs KSh 12.85 
and the liner is an additional KSh 3.00. 
b This is the minimum charge, assuming that there are 
no late document charges, no transfer of cargo in the 
port area, no hiring of equipment, nor any other 
additional charges. 
c The costs of insurance and interest are based on an 
f.o.b. value of U.S. $ 120 per metric ton, with U.S. $ 1.00 
equaling KSh 10.5. 
foreign exchange, but it also helps to make 
low-value, bulky agricultural exports un-
competitive in world markets. 
Assumptions were required for some parts 
of the sugar production process, because 
there was not enough time to collect data for 
detailed estimates. The average rate of tax-
ation on heavy agricultural machinery was 
assumed to be 20 percent, which is lower 
than that for 12-ton trucks, because import 
duty for most agricultural machinery is lower. 
There are no taxes on imported fertilizers or 
chemicals, but a 5 percent implicit tax com-
ponent is added to cover transport costs and 
packaging materials. Based ori the relative 
weights attached to production inputs in 
Table 27, this gives a total indirect tax rate 
on sugarcane production of 13 percent. 
The tax on sugarcane processing and 
transport to the coast is more difficult to 
estimate. Aldington estimates approximately 
50 percent of processing costs are items 
with a large import component, such as 
machinery (including both depreciation and 
spare parts), oil, chemicals, road maintenance, 
and so forth.115 Assuming an average tax 
rate of 20 percent on operating this machinery 
as with agricultural machinery and given 
that these elements represent half of total 
processing costs (Table 26), the rate of tax-
ation for processing would be about 10 per-
cent. As the sugar is transported to the point 
of exit on the railways, only a 5 percent in-
direct tax is assumed because there is no duty 
and sales tax rate applicable to imported 
engines or rolling stock. Thus the overall tax 
rate for sugar produced for export is estimated 
at about 10 percent; further research should 
estimate this more precisely. Given that in 
September 1981 the cost of Kenya sugar was 
U.S. $293 per ton at the official exchange 
rate (Table 25), plus U.S. $52 for transport 
(Table 26) and less U.S. $30 in indirect taxes 
(as estimated above), the domestic border 
price net of tax would have been U.S. $315. 
This is 15 percent below the long-term equi-
librium sugar price to 1995 at the constant 
1981 price of U.S. $372 estimated by the World 
Bank. Thus Kenya can probably export sugar 
competitively at long-term international 
prices. 
Potential to Lower Production Costs 
High sugar yields are another indicator 
of Kenya's ability to compete effectively in 
the international sugar market. Current yields 
reflect the suitability of the climate and soil 
conditions in the growing area, the adoption 
of high-yielding varieties, and the improved 
agronomic practices used by farmers. Yields 
vary widely among Kenya's eight factories, 
so that average yields at Mumias are three or 
four times higher than at Ramisi (Table 29). 
Yields of farm area attached to factories in 
western Kenya compare favorably with those 
in Maharashtra in western India, which has a 
similar length of growing season. Maharashtra 
115 T. J. Aldington, "Domestic Resource Costs," Nairobi, 1979 (mimeographed). 
61 







Foreign Exchange Costs 




Share from Opportunity Cost of 
Domestic Cost Domestic 
Resources Weight Resources 
(KSh/ (KSh/ (percent) (U.S. $/ (percent) (KSh/ 
hectare) metric metric ton) metric ton) 
ton) 
Cane 
Field machinery 1,412.00 6.28 60.0 0.50 40.0 1.20a 3.01 
Seed treatment 103.00 0.46 60.0 0.04 40.0 1.20a 0.22 
Planting 303.45 1.35 100.0 0.18 
Labor 2,757.30 15.28 100.0 0.55a 8.40 
Fertilizer 1,776.10 7.89 77.0 0.81 23.0 0.90a 1.63 
Transport 27.00 60.0 2.16 40.0 1.20a 12.96 
Interest (10 percent) 3.42 100.0 1.00 3.42 
Land opportunity 
cost 880.00 3.91 100.0 1.00 3.91 
Total 7,231.85 65.59 42.2 3.69 57.8a 33.55 
White sugar 
Cost of cane 655.90 42.2 36.90 57.8a 0.88a 335.50 
Processing 1,238.74 52.8 87.19 47.2a 0.99a 580.77 
Transport to coast 
Sugar 347.00 49.4 22.84 50.6a 1.04a 182.65 
Molasses 234.00 57.7 18.05 42.3a 1.17a 115.82 
Total 2,475.64 50.0 164.98 50.0 0.99a 1,228.57 
Source: Derived from data contained in T. J. Aldington, Domestic Resource Costs (Nairobi: Government Printer, 
January 1979). 
Notes: The exchange rate assumed is U.S. $1.00 = KSh 7.5. The planting costs incurred are for the sugarcane used 
for planting. This can be regarded as a foreign exchange cost because the cane used for planting would 
otherwise have been processed and exported. 
a This is the weighted average of estimates for components that make up these costs. 
averaged 65.9 tons per hectare in 1976/77 
and 85 tons per hectare in 1978/79.116 Kenya's 
sugarcane yieids are even more remarkable 
in view of the limited resources allocated to 
sugarcane research. 
There is still considerable scope to in-
crease yields through improvements in water 
control, input delivery, and extension ser-
vices. Average yields of estates, at 300 tons 
per hectare over a 60-month cycle, were 70 
percent higher than those of smallholders in 
1980/81.117 
The impression that production costs are 
low in Kenya has been supported by a com-
parison of international production costs.118 
But this apparent technical superiority has 
to be examined in the context of input use 
and overall cost increases to analyze whether 
it reflects a genuine comparative advantage. 
Kenya may also be able to lower long-
term costs by reducing finance, factory main-
tenance, and transport costs. Because all but 
two of Kenya's factories have been built since 
1965, capital costs have not yet been written 
off. Transport costs are also high: 50 percent 
of cane production costs are for transport 
and field machinery (Table 27). Initial ex-
periments to reduce these costs by replacing 
trucks and machinery with bullock labor 
have been encouraging, at least for weeding 
between rows.119 But because the main cost 
of bullock labor is the opportunity cost of 
land to produce the feed required, further 
analysis is needed. Finally, an increased 
domestic capability to manufacture spare 
parts would reduce the number of spares that 
need to be kept in stock and perhaps also 
reduce their cost. 
116 India, Ministry of Agriculture and Education, Department of Economics and Statistics, Estimates of Area and 
Production of Principal Crops in India. 1978/79 (New Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1980). 
117 Kenya Sugar Authority, personal communication, 1982. 
118 Connell, Rice and Co., World Sugar: Capacity. Cost and Policy (Westfield, N.J.: Connell, Rice and Co., 1977). 
119 Kenya Sugar Authority, personal communication, 1982. 
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Table 28—Estimate of the tax rate paid by the road transport industry, 1981/82 
7-Ton Truck 12-Ton Truck 
Operating Operating 
Item of Expenditure Cost Tax Cost Tax Tax Rate 
(KSh/kilometer) (percent) 
Depreciation3 0.81 0.27 1.02 0.35 
Fuelb 1.73 0.41 1.85 0.44 
Insurance0 0.30 0.45 
Spare partsd 0.60 0.32 0.69 0.37 
Labor 0.24 0.28 
Labor for servicing 0.12 0.12 
Tires6 0.45 0.14 0.75 0.23 
Road taxf 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Interest (15 percent)8 0.24 0.30 
Total 4.52 1.17 5.49 1.42 
Sources: Data on insurance, servicing, and spare parts are from records of a major road freight and forwarding 
company of Nairobi. The rates of duties and sales taxes are from Kenya's Custom and Excise Act of 1978 
and the Finance Bill, which was published in the Kenya Gazette Supplements for June 1978, June 1979, June 
1980, and June 1981. 
Notes: The costs are calculated assuming that the trucks go 100,000 kilometers each year. Total taxes placed on 
the trucks are 34 percent. This assumes that the user paid KSh 323,000 for a 7-ton truck and 406,000 for a 
12-ton truck. With a sales tax rate of 15 percent, deductions of 7.5 percent for the profit of the importer and 
10 percent for the cost of the chassis, and a duty of 40 percent, the total tax is KSh 109,990 for a 7-ton truck 
and KSh 138,259 for a 12-ton truck. 
a Depreciation is assumed to be a straight 25 percent each year for four years. 
b Fuel is assumed to cost K Sh 5.18 per liter. Fuel consumption is assumed to be 3 kilometers per liter for a 7-ton truck 
and 2.8 kilometers per liter for a 12-ton truck. 
0 The insurance on a 7-ton truck is assumed to be KSh 30,000 and on a 12-ton truck, KSh 45,000. 
d The costs of servicing a 7-ton truck are K Sh 8,000 a month; K Sh 5,000 of this is for spare parts. It is assumed that the 
costs for a 12-ton truck are 15 percent higher. This is because it would carry heavier loads (the engines of the two 
kinds of trucks are the same size). 
e It was assumed that 1.5 sets of retreads and 1.5 sets of new tires are bought for each truck each year. A 7-ton truck 
has 6 wheels; a 12-ton truck, 10. So if a new tire costs K Sh 5,500 and a retread, K Sh 2,000, the total cost of tires would 
be KSh 45,000 for a 7-ton truck and KSh 75,000 for a 12-ton truck. 
f The road tax is KSh 3,000 per year. 
8 Interest can be defined as the opportunity cost of capital tied up in the vehicle. Under this definition, the interest 
falls as the vehicle depreciates. As it is assumed that the vehicle is written of f after 4 years, interest here is the 
opportunity cost of the capital in the vehicle when it is 2 years old and worth half of what it was when it was new. 
h The duty on diesel fuel is KSh 440 per 1,000 liters and the sales tax is KSh 787 per 1,000 liters, for a total tax of 
KSh 1,227 per 1,000 liters, which is 23.7 percent of the pump price. 
1 The taxes on spare parts are the same as the taxes on the trucks themselves, that is, the duty is 40 percent, and the 
sales tax, 15 percent, which gives a total tax of 34 percent. 
' The sales tax on both new tires and retreads is 15 percent. The duty on the raw materials that go into new tires is 30 
percent. The duty on the machinery and spare parts used for retreads is 20 percent. So the tax rate on all tires is 30 
percent. 
New Factory Capacity 
Although Kenya is expected to have some 
excess factory capacity between 1981 and 
1989, none is expected after 1989 unless 
factory capacity is expanded. Capacity is 
expected to reach 481,500 tons in the early 
1980s and could increase to 520,000 tons by 
1988 by extending existing factory capacity. 
In addition, a new factory may be built at 
Busia. This growth in production is not ex-
pected to keep up with growth in consump-
tion, which the 1981 National Food Policy 
paper estimates will reach 570,000 tons by 
1989, based on a 4 percent annual growth 
rate.120 This is lower than the compound 
120 Kenya, National Assembly, Sessional Papers. 1981. Paper No. 4, "National Food Policy." 
Table 29—Yields of sugarcane from area belonging to eight sugar factories, 1976-80 
Factory 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
(metric tons/hectare) 
Western Kenya 
Mumias 101.4 123.3 153.2 150.9 167.7 
Nzoia3 161.3 141.7 n.a. 
Chemilil 67.2 79.4 121.2 126.5 100.9 
Muhoroni 84.5 76.3 85.1 75.3 84.9 
Miwani 42.4 40.8 94.5 99.8 63.3 
Sony" 71.3 n.a. 
Kabwas 65.1 68.8 75.5 68.5 n.a. 
Coast Province 
Ramisi 26.4 32.7 45.4 39.9 n.a. 
Source: Unpublished data provided by the Kenya Sugar Authority. 
Note: Where n.a. appears, the figure was not available. 
a Production began at Nzoia in 1978 and at Sony in 1979. 
growth of consumption from 162,000 tons in 
1970 to 300,000 tons in 1980, which is a com-
pound growth rate of 6.36 percent (Table 24). 
However, the growth rate will primarily be 
determined by growth in per capita income. 
Unless growth in consumption drops sub-
stantially below 4 percent per year, there is 
not expected to be any surplus available for 
export by 1989 without investment in addi-
tional factory capacity. 
With costs of new factory capacity now 
at U.S. $1,500 to $2,000 per ton of raw sugar 
per year and 60-80 percent higher if the cost 
of the agricultural complement and the in-
frastructure are included,121 the capital costs 
for 50,000 tons of white sugar per year will 
be about U.S. $85 million at current prices. 
An alternative would be to expand the already 
substantial jaggery production for domestic 
consumption, making part of existing white 
sugar production available for export. The 
number of jaggery factories in Kenya is un-
certain. The 1974 Directory of Industries 
lists only six companies in Western and 
Nyanza provinces that produce jaggery,122 
but as many as 120 jaggery factories are li-
censed by the Ministry of Agriculture.123 Of 
these, the majority are sited on sugar estates 
formerly owned by Asians, which are now 
owned and operated by African farmers. If 
jaggery were priced below white sugar in the 
domestic market, low-income groups might 
be persuaded to use it instead of white sugar. 
Moreover, there would be nutritional benefits 
because jaggery contains several important 
minerals, such as iron, that are not contained 
in plantation white sugar.124 
Although the sugar recovery ratio is sig-
nificantly lower in jaggery than in white 
sugar (7.5 percent as against 10 percent), it 
would have several major advantages. Jaggery 
production allows factories to be located 
close to production and thus reduces trans-
port costs, which are 38 percent of all grower 
costs (Tables 27 and 28). Most of the skills 
required in jaggery processing are not ac-
quired from formal training, and thus the 
industry makes fewer demands on the scarce 
supply of highly trained manpower. Also, it 
has greater backward linkages to domestic 
manufacturing, as the machinery and spare 
parts could be manufactured locally. 
The process probably is also less capital-
intensive per unit of output. A 1977 study of 
121 World Bank Regional Mission for East Africa, Nairobi, personal communication, November 1981. The Commodities 
and Export Projections Division of the World Bank in Washington estimates factory costs at roughly $1,000 per ton of 
annual capacity, which probably reflects the lower costs in the more industrialized countries of Asia and Latin 
America (see World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. 2: 54). 
122 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Directory of Industries 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1974). 
123 Kenya Sugar Authority, personal communication, November 1982. 
124 Ruth Oniango, "Nutrition and Food Consumption Policies," a paper presented at the Food Research Priorities 
Conference of the National Council for Science and Technology, Nairobi, June 2, 1982 (mimeographed). 
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small plantation white sugar plants that pro-
duce less than 600 tons of sugar per day 
estimates that the total cost per ton of sugar 
produced by these miniplants was KSh 2,967, 
against K Sh 5,743 for the large Nzoia factory 
being constructed at that time.125 Data on 
whether lower capital intensity extends down 
to the jaggery factory is not available, but 
should be easy to obtain given the large 
number of factories already operating in 
Kenya. There can be no doubt that, because 
more labor is used per unit of output, jaggery 
offers greater employment opportunities 
per ton of sugar produced than the larger 
units. The smaller absolute amounts of capital 
involved for each production unit make it 
possible to finance construction by mobiliz-
ing rural savings rather than by using foreign 
loans. However, the interests of the existing 
white sugar factories and large-scale ma-
chinery manufacturers overseas militate 
against expansion of the jaggery industry. 
Maize 
It may seem surprising to include maize 
as a potential food export commodity after 
the shortages in 1979/80 and 1980/81. How-
ever, the history of Kenya's maize production 
during the last 20 years shows alternating 
periods of surplus and deficit, and during 
many of the periods of surplus, there have 
been exports (see Table 30). 
Although the fluctuations of NCPB pur-
chases and sales are caused in part by weather 
variability, it is not because rainfall is un-
reliable in the major producing areas. Be-
tween 65 and 88 percent of NCPB purchases 
in each year of the last 10 years have come 
from six districts in Western and Rift Valley 
provinces (Table 31). To be adequate for 
maize production, the rainfall in these dis-
tricts in the growing period from April to 
August should be a minimum of 100 milli-
meters each month. This also allows for 
some unevenness in the distribution of rain-
fall within each month. Rain is particularly 
important during the 10 days when the maize 
tassels appear, which usually occurs in late 
June or early July. With few exceptions, rain-
fall in each of the major maiza exporting 
districts in each month of the growing season 
in each year has exceeded the minimum 
requirements (Table 32). As Table 33 shows, 
however, there is substantial weather var-
iability in districts where maize deficits 
periodically occur. This suggests that fluc-
tuations in NCPB purchases are a conse-
quence of official NCPB price changes and 
other nonprice factors governing crop de-
livery and payment rather than of weather 
variability. 
A regression analysis of maize deliver-
ies to NCPB during the period 1965-74 by 
Hesselmark, which uses only rainfall as an 
explanatory variable, showed low correlation 
with the major producing areas, which he 
calls North Rift (0.0006), Western Kenya (0.22), 
and Central and Eastern Kenya (0.06). How-
ever, when hybrid seed sales were added, 
the model showed a close fit to the data for 
the major maize-surplus areas of North Rift 
(r2 = 0.93) and Western Kenya (r2 = 0.98), but 
rather poor results for the areas of occasional 
maize deficit in Central and Eastern Kenya 
(r2 = 0.4).126 Hybrid seed sales in North Rift 
and Western Kenya were probably a good 
proxy variable for changes in the area planted 
in those regions, and also for expected price. 
These results conflict with the data in 
Table 32, which show that rainfall was always 
adequate for maize in the major surplus re-
gions, and thus it should not be a significant 
variable. A possible way to explain rainfall's 
significance in the model is through an 
understanding of unofficial markets. If rain-
fall in maize-deficit areas is highly variable, 
as Table 33 suggests, then years of low rain-
fall in maize-deficit regions may be years of 
low sales by maize-surplus areas to NCPB, 
because there is greater opportunity to sell 
to maize-deficit areas through unofficial 
markets. Rainfall in maize-surplus regions 
in Hesselmark's model may, therefore, be a 
proxy for rainfall in maize-deficit regions, as 
well as a proxy for demand for maize in un-
official marketing channels. 
Price and Nonprice Factors 
The official price paid by the government 
to farmers increased from KSh 80.00 in 1979/ 
125 J. P. Mukherji and Assistants, "Feasibility Study on Mini Sugar Plants in Kenya," a study undertaken for the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi, 1977 (mimeographed). 
126 Olof Hesselmark, "The Relation between Rainfall and Maize Marketing in Kenya," a paper prepared for the Maize 
and Produce Board, Nairobi, May 1975 (mimeographed). 
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Table 30—Purchases and sales of maize by the National Cereals and Produce Board 
(NCPB) and imports and exports of maize, 1959/60-1981/82 
Surplus 
Year NCPB Purchases NCPB Sales or Deficit Imports Exports 
(1,000 bags) 
1959/60 1,659 1,404 +255 100 
1960/61 1,586 2,127 -541 199 2 
1961/62 1,643 1,433 +210 713 101 
1962/63 2,233 1,041 + 1,192 1,063 
1963/64 1,073 1,131 -58 611 
1964/65 1,170 5,505 -4,335 396 11 
1965/66 1,474 1,735 -261 2,131 
1966/67 2,509 1,616 +893 694 
1967/68 3,582 1,073 +2,509 2,986 
1968/69 3,246 1,284 + 1,962 2,715 
1969/70 2,152 2,003 + 149 148 380 
1970/71 2,668 3,208 -540 
1971/72 4,211 2,117 +2,094 298 
1972/73 5,083 2,153 +2,930 1,799 
1973/74 3,727 3,876 -149 1,512 
1974/75 5,009 3,773 + 1,236 
1975/76 6,174 4,193 + 1,981 2,495 
1976/77 6,031 4,253 + 1,778 162 
1977/78 2,713a 1,442 + 1,271 306 
1978/79 2,648 4,149 -1,501 1,456 
1979/80 1,456 5,222 -3,766 1,833 233 
1980/81 4,367 7,611 -3,244 4,867 
1981/82 7,500b 5,876 + 1,624 2,278 
Sources: For 1959/60 to 1978/79, Maize and Produce Board, Annual Report. 1959/60-1978/79 (Nairobi: Maize and 
Produce Board, 1960-79). For 1979/80 to 1981/82, unpublished data provided by the National Cereals and 
Produce Board. 
Note: One bag equals 90 kilograms net. 
a This figure does not include purchases of 2 million bags by millers directly from farmers. 
b This estimate was announced by the Minister of Agriculture (Daily Nation. April 26, 1982). 
80 to KSh 95.00 per bag in 1981/82. How-
ever, changes in nonprice factors, such as 
collection and drying costs, have become of 
major importance since 1975, and they may 
change the farmgate price to the farmer by as 
much as 20 percent. Prior to 1980/81, farmers 
were responsible for the cost of delivering 
their crops to NCPB depots, paying KSh 3.50 
per bag. In 1980/81, in response to maize 
shortages, the NCPB took over the cost of 
transferring maize from the farm by estab-
lishing buying centers in various locations 
close to farms to collect smallholders' produce. 
This was at a cost to the NCPB of K Sh 15.30 
per bag of 90 kilograms.127 
That same year NCPB agreed to dry at its 
own cost any lot less than 10 bags, which is 
approximately 75 percent of the Kenyan 
maize crop. For 1981/82, the total cost to 
NCPB of this drying of the crop was K Sh 13.20 
per bag or KSh 147.00 per ton. This figure is 
based on drying costs of KSh 8.42 per bag for 
fuel, machinery depreciation, management, 
and labor. The weight loss of nearly 5 kilo-
grams when the water is removed adds a fur-
ther cost of KSh 4.78, as additional maize 
must be added to bring the weight of the bags 
back to 90 kilograms. This brings the total 
cost of drying to KSh 13.20 per bag.128 Be-
cause only 75 percent has to be dried, the 
average cost of drying is reduced from 
K Sh 13.20 to K Sh 9.90 per bag, or 10.4 percent 
of the official price in 1981/82 of KSh 95.00 
per 90 kilogram bag. 
With NCPB now meeting transport costs, 
the K Sh 3.50 for transport was also no longer 
127 National Cereals and Produce Board, personal communication, 1982. 
128 Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi, personal communication, 1982. 
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Table 31—Official purchases of maize from selected districts, 1970/71-1979/80 
Rift Valley Province Western Province 
Year Nandi Nakuru Trans Nzoia Uasin Gishu Bungoma Kakamega 
(1,000 bags) 
1970/71 212.3 163.5 690.9 470.3 521.0 297.1 
1971/72 359.6 147.9 1,048.2 521.0 906.1 504.8 
1972/73 418.1 328.1 1,283.2 508.9 561.3 509.7 
1973/74 376.1 59.4 843.0 425.8 509.9 846.6 
1974/75 400.7 164.4 787.4 346.7 551.2 1,070.3 
1975/76 452.1 592.5 1,206.6 320.1 647.2 1,153.6 
1976/77 378.2 282.5 1,187.9 255.8 785.5 1,024.1 
1977/78 253.8 249.1 546.8 238.3 280.2 548.3 
1978/79 118.3 275.2 721.7 380.6 162.0 384.8 
1979/80 123.3 69.2 574.4 191.5 134.4 171.2 
Direct Purchases 
Other Total NCPB from Large-Scale 
Year Districts Purchases Millers Total 
(1,000 bags) 
1970/71 311.2 2,666.3 13.4 2,679.7 
1971/72 723.0 4,210.6 23.7 4,234.3 
1972/73 1,472.5 5,081.8 3.5 5,085.3 
1973/74 663.5 3,724.3 1.1 3,725.4 
1974/75 1,492.0 5,012.7 13.6 5,026.3 
1975/76 1,801.3 6,173.4 81.4 6,254.8 
1976/77 2,117.2 6,031.2 190.7 6,222.1 
1977/78 596.7 2,713.2 2,028.4 4,741.6 
1978/79 586.2 2,628.9 130.0 2,758.9 
1979/80 226.2 1,490.2 67.8 1,558.0 
Sources: For 1970/71 to 1978/79, Maize and Produce Board, Annual Report. 1970/71 to 1978/79 (Nairobi: Maize and 
Produce Board, 1971-79). For 1979/80, unpublished data provided by the National Cereals and Produce 
Board (NCPB). 
deducted from the farmgate price, so the 
return to the farmer from 1979/80 to 1981/82 
increased by 43 percent rather than by the 
19 percent indicated in the official maize 
price. Thus, a strong argument can be made 
for including the decision on who will bear 
the drying and transport costs in the annual 
review process. 
In 1979/80 and 1980/81 payments to 
farmers took up to six months to reach them, 
which offset the hidden price increase farmers 
received for collection and buying costs 
assumed by the NCPB. Delays in payments 
by the NCPB not only reduce official prices 
by approximately 7 percent (assuming an 
inflation rate of about 14 percent per year), 
but also affect the timely planting of the next 
season's crop because the capital for seed 
and other inputs is not available. This may 
greatly raise the cost to the farmer. It is the 
official price plus or minus all the nonprice 
aspects with which the informal market has 
to compete. 
Potential to Increase Yields 
Because Kenya has ideal growing condi-
tions for maize in the main maize-surplus 
districts, the potential for increasing yields 
is large. The most important factor affecting 
yields is the time of planting.129 Based on 
129 D. N. Ngugi, "Research Priorities for Increased Food Production," a paper presented at the Food Research Priorities 
Conference of the National Council of Science and Technology, Nairobi, June 2, 1982. 
67 
Table 52—Rainfall during the maize-growing period in the major maize-exporting districts, 1970-80 
Province/District Month 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Rift Valley Province 
(millimeters) 
Nandi April 253.2 346.7 46.8 109.9 145.5 164.2 164.7 190.6 172.1 172.0 250.7 
May 149.7 250.1 194.9 129.7 50.2 157.4 172.0 179.1 180.7 219.6 232.8 
June 173.6 167.2 245.7 178.0 81.6 121.4 104.5 256.3 209.6 169.3 93.0 
July 81.0 220.9 82.1 119.0 238.9 251.1 113.0 213.2 99.3 168.5 106.3 
August 133.2 328.4 130.1 181.4 77.0 196.5 196.1 186.2 160.1 293.5 189.2 
Total 790.7 1,313.3 699.6 718.0 593.2 890.6 750.3 1,025.4 821.8 1,022.9 872.0 
Nakuru April 197.3 86.7 35.0 43.5 137.4 149.5 104.9 221.0 146.5 120.0 102.3 
May 106.4 147.2 102.5 115.9 61.7 144.9 118.6 175.3 117.8 98.3 342.1 
June 43.5 118.5 113.9 24.7 112.7 121.2 70.0 78.6 54.5 91.4 85.2 
July 97.7 60.0 81.5 62.8 137.2 72.0 107.2 193.1 97.6 81.9 29.3 
August 69.7 136.9 128.2 188.6 197.2 193.3 168.5 91.3 105.6 127.2 58.6 
Total 514.6 549.3 461.1 435.6 646.2 681.0 569.2 759.3 522.0 518.8 617.5 
Trans Nzoia April 198.7 161.4 156.5 38.6 107.5 135.0 72.6 289.0 70.3 111.3 125.7 
May 136.2 182.4 160.7 216.0 157.2 138.6 157.2 92.5 138.7 87.5 n.a. 
June 62.6 147.7 96.7 109.5 195.7 129.5 101.8 168.8 109.7 119.2 n.a. 
July 177.3 117.4 70.9 104.5 222.6 224.0 137.3 178.2 195.4 82.8 n.a. 
August 205.1 173.5 63.3 220.9 138.7 236.0 85.2 135.5 95.5 95.4 n.a. 
Total 779.9 782.4 548.1 689.5 821.7 863.1 554.1 864.0 609.6 496.2 125.7 
Uasin Gishu April 139.9 96.6 83.9 30.8 20.1 142.5 68.2 263.6 32.8 151.3 147.3 
May 110.6 150.4 64.2 236.9 113.0 187.5 156.3 102.9 110.3 125.6 300.2 
June 52.2 169.1 122.2 107.5 80.4 98.9 79.6 106.4 168.4 172.9 156.7 
July 134.9 132.6 297.2 147.8 166.5 124.3 135.7 132.9 142.6 106.8 n.a. 
August 214.8 204.6 160.3 195.4 105.0 268.2 209.9 129.9 198.7 96.1 67.8 
Total 652.4 753.3 727.8 718.4 485.0 821.4 649.7 735.7 652.8 652.7 672.0 
Western Province April 260.8 n.a. 251.7 140.7 291.3 296.1 179.5 285.9 137.2 121.0 156.1 
Bungoma May 403.9 aa . 222.4 259.5 179.5 160.2 128.3 116.9 187.0 259.3 257.9 
June 109.0 38.9 124.7 114.9 80.9 120.4 232.1 125.9 100.7 75.3 121.5 
July 73.0 147.7 127.8 38.4 161.7 151.4 132.8 117.6 77.4 45.1 82.7 
August 268.0 87.2 107.1 189.1 115.4 61.6 52.3 174.3 128.8 77.5 969.7 
Total 1,114.7 273.8 833.7 742.6 828.8 789.7 724.3 820.6 631.1 578.2 1,587.9 
Kakamega April 273.1 227.3 250.1 181.3 251.9 221.1 219.1 318.9 153.4 102.0 217.3 
May 217.8 245.0 205.6 362.1 168.0 218.6 312.4 319.5 245.4 224.8 269.5 
June 148.4 124.1 192.8 285.8 245.9 193.5 158.8 238.8 207.4 166.2 204.6 
July 218.9 82.0 212.7 109.9 239.4 284.2 198.0 180.5 78.1 96.1 125.3 
August 303.4 249.0 219.1 241.5 91.7 291.8 330.6 212.9 237.1 139.0 157.6 
Total 1,161.6 927.4 1,080.3 1,180.6 996.9 1,209.2 1,218.9 1,265.6 921.4 728.1 974.3 
Source: Unpublished data provided by Kenya, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Meteorological Department. 
Note: Where n.a. appears, the data were not available. 
Table 55—Rainfall during the maize-growing period in the major maize-deficit districts, 1970-80 
Province/District Month 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
(millimeters) 
Central Province 
156.1 66.3 57.2 Nyeri April 179.9 110.7 90.4 265.6 166.2 159.7 90.1 289.4 
May 132.2 133.0 335.8 111.3 28.0 166.6 115.5 133.5 68.5 360.3 209.1 
June 90.2 27.9 30.8 n.a. 69.0 34.4 32.6 17.9 38.2 81.9 209.1 
July 30.0 29.2 11.1 37.1 133.3 50.3 55.2 25.6 19.1 34.8 5.6 
August 20.2 34.1 38.1 22.1 47.0 31.7 25.2 30.7 27.6 14.0 49.8 
Total 452.5 334.9 506.2 436.1 443.5 442.7 318.6 497.1 309.5 557.3 530.8 
Muranga April 362.3 330.5 79.4 156.7 374.5 401.9 227.2 459.3 426.1 289.2 204.6 
May 139.7 269.5 307.5 133.6 144.6 248.0 82.5 371.8 90.0 216.2 185.2 
June 19.1 21.6 58.7 12.1 143.0 34.9 61.7 15.8 21.2 49.9 2.5 
July 16.5 29.0 15.5 25.0 149.8 34.2 10.2 11.3 21.3 14.7 6.3 
August 20.5 2.9 8.9 9.0 93.1 19.9 8.5 16.8 13.8 22.1 38.4 
Total 558.1 653.5 470.0 336.4 905.0 738.9 390.1 875.0 572.4 592.1 437.6 
Kirinyaga April 428.5 302.0 152.0 253.5 218.2 312.5 424.7 510.1 429.1 306.1 254.0 
May 163.4 325.3 286.2 343.4 250.7 351.9 130.3 236.6 99.0 323.1 208.7 
June 48.7 55.5 27.5 39.3 589.9 58.4 111.6 37.8 59.3 52.5 14.2 
July 93.0 78.0 44.0 51.1 194.8 47.0 53.1 42.1 56.4 50.5 30.6 
August 89.8 45.5 15.0 59.8 68.0 48.9 24.3 39.7 65.9 50.3 111.6 
Total 823.4 806.3 524.7 747.1 1,321.6 818.7 744.0 866.3 709.7 782.5 619.1 
Kiambu April 358.1 297.4 39.1 154.8 267.6 164.9 282.2 517.0 311.0 172.6 131.4 
May 155.3 315.9 152.0 78.0 46.5 97.3 135.9 184.0 138.2 148.7 327.6 
June 61.4 19.8 133.2 10.1 125.6 16.5 36.7 59.7 14.4 22.6 6.9 
July n.a. 62.3 8.7 14.7 168.3 57.5 16.3 13.2 28.8 14.5 n.a. 
August 10.7 17.6 3.4 16.6 17.5 6.8 1.3 73.3 3.2 7.4 8.8 
Total 585.5 713.0 336.4 274.2 625.5 343.0 472.4 847.2 495.6 365.8 474.7 
Eastern Province 
284.0 147.9 Embu April n.a. 317.1 106.8 155.7 231.3 297.1 366.5 431.7 422.9 
May n.a. 102.6 281.2 60.3 105.5 107.2 41.5 200.3 65.8 243.9 216.4 
June n.a. 37.1 38.5 0.7 60.5 n.a. 131.1 14.5 36.6 44.3 4.1 
July n.a. 19.1 18.3 28.4 180.0 n.a. 35.0 54.4 62.8 30.8 9.6 
August n.a. 19.3 n.a. 18.8 18.1 n.a. 10.0 33.7 52.7 34.3 42.0 
Total n.a. 495.2 444.8 263.9 595.4 404.3 584.1 734.6 640.8, 637.3 420.0 
Machakos April 188.2 275.9 25.2 172.9 281.3 204.0 124.2 297.2 318.2 415.7 120.6 
May 76.7 102.3 136.6 12.1 20.2 47.9 30.3 35.0 30.0 146.4 118.4 
June 0.0 22.8 15.2 0.0 20.9 0.0 49.3 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 
July 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.2 31.5 2.5 21.8 3.9 10.5 0.0 
August 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 0.0 0.0 16.3 0.0 0.0 45.7 
Total 268.3 401.0 177.0 185.0 373.6 283.4 206.3 370.3 352.1 587.6 284.7 
Kitui April 57.8 294.7 73.4 119.3 410.1 206.1 304.7 350.6 530.9 620.1 165.0 
May 112.1 107.9 12.9 7.5 40.8 58.2 22.5 103.4 6.1 135.0 10.4 
June 0.0 5.5 2.8 0.0 6.3 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 20.9 0.0 
July 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.1 0.0 
August 6.9 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 17.0 0.0 0.0 20.1 
Total 176.8 410.1 90.1 126.8 474.0 264.3 339.2 471.0 537.0 789.1 195.5 
Source: Unpublished data provided by Kenya, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Meteorological Department. 
Note: Where n.a. appears, the data were not available. 
research at the National Agricultural Research 
Station at Kitale from 1965 to 1968,130 the 
Kenya Seed Company estimates as a rule of 
thumb that there is a loss of 1 bag per hectare 
per day for maize planted late, so that with 
approximately 1 million hectares of maize 
planted 10 days late on average, the loss from 
late planting is approximately 10 million bags. 
Sales of maize seed continue in Kitale up to 
the end of May, although the optimal plant-
ing time is in March. As stated, late planting 
is caused in part by delays in payments for 
the previous year's crop and by delays in 
seasonal credit disbursement. 
There is also potential to raise yields 
through increased use of improved seeds 
and fertilizer. No recent data are available 
on area coverage of hybrids and composites, 
but FAO estimates, based on the 1975 Rural 
Survey, suggest that in 1974/75, 90 percent 
of the areas suitable for composites in Eastern 
and Coast provinces were still planted with 
traditional varieties of maize. Adoption of 
composites would be especially beneficial 
because seeds taken from plants grown 
from composite seeds retain their high-
yielding characteristics, whereas farmers 
must obtain new supplies of hybrid seeds 
each year. Moreover, 85 percent of the area 
in Nyanza and 72 percent in Central Province 
suitable for both composites and hybrids, 
and 29 percent of the area in Western and 19 
percent in Rift Valley suitable for hybrids 
were still in traditional maize.131 Seed sales 
by the Kenya Seed Company increased 30 
percent from 1974/75 to 1980/81 (see Table 
34). But, at a planting rate of 25 kilograms 
per hectare, only 480,000 hectares were 
covered in 1981, or 28 percent of estimated 
total maize area in 1974/75, including areas 
where both maize and beans were planted.132 
Growth of seed sales since 1974/75 has been 
concentrated in the smaller packaging units 
purchased by small farms (see Table 35). The 
major growth has been outside the traditional 
maize growing areas of Trans Nzoia, Uasin 
Gishu, and Western Province (Table 34). 
Growth since 1974/75 has been especially 
rapid from the Kenya Farmers Association's 
sales outlets at Kisumu, Nyahururu, and 
Nanyuki, although the proportion of area 
covered with hybrid seeds in these areas 
remains low. 
Fertilizer consumption in Kenya has 
shown no significant increase since the 
early 1970s (Table 36), which suggests that 
fertilizer use on maize has been almost 
constant, although there may have been 
some diversion to maize from other crops. 
This contrasts sharply with experiences in 
other developing countries. During this period 
in Nigeria fertilizer consumption increased 
more than 10 times,133 and in India it mul-
tiplied 2.3 times, even though it started in 
1971/72 from a much higher base.134 Stag-
nant fertilizer consumption suggests that a 
major source of increased marketed produc-
tion has been a transfer of area from uncul-
tivated land and grass leys to maize in the 
major maize-exporting districts. This could 
be the consequence of rapidly rising man-
land ratios in these districts. Data on changes 
in cropping patterns over time are not avail-
able to test this hypothesis. 
International Demand for Maize 
By 1978 maize imports into the selected 
oil-exporting countries had reached $184 
million (Table 3). Although starting from a 
small base, the rate of growth from 1971-73 
to 1976-78 was high, ranging from a doubling 
of imports in the Gulf States to a tenfold 
increase in West Africa (see Chapter 3). The 
World Bank explains this growth as resulting 
largely from efforts to establish feed-based 
livestock and poultry industries in oil-
130 A. Y. Allan, "Early Planting of Maize—Essential for High Yields," Kenya Farmer. March 1980. 
131 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Agricultural and Rural Development Review and 
Programming Mission for Kenya, Mission Findings and Recommendations, p. 44. 
132 Maize hectarage in 1974/75 is estimated from Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Integrated Rural Survey, p. 79. 
133 Samson Olajuwon Olayide and Francis Sulemanu Idachaba, "Input Supply and Food Marketing Systems for 
Agricultural Growth: A Nigerian Case Study," a paper presented at the Conference on Accelerating Agricultural 
Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, August 29 to September 1, 1983 (mimeographed), p. 8. 
134 Gunvant M. Desai, "Fertilizer Use on India's Unirrigated Areas: A Perspective Based on Past Record and Future 
Needs," a paper presented at the seminar of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics on 
Technology Options for Dryland Agriculture: Potential and Challenge, Patancheru, Andhra Pradesh, India, August 22-24, 
1983 (mimeographed), p. 16. 
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Table 34—Hybrid seed sales in major maize-producing districts, 1969/70-1980/81 
Province/District 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 
(metric tons) 
Trans Nzoia3 617.4 893.9 1,154.6 1,116.4 846.9 1,190.2 
Uasin Gishub 682.9 838.6 1,171.8 1,114.1 927.2 1,523.7 
Nandic 258.2 371.7 624.9 877.9 914.0 1,208.8 
Western Province districts'1 536.1 789.4 873.4 1,089.8 1,190.3 1,288.5 
Nyanza Province districts6 514.9 891.2 886.3 1,162.7 1,456.7 1,412.9 
Nakuru 251.3 466.6 767.3 861.5 821.1 1,013.8 
Nyandarua f 13.7 39.7 85.5 117.8 252.1 307.4 
Central Province districts8 110.7 241.5 374.0 581.2 762.3 801.6 
Nairobi area 167.2 209.9 273.9 207.1 251.2 265.6 
Other 55.4 56.9 75.3 16.5 25.6 35.7 
Total 3,207.8 4,799.4 6,287.0 7,145.0 7,447.4 9,048.2 
Province/District 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 
(metric tons) 
Trans Nzoia3 1,422.0 1,753.1 1,110.6 893.6 1,850.5 1,497.0 
Uasin Gishub 1,614.7 2,001.3 1,865.3 1,233.8 1,873.4 1,696.9 
Nandi0 1,532.0 1,552.0 1,365.0 1,124.6 1,530.3 1,769.1 
Western Province districts'1 1,339.8 1,525.4 1,023.8 986.9 1,635.3 1,354.5 
Nyanza Province districts6 1,642.9 2,005.3 2,438.0 2,043.3 2,475.5 2,378.3 
Nakuru 1,217.2 1,171.6 1,349.8 965.9 1,336.2 1,075.8 
Nyandarua f 481.8 568.3 254.5 328.9 538.2 707.7 
Central Province districts8 1,042.2 1,171.3 1,086.4 1,236.4 1,423.5 1,283.2 
Nairobi area 323.0 386.9 359.8 319.4 390.4 372.4 
Other 84.3 88.8 68.7 59.6 19.9 62.1 
Total 10,699.9 12,224.0 10,921.9 9,192.4 13,073.2 12,197.0 
Source: Data provided by the Kenya Seed Company. 
Note: Sales of hybrid seeds take place at sales outlets of the Kenya Farmers Association. 
3 These figures are for sales at Kitale. 
b These figures are for sales at Eldoret and Moi's Bridge. 
c These figures are for sales at Turbo and Lumbwa/Kipkelion. 
d These figures are for sales at Bungoma, Webuye, and Lugare. 
c These figures are for sales at Kisumu/Kisii. 
' These figures are for sales at Nyahururu and Nanyuki. 
8 These figures are for sales at Karatina, Sagana, Maragua, and Thika. 
exporting countries, including Iraq, Iran, 
and Saudi Arabia. Rising incomes have 
greatly increased the demand for meat in 
these countries.135 
The major substitutes for maize are other 
coarse grains, such as barley, rye, oats, and 
millet, and cassava. According to World Bank 
estimates, the largest exporters of coarse 
grains in 1980 were the United States with 
66 percent of total exports, France, and 
Argentina. Of the major importers, the EC 
imported 19 percent; Japan, 17 percent; the 
U.S.S.R., 14 percent; and developing coun-
tries, 36 percent. World imports grew by 8.3 
percent per year from 1970 to 1980 and are 
projected to grow 6-7 percent in the 1980s.136 
The dominance of the United States as a 
supplier may provide Kenya with additional 
opportunities to export maize to the EC. 
Although maize is not yet included under 
the Lome Convention, Kenya is one of the 
ACP countries favored under the Convention. 
Kenya may also export to countries that 
135 World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. 2: 161. 
136 Ibid., 2: 165-166. 
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Table 35—Sales of 10- and 25-kilogram 
units of hybrid maize seeds, 
1969/70-1980/81 
10-Kilogram 25-Kilogram 
Year Units Units 
(1,000) 
1969/70 217.7 41.2 
1970/71 336.7 57.3 
1971/72 462.6 66.4 
1972/73 594.6 48.0 
1973/74 656.6 35.2 
1974/75 790.8 45.6 
1975/76 942.7 50.9 
1976/77 1,074.0 59.4 
1977/78 1,019.6 29.0 
1978/79 868.9 20.1 
1979/80 1,185.0 48.9 
1980/81 1,127.6 36.8 
Source: Data provided by the Kenya Seed Company. 
Note: Sales of hybrid seeds are made at the sales 
of f ices of the Kenya Farmers Association. The 
10-kilogram units are favored for small farms; 
the 25-kilogram units, for larger farms. 
wish to diversify supplies in order to decrease 
their dependence on the United States. In 
addition, neighboring countries like Zambia 
and Tanzania have a strong preference, as 
Kenya does, for white maize and pay a pre-
mium for it. These countries provide addi-
tional markets for maize, and because of 
proximity, Kenya may enjoy an advantage in 
freight costs over other large suppliers. In 
1979, however, when Kenya previously ex-
ported maize, the main buyers were South 
America, 47,000 tons; Japan, 45,000 tons; 
and Switzerland, 14,000 tons.137 
This brief survey indicates that there is a 
significant and rapidly growing demand for 
maize in oil-exporting countries. There is 
also likely to be growth of demand in other 
developing countries, the Eastern bloc, and 
Japan. But are Kenya's costs low enough to 
compete against the United States and other 
large grain exporters? 
Potential to Export Maize Competitively 
There are two main components of the 
domestic border price of maize. The first is 
the price paid to the grower by the NCPB, 
which is fixed by the government. The second 
is the cost of handling and transport from 
the farmgate to the vessel in Mombasa. 
The prices paid to maize growers by NCPB 
in each year from 1971 to 1982, calculated in 
dollars at prevailing exchange rates, are 
Table 36—Fertilizer imports, 1970-1981/82 
Year Nitrogen Phosphorus Others Total 
(metric tons) 
1970 50,170 41,818 48,900 140,888 
1971 41,025 41,252 47,610 129,887 
1972 55,530 37,331 62,817 155,678 
1973 77,437 30,986 33,145 141,568 
1974 104,538 49,540 37,995 192,073 
1975 44,394 30,626 33,884 108,904 
1976 20,194 30,636 29,474 80,304 
1977 88,201 33,500 7,338 129,039 
1978 78,170 19,625 57,384 155,179 
1979 38,375 11,455 10,924 60,754 
1980 61,829 25,460 42,383 129,672 
1980/81 n.a. n.a. n.a. 129,865 
1981/82 n.a. n.a. n.a. 150,430 
Sources: The data for 1970-80 are taken from Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise 
Department, Annual Trade Report. 1970-80 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970-80), cited in Kenya, Ministry 
of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 1981 (Nairobi: 
Government Printer, 1982). The figures for 1980/81 and 1981/82 were obtained from Kenya Farmers 
Association, "Input Supply Systems," a paper prepared for the Workshop on Food Policy Research 
Priorities, Nairobi, June 14-17, 1982. 
Note: Where n.a. appears, the data were not available. 
Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise Department, Annual Trade Report. 1980. 
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when the producer price is well below the 
international price. Kenya might enjoy some 
advantage in freight costs over the United 
States or Argentina in supplying cereals to 
North Africa or the Gulf States because the 
distance is shorter. However, this is probably 
more than offset by the smaller freighters 
available to Kenya and by delays and high 
port charges at Mombasa, which raise freight 
rates charged by the shipping companies. 
Table 38 shows that the single largest 
item in transferring maize from the farm to 
the port is rail transport. The rail charges of 
Kenya Railways—U.S. $28.60 per ton—are 
higher than those in the United States— 
about U.S. $20 per ton—even though the dis-
tances in the United States are much greater. 
For example, the freight rate by rail from Des 
Moines, Iowa, to New Orleans, Louisiana (ef-
fective April 10, 1982), was U.S. $27 per ton 
by rail or U.S. $13-16 by barge.139 A high 













the Export Parity 
Price and the Kenyan 
Domestic Border Price 
(KSh/bag) (KSh/ (KSh=U.S. $1) (U.S. $/metric ton) 
metric ton) 
1971° 30 333.3 7.14 46.7 58.4 + 11.7 
1972 35 388.9 7.14 54.5 56.0 + 1.5 
1973 35 388.9 6.90 56.4 98.0 +41.6 
1974 40 444.4 7.14 62.2 132.0 +69.8 
1975 60 666.7 8.25 80.8 119.6 +38.8 
1976 65 676.4 8.31 81.4 112.4 +31.0 
1977 85 944.4 7.95 118.7 95.3 -23.4 
1978 85 944.4 7.40 127.6 100.7 -26.9 
1979 80 888.9 7.33 121.3 115.5 -5.8 
1980 80 888.9 7.57 117.4 125.3 +7.9 
1981 85 944.4 8.45 111.8 130.8 + 19.0 
1982" 95 1,056.0 10.50 10.6 116.0 + 15.4 
1983d 135 1,500.0 10.70 140.2 129.2 -1 1.0 
Sources: The international prices are from World Bank, Price Prospects of Major Primary Commodities, World Bank 
Report No. 814/82,5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982). For the exchange rates, see Central Bank of 
Kenya, "Selected Foreign Exchange Mean Rates," Economic and Financial Review 14 (October-December 
1981). The Kenya price paid to the farmer is derived from Maize and Produce Board, Annual Report, various 
issues (Nairobi: Government Printer, various years); and Kenya Gazette, various issues. 
Note: Each bag weighed 90 kilograms. 
a This is the purchase price paid by the National Cereals and Produce Board during the maize purchasing period 
(January to June). 
b The price is for yellow maize U.S. No. 2, f.o.b. U.S. Gulf ports. 
c 1971 refers to the purchasing periods for 1970-71. 
d The prices for 1982 and 1983 were projected in 1981. 
138 wor ld Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. 2: 167 and 177. 




shown in Table 37. The Kenyan price was 
well below the international price in the 
early 1970s, above it during 1977-79, and 
again below it during 1980-82. However, 
with the 42 percent increase in the producer 
price in Kenya for the 1982/83 crop purchas-
ing period, from KSh 95 to KSh 135 per bag 
(Table 37), and with the international price 
still depressed, the Kenyan producer price 
was above the export parity price but still 
below the long-term equilibrium price of 
U.S. $141 per ton at 1981 prices.138 
The second component of the maize ex-
port price is the cost of handling and trans-
port. The costs of moving maize from the 
farmgate to Mombasa are estimated to be 
U.S. $70.60 per ton, or more than 60 percent 
of the current price of maize delivered to U.S. 
Gulf ports (Table 38). This would raise the 
domestic border price of Kenya's maize 
above the export parity price even in years 
Table 38—Estimated costs of moving 
maize from the farm to the 
port of Mombasa, 1981/82 
Transportation Cost Component Cost 
(KSh/ 
metric ton) 
Purchase of grain (including 
transport)3 179 
Bagsb 106 
Drying (including weight loss)0 110 
Rail transport from storage to 
Mombasa 300 
Wharf and handling charges'1 18 
Insurance (1 percent of f.o.b. value)6 13 
Interest (14 percent of f.o.b. value 
for 1 month)e 15 
Total 741 
Total in U.S. dollars 70.60 
Sources: The cost of purchasing grain is f rom the 
National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB). 
The cost of bags comes f rom a personal com-
munication from the Ministry o f Agriculture, 
as does the f igure for the drying costs. The 
cost o f transport f rom storage to Mombasa 
was given by Kenya Railways, and the wharf 
and handling charges are taken f rom Kenya 
Ports Authority, "Tar i f fs of Rates and Charges 
for Wharfage Handling and General Services," 
Tariff Book No. 2. Effective 1 July 1982 (Nairobi: 
Kenya Ports Authority, 1982). 
3 Col lect ion and handling are estimated to have cost 
the NCPB KSh 15.30 per bag in 1980/81. It is assumed 
that these costs did not change in 1981/82 even though 
buying centers handled greater volumes. 
b Maize requires bags because of the lack o f bulk 
handling facilities in NCPB up-country stores and in 
the port of Mombasa. New bags are used to carry the 
maize up to the side of the ship. Then the maize is 
poured from the bags into the ship's hold. Bags are 
badly torn in the port, so they are sold by the NCPB at 
low prices. The figure used here assumes that 11 new 
bags are used to carry a metric ton and includes 75 
percent of their cost, at KSh 12.85 per bag. 
c The NCPB has to dry any lot o f less than 10 bags at its 
own cost. Seventy-f ive percent o f the maize delivered 
comes in such lots. Given drying costs of KSh 8.42 per 
bag, with a water removal rate of 5 percent, plus an 
average weight loss of 5 percent and a price to the 
farmer of KSh 95 per bag in 1981/82, the total cost 
comes to K Sh 13.20 per bag dried, or K Sh 147 per metric 
ton. As only 75 percent has to be dried, this is reduced 
to KSh 110. 
d This is the minimum charge, assuming that there are 
no late document charges, no transfer of cargo in the 
port area, no hiring of equipment, nor any other 
additional charges. 
e The costs of insurance and interest are based on an 
f.o.b. value of U.S. $120 per metric ton, with U.S. $1.00 
equaling KSh 10.5. 
proportion moved to the U.S. ports on the 
Gulf of Mexico goes on barges. More than 85 
percent of the maize transported to New 
Orleans or Houston in 1977 went by barge, 
14.5 percent by rail, and 0.5 percent by 
truck.140 To a degree, U.S. grain exports 
represent a return on capital investments in 
infrastructure that began 120 years ago, 
much of it in periods when capital had a 
lower cost than today. Even the cost of U.S. 
$28.60 for movement in Kenya may be un-
derestimated, for if large quantities of maize 
are put on the railways, it might well drive 
other goods onto the road owing to the phys-
ical and managerial limitations of Kenya's 
railways. In this case, the true marginal cost 
is the road haulage cost, which would be sig-
nificantly higher given the present cost 
structure. 
A second major cost in the border price 
of maize is the cost of transport from farm-
gate to depot, which forms a major part of 
the NCPB purchase price (Table 38). Since 
the 1980/81 government directive, NCPB has 
paid transport costs to the farmer of K Sh 0.18 
per kilometer per bag or KSh 2.0 per ton per 
kilometer for whole large loads delivered to 
the NCPB depot. The NCPB estimated its total 
purchasing costs in 1980/81, after it took 
over much of the collection cost, to be 
KSh 15.30 per bag, including the transport 
element but not including interest on the 
estimated capital cost of KSh 17 million to 
set up the 368 buying centers, or the cost of 
Ministry of Agriculture supervision. The 
Ministry of Agriculture uses personnel, ve-
hicles, and fuel from its operating budget to 
supervise the purchasing operations of the 
NCPB. It has been impossible to estimate 
this cost. Before the NCPB took over all 
purchases, traders were paid KSh 3.50 per 
bag or roughly 4 percent of the producer price 
to deliver maize to the Board's main ware-
houses, so the change to direct purchases has 
greatly increased the NCPB costs. The high 
costs of transport are in part a consequence 
of unpaved rural access roads and the high 
rates of taxation in the transport industry 
noted earlier. 
Bags are another major cost. As bags are 
55 percent jute and 45 percent sisal (some 
jute is used because sisal is so rough to 
handle), there is a significant import content. 
Based on estimates of 30 percent of the cost 
161 Ibid. 
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of the finished bag being jute and the prevail-
ing 30 percent duty on imported jute, there is 
approximately a 10 percent tax component in 
the final factory price of bags.141 Bag costs 
could be avoided largely by construction of 
bulk handling facilities in the port (construc-
tion of such a facility began in June 1982) 
and in rural NCPB stores. 
The fourth significant cost of nearly U.S. 
$10.50 per ton is the estimated cost of crop 
drying (Table 38). The moisture in the crop 
when it is received has to be reduced to an 
acceptable moisture level for storage, which 
is 13.5 percent. Although the NCPB has been 
drying all deliveries of less than 10 bags 
since 1980/81 at its own expense, it is still 
permitted to charge the costs of drying 
larger lots to the individual farmer, which 
amounts to about 25 percent of deliveries. 
In the United States the cost of drying the 
crop and the weight loss incurred are borne 
by the farmer and not by the grain exporter. 
Policy Implications 
Because the major agricultural produc-
tion areas are all more than 500 kilometers 
from the coast, it is probably not feasible for 
Kenya to export bulky, low-cost agricultural 
commodities like maize, wheat, minor cereals, 
oil cakes, and cassava. Low-cost vegetables 
like onions and potatoes and even slightly 
higher-value products like sugar and pulses 
are affected by the high transport costs. 
Only high-value exports like coffee, tea, and 
meat products are not significantly affected. 
However, Thailand has exported cassava (a 
lower cost item than maize) to the EC, despite 
producing areas 400-500 kilometers from 
the coast, no railways to the producing areas, 
no subsidies, and a 6 percent duty rate charged 
by the EC. Therefore, it should be feasible 
for Kenya to export maize in the future if the 
government is prepared to take some radical 
steps. These would include eliminating taxes 
on road transport; further reducing road 
transport costs by taking a more laissez-faire 
attitude on vehicle standards; reducing bag 
costs, drying costs, and weight losses; and 
minimizing administrative overheads by 
selectively involving the private sector in 
transport and farmgate purchasing. It would 
also necessitate heavy infrastructural invest-
ment in rural access roads and the railways, 
which must be weighed against returns on 
capital in raising production and exports of 
other commodities. 
The role of the NCPB in the maize mar-
keting system needs to be reexamined. The 
costs to the NCPB of collecting, transporting, 
and drying are making considerable demands 
on government resources of manpower and 
working capital, while other areas of gov-
ernment activity in agriculture, such as 
research and extension, are often starved for 
funds. The NCPB could keep prices within a 
broad band if it gradually handed over grain 
handling and distribution to African bus-
inessmen. If it intervened only when farmgate 
prices rose above domestic border prices 
(delivered Nairobi) or fell below export parity 
prices, it could control the supply of maize 
at no long-term cost, unless large-scale 
imports were required. 
Based on the data in Table 38, in June 1982 
the government would have intervened if 
maize fell below U.S. $60 per ton or rose 
above U.S. $ 160, or if maize were outside the 
range of KSh 57-152 per bag, as shown in 
Figure 5. With lower road transport costs and 
bulk handling facilities, the band could per-
haps be narrowed to between KSh 75 and 
KSh 140 per bag at the June 1982 exchange 
rates. If this band were still too wide, setting 
a relatively narrow band even for a short time 
would help to limit NCPB losses and establish 
the principle of limiting the NCPB interven-
tions to periods of high surplus or shortfall. 
The role of the NCPB would then be similar 
to that of the controlling parastatal in India, 
the Food Corporation of India, especially if 
the NCPB retained a monopoly over imports 
and exports of grain.142 
One means of gradually phasing out the 
NCPB involvement in grain marketing would 
be to make use of one of the provisions in 
the present Maize Marketing Act (Cap 338). 
Under paragraph 15(6), the Minister may 
allow free trade in maize to extend from 
within a single district to "two or more con-
tiguous districts." If the contiguous districts 
were redefined as all districts within the 
province, it would be possible to allow sub-
stantial interdistrict trade while still control-
ling interprovincial trade. The government 
would thereby retain control of supplies to 
Nairobi and Mombasa, while leaving the 
14' East Africa Bag and Cordage Co., personal communication, November 1982. 
142 See R. N. Chopra, Evolution of Food Policy in India (Bombay: Macmillan, 1981). 
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Figure 5—Setting maize prices to limit financial obligations of the National Cereals 
and Produce Board (NCPB) 
Price 
(KSh/metric ton) 
NCPB would depress the price for consumers 
Import parity 
Import parity 





/ Export parity 
40-
20 
NCPB would support the price for farmers 
Sources: The costs assumed for this figure are given by the National Cereals and Produce Board, a personal com-
munication from the Ministry of Agriculture, Kenya Railways, and Kenya Ports Authority, "Tariffs of Rates 
and Charges for Wharfage Handling and General Services," Tariff Booh No. 2. Effective 1 July 1982 (Nairobi: 
Kenya Ports Authority, 1982). 
Note: The costs and exchange rates of June 1982 are assumed. 
supply of many smaller towns to the market 
except under conditions of shortage. This 
would allow the African business sector to 
expand its operations gradually. 
Sugar and maize compete for land in 
western Kenya. A critical policy issue in 
Kenya is what proportion of available land 
should be allocated to each of these two 
crops. As the area is relatively homogeneous 
in its agroclimatic conditions, the appro-
priate analytical tool to pursue this question 
is the domestic resource cost, which Aldington 
estimated for maize and sugar in 1978.143 
His estimates were KSh 12.65 per dollar of 
export earnings for sugar and KSh 18.01 per 
dollar for export maize, with more than 50 
percent of the domestic border price for maize 
being transport from farm to port. If sugar for 
export displaces maize production required 
to achieve domestic self-sufficiency, the 
situation is reversed. From data in Aldington's 
paper, the DRC for home-consumed maize 
per dollar of foreign exchange saved on 
imports is only KSh 2.23. Thus, the economic 
desirability of growing sugar as an export 
crop depends totally on there being sufficient 
maize for home consumption. 
The aim of government policy must be to 
143 Aldington, "Domestic Resource Costs." 
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raise yields of both crops, and this analysis 
has indicated the potentials of each. How-
ever, price policy also plays a role in the 
allocation of resources between these crops. 
Attention must not only focus on official 
prices, but also on prices in the informal 
market. The ratio of official sugarcane and 
maize prices during the period 1971-81 re-
mained stable in a band between 1.10 and 
1.50 for each of the 11 years, except 1974 
when maize prices rose sharply relative to 
sugar prices (Table 39). In 1979 a fall in 
unofficial maize prices, following a large 
maize surplus in 1977/78, resulted in a sub-
stantial increase in sugar area planted. How-
ever, in 1979/80 the unofficial maize price 
increased to KSh 200-300 per bag. At an 
average price of KSh 250 per bag, this ef-
fectively reduced the sugarcane to maize 
ratio from the official level of 1.76 in 1978/79 
to 0.53 in 1979/80, and thus it induced a sub-
stantial shift from sugar to maize. This 
caused factory sugarcane purchases to fall 
by 24 percent from 1980 to 1982 (Table 24). 
Sugar prices in 1980 were 10 percent above 
the 1971 level in real terms, but more than 
20 percent below the level for 1976-78. 
However, in 1982, sugar prices were 13 per-
cent below the 1980 level and 36 percent 
below the 1976-78 level in real terms. 
Maize has little potential as an export 
crop because the transport costs to the port 
are so high. The long-term potential of sugar 
is better, but its success as an export crop 
will depend on the answers to three critical 
questions. 
First, can marketed maize production 
rise fast enough to keep pace with growth of 
domestic demand so that land can be released 
from maize to grow more sugar? This will 
depend on the rate of adoption of presently 
available technology, growth in fertilizer 
consumption, and the long-term capacity of 
the research system to produce new high-
yielding seed varieties. 
Second, can sugar production costs per 
ton be reduced, either by substituting local 
transport and manufacturing parts for im-
ports or by lowering sugarcane production 
costs in the field through new varieties or 
greater efficiency of input use? 
Finally, can the capital costs of creating 
new sugar processing capacity be reduced 
by building jaggery factories to meet local 
demand for sweeteners, thus releasing exist-
ing factories to produce white sugar for 
export? 
Table 39—Current and constant official 1969 prices of sugarcane and maize and 
the ratio of current prices of the two commodities, 1971-82 
Ratio of Current 
Current Prices Sugarcane Price Constant 1969 Prices 
Year Sugarcane Maize to Maize Price Sugarcane Maize 
(KSh/metric ton) (KSh/100 (KSh/metric ton) (KSh/100 
kilograms) kilograms) 
1971 45.2 33.3 1.36 42.7 31.5 
1972 50.0 38.8 1.29 44.8 34.8 
1973 51.8 44.4 1.17 41.8 33.2 
1974 61.8 66.7 0.92 43.1 42.7 
1975 89.4 72.2 1.24 52.9 40.7 
1976 104.5 94.4 1.11 56.3 48.0 
1977 127.1 94.4 1.55 61.3 42.9 
1978 133.0 88.9 1.50 57.1 36.6 
1979 133.0 88.9 1.50 52.7 36.6 
1980 133.0 94.4 1.41 46.3 30.5 
1981 133.0 105.6 1.26 41.5 29.6 
1982 145.0 144.0 1.01 39.0 34.4 
Sources: Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 
1979 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1980); Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 1980 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981); and Kenya Gazette. 
various issues. 
Notes: The prices are those expected at the time of planting for the crop year following, that is, the 1977 figures are 
for purchases in 1977/78. To obtain constant prices, current prices were deflated by the Nairobi middle-
income consumer price index. 
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PULSES AND HORTICULTURAL CROPS 
Background 
The last two products to be considered 
are pulses and horticultural crops. Both are 
considered "minor crops" in Kenya, although 
pulses rank among the top 10 crops in area 
and in total value of production. Exports of 
pulses were erratic throughout the 1970s, 
while there was steady growth in exports of 
horticultural products (see Table 1). 
Pulses are produced extensively on small 
farms but are generally not grown commer-
cially on large farms in Kenya. This is surpris-
ing in view of the ideal growing conditions 
and the possibility of rotating pulses with 
maize. The commercial planting of pulses in 
the United States illustrates the financial 
feasibility of large-scale production of pulses. 
Fruit and vegetable production is also small-
holder dominated. Large-scale production 
is confined primarily to pineapples at Thika 
in Central Province and to vegetables for 
fresh export and dehydration near Lake 
Naivasha and some apple and avocado 
orchards at Kitale in Rift Valley Province. 
Marketing of pulses, as well as many 
other potentially important minor crops, is 
carried out by the NCPB. The NCPB is the 
only legal buyer of beans in quantities of 
more than 10 bags (900 kilograms), and 
movement across district boundaries is 
usually restricted to 1 bag unless the farmer 
has an official permit. Since 1980/81 the 
NCPB has taken delivery at collection centers 
as well as at its major stores. After delivery, it 
dusts the crop against weevil infestation, 
stores it, and sells it locally, with occasional 
export sales in years of large surpluses. Major 
NCPB problems are management control to 
prevent purchase of weevil-infested beans, 
quality and variety control at the point of 
purchase (there are more than 90 traditional 
varieties of beans registered in Kenya),144 
and the financial resources required to 
ensure prompt payments to farmers. Distor-
tions in the internal marketing system have 
been much discussed in the literature.145 
Major buyers of smallholder horticultural 
crops are African and Asian traders and 
wholesalers who sell directly to the retail 
markets, the eight main fruit and vegetable 
processors, and buyers of relatively small 
quantities of high-quality produce for fresh 
export by airfreight. A government agency 
established in the early 1970s, the Horticul-
tural Crops Development Authority, is re-
sponsible for overall control of the industry. 
The Authority's functions include monitor-
ing markets for fresh produce in Kenya and 
overseas, controlling fresh export quality, 
and general promotion of the industry. It is 
financed in part by a small direct cess on all 
fresh exports and produce purchased by 
processors. 
Research on both pulses and horticultural 
crops is carried out at the National Horticul-
tural Research Station. The government has 
established nurseries for improved fruit-
crop planting material and has become the 
major supplier. Vegetable seeds are still 
mainly imported. Improved seed varieties for 
beans, which are being developed through a 
major aid-assisted grain-legume breeding 
project, are being multiplied and distributed 
by a subsidiary of the Kenya Seed Company 
and a small private company, but there is no 
agency to multiply improved seeds from the 
FAO-assisted breeding scheme for grams. As 
for all crops, extension is entirely the re-
sponsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Pulses 
Pulses were not shown as a separate 
item in Chapter 4, as imports by the oil 
144 National Horticultural Research Station, Thika, personal communi.cation, 1982. 
145 See Olof Hesselmark, The Marketing of Maize and Beans in Kenya—A Proposal for Improved Effectiveness. Working 
Paper 300 (Nairobi: Institute of Development Studies, 1977); and Guenter Schmidt, Maize and Beans Marketing in Kenya— 
The Interaction and Effectiveness of the Informal and Formal Marketing Systems. Occasional Paper 31 (Nairobi: Institute of 
Development Studies, 1979). 
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exporters were less than 2 percent of their 
total agricultural imports in 1978. From 
Kenya's standpoint, however, the potential 
for growing pulses for export is good because 
growing conditions for both edible dry beans 
and for grams are favorable. Total imports of 
pulses to the selected countries averaged 
363,000 tons per year, with an average value 
of $185 million during the period 1976-78 
and have almost doubled since the early 
1970s. Imports are concentrated in North 
Africa and the Gulf States (Table 40). For the 
dry edible beans, the main markets are Iraq 
and North Africa for white beans and Iran 
for both colored and white beans. 
As a relatively small item in international 
trade, data on world production and price 
trends of pulses are difficult to obtain. Pro-
duction of dry edible beans in the United 
States, the largest producer, nearly doubled 
in the late 1970s from 0.8 million tons in 
1977 to 1.44 million tons in 1981.146 How-
ever, this growth was due to exceptional 
demand in Mexico in 1980 and 1981 and is 
probably above the long-term trend. Inter-
national prices of several main varieties of 
dry edible beans for which data were available 
showed considerable fluctuations between 
1970 and 1980 (Table 41). The Michigan pea 
bean or "navy bean," which made up 15-30 
percent of total U.S. production in the late 
1970s, and the Great Northern bean cor-
respond closely to the Ethiopian white bean 
and the white Kenya pearl bean, for which 
the main market is the United Kingdom at 
90,000 to 100,000 tons per year. The reason 
for higher prices for the U.S. product is its 
standardized quality and guaranteed freedom 
from insect infestation and from an excessive 
amount of broken beans. The U.S. California 
and U.S. Michigan dark red kidney beans 
correspond closely to the Kenyan Canadian 
Wonder type in shape and to the Kenyan 
red haricot bean in color; their relatively high 
prices and the large areas where these beans 
are grown in Kenya make them of special 
interest. The Kenyan brown speckled Rose-
coco corresponds closely to the U.S. pinto 
bean and the red speckled Rosecoco to the 
U.S. cranberry bean. 
Bean exports appear viable, even at the 
rather depressed prices of 1981. For example, 
with a freight factor of U.S. $50 per ton and an 
Table 40—Volume and value of pulses 
imported by selected oil-
exporting countries, 1971 -
73 and 1976-78 averages 
Volume Value 
Region 1971-73 1976-78 1971-73 1976-78 
(1,000 metric tons) (U.S. $) 
West Africa 1 3 3 
North Africa 76 164 15 87 
Gulf States 113 163 40 80 
Iran 8 30 2 14 
Indonesia 1 3 1 
Total 198 363 57 185 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
exchange rate of U.S. $ 1 equals K Sh 10.50, the 
U.S. red kidney bean price of U.S. $720 per 
ton in March 1982 would give an export 
parity price of KSh 7,035 per ton or KSh 633 
per bag against the current farmgate price 
for Canadian Wonder beans of KSh 330 
offered to farmers by the NCPB. Even allow-
ing for K Sh 63 per bag for packing, handling, 
and local transport, as for maize (Table 38), 
and even if the export parity value is 20 
percent below the U.S. product, the Kenyan 
domestic border price of KSh 4,367 per ton 
is 22.5 percent lower than the export parity 
price of KSh 5,658. To obtain prices com-
parable with those of the United States will 
require variety and quality standardization 
and complete success in the battle against 
insect infestation. The inability of importers 
to remove weevil-damaged beans mechani-
cally makes it difficult to dispose of insect-
infested beans at almost any price. 
Dry edible beans are second only to maize 
in area cultivated in Kenya. This makes the 
neglect of the export potential of the crop in 
literature on Kenyan agriculture surprising. 
In 1974/75 there were nearly 50,000 hectares 
of beans grown in pure stands. If 30 percent 
of the area sown in stands mixed with maize 
is included, a further 235,500 hectares is 
added, bringing the total to nearly 0.3 million 
hectares. Area sown in grams was even greater 
at 387,000 hectares, of which the most widely 
grown were cowpeas and pigeon peas.147 
146 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Statistical Reporting Service, Crop Reporting Board, "Crop Production," 
Washington, D.C., December 1981, p. A-8. 
147 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Rural Survey, p. 79. 
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Fifty-six percent of total bean production 
and 58 percent of bean sales are from farms 
of less than 2 hectares, and only 1.6 percent 
of total marketed surplus is from farms of 
more than 8 hectares (Table 42). Small farms 
are of even greater importance in marketed 
pulse production than in maize (compare 
with Table 23). 
Yields of pulses in Kenya are low. Esti-
mates made in Nyeri District of Central 
Province show yields of beans at six bags per 
hectare, which is 187 kilograms per acre for 
1980,148 compared with average yields in 
the United States of more than 650 kilograms 
per acre in 1980 and 1981.149 Yields of grams 
are also low, typically between 200 to 460 
kilograms per hectare.150 
Beans and grams are still grown in most 
parts of the country using traditional seeds 
and agronomic practices, without row plant-
ing or chemical fertilizers. The low yields in 
areas of good rainfall underline the unrealized 
potential to produce export surpluses through 
improved varieties, better cultivation meth-
ods, and use of chemical fertilizers. A Dutch-
assisted grain-legume research project has 
produced improved varieties for the two 
major dry edible bean varieties—Rosecoco 
and Canadian Wonder. Adoption of the new 
varieties, although still less than 1 percent 
of the area, is accelerating.151 Also, green 
gram varieties, the most commonly grown 
grams, are now becoming available from an 
FAO assisted dryland farming research project 
at Katumani. Yields of up to 1,800 kilograms 
per hectare have been obtained on the re-
search station,152 although data are not yet 
available for yields on farmers' fields. 
Officially marketed production of beans 
and grams by province during the period 
1970/71 -1979/80 is shown in Tables 43 and 
44. On the basis of three-year moving averages, 
total marketed production of beans fluctu-
ated between 80,000 bags and 140,000 bags 
from 1966/67 to 197 5/76. It then fell sharply 
to less than 10,000 bags in 1978/79 before 
rising again to 60,000 bags in 1980/81 53 In 
1981 /82, the NCPB purchases were about 0.8 
million bags or more than 73,000 tons, with a 
potential export parity value of more than 
U.S. $36 million. Official gram purchases fell 
steadily from about 30,000 bags per year in 
the early 1970s to less than 5,000 bags per 
year in the late 1970s, but again rose to 
nearly 30,000 bags in 1981/82. Eastern Prov-
ince was the major area of production of 
both beans and grams until 1975/76, but 
marketed production of beans has also been 
significant from all the other provinces 
except Coast Province, where production 
conditions are unsuitable. In 1981/82 the 
major suppliers to the NCPB were Rift Valley 
Province with 40 percent and Eastern Province 
with 30 percent. This was particularly sur-
prising in view of the small area planted in 
beans in Rift Valley Province in 1974/75 
(Table 43). 
The dramatic increase in bean purchases 
in 1981/82—over five times larger than in 
any year in the preceding decade—needs to 
be explained. Although part of the crop may 
have come from neighboring countries, the 
large purchases in Eastern Province, which 
has no borders with other bean-growing 
countries, suggests that most of it was locally 
produced. The 62 percent increase in the 
price in 1980/81 was clearly a major factor 
(see Tables 45 and 46), although the response 
was delayed until 1981/82. The delay may 
well have resulted from the high unofficial 
prices still prevailing for maize in 1980/81. 
As maize became abundantly available in 
1981, lower maize prices were expected, 
which may have encouraged a shift into 
beans. The price increase in beans probably 
caused some area to be diverted from potatoes 
and sorghum and millets, as well as maize. 
The constraints to increasing pulse ex-
ports are in the internal marketing and input 
supply systems. The NCPB does not provide 
strong vertical linkages between the export 
market and the local smallholder. Large 
differences in international prices for dif-
ferent types of colored beans are not reflected 
148 Nyeri, District Agricultural Officer, Nyeri District Annual Report. 1980 (Nairobi: Ministry of Agriculture, 1980). 
149 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Statistical Reporting Service, Crop Reporting Board, "Crop Production." 
150 J. D. Acland, East African Crops (Nairobi: Longmans, 1971), p. 117. 
151 National Seed Quality Control Service, Nakuru, personal communication, 1982. 
152 Katumani Research Station, Katumani, personal communication, March 1982. 
153 These moving averages were derived from figures for 1966/67 to 1979/80 from Maize and Produce Board, Annual 
Report, various issues (Nairobi: Maize and Produce Board, various years). The data for 1980/81-1981/82 were provided 
by the National Cereals and Produce Board. 
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Table 42—Marketed surplus of beans, by farm size group, 1974/75 
Number of Share 
Farms Sown Area Sown Share of Quantity of Total 
Farm Size Group with Beans3 with Beansb Yield Yield Soldc Soldc Sales 
(hectares) (1,000) (1,000 hectares) (metric (percent) (1,000 metric (percer 
tons/ tons) 
hectare) 
Less than 0.5 123.9 47.1 0.31 26.4 3.85 9.7 
0.5 - 0.9 177.8 93.3 0.25 22.3 5.20 13.1 
1.0 - 1.9 305.5 220.2 0.20 31.5 13.87 34.9 
2.0 - 2.9 153.4 114.3 0.15 31.2 5.35 13.5 
3 . 0 - 3 . 9 92.3 88.7 0.19 17.3 2.92 7.3 
4.0 - 4.9 75.7 71.6 0.18 13.8 1.78 4.5 
5.0 - 7.9 64.2 88.2 0.16 43.5 6.14 15.4 
8.0 and more 28.1 40.1 0.07 23.3 0.65 1.6 
Total 1,020.9 763.5 0.19 27.8 39.76 100.0 
Source: Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Rural Survey 1974-75, Basic 
Report (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1977). 
Note: Vertical and horizontal totals differ slightly because of rounding. 
a Farms are defined here not as registered farms on the land registration lists in the district land office, but as the land 
associated with a household that is used wholly or partially for agricultural purposes and managed as a single 
economic unit. 
b This includes the areas sown with mixed maize and beans and pure stands of beans. 
c The amount sold was calculated as all produce not consumed. This exaggerates the quantity sold as a small amount 
is retained for seed. 
in domestic price differentials. Until mid-
1982 bags of mixed beans received the same 
price as those grown from certified seeds, 
and there was no premium for purchases of 
uniform size and color. In the export market, 
these quality differences command price 
differentials of up to 300 percent. In the 
local market, the NCPB often cannot obtain 
significantly higher prices for quality dif-
ferences, especially in periods of shortage. 
It is difficult to control decisions by buying 
clerks in remote buying centers who have to 
grade beans at the time of purchase. Also, 
there are no smallholder pressure groups to 
articulate problems to the NCPB. This affects 
such issues as quality differentials and the 
number and location of buying centers. 
Another problem has been the NCPB's 
difficulty in establishing a reputation among 
international buyers for a product that is 
free from weevil infestation. The NCPB's task 
is difficult when many beans from small-
holders are sold to the NCPB already infested 
with weevils, which quickly spread to other 
lots. The training and supervision of buying 
clerks that is required to control this effec-
tively will probably be beyond the institu-
tional capacity of the NCPB for some vears. 
High collection costs are another problem 
associated with NCPB buying, because para-
statal purchasing operations do not have 
the flexibility of manpower, transport, timing 
of collection, and payment arrangements 
that characterize the operations of small 
traders. 
On the input side, a number of problems 
constrain realization of the three to four 
times increase in yields possible by early 
planting, clean seed, and other good hus-
bandry practices.154 In the case of grams, a 
major problem is likely to be the lack of any 
institution to carry out seed multiplication 
and to distribute improved seed. Because of 
price controls, the Kenya Seed Company, 
which is 85 percent owned by the govern-
ment, is reluctant to subsidize development 
costs on these and other minor crops like 
sorghums and millets from profits on maize 
154 For the yield gap and ways to increase bean yields, see D. N. Ngugi, "Agricultural Research to Increase Food 
Production," a paper presented at the Food Research Priorities Conference of the National Council of Science and 
Technology, Nairobi, June 2, 1982 (mimeographed). 
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Table 43—Total official purchases of beans, by province and district, 1970/71 
1979/80 and 1981/82 
1970/ 1971/ 1972/ 1973/ 1974/ 1975/ 1976/ 1977/ 1978/ 1979/ 1981/ 
Province/District 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 82 
(1,000 bags) 





















Other 0.5 0.6 
Trans Nzoia 1.2 1.0 8.7 2.8 1.7 3.0 17.9 
Elgeya Marakwet 0.7 
Narok 
Kericho 0.3 0.6 5.8 
Nandi 
West Pokot 0.3 0.5 
Kajiado 7.8 15.8 
Laikipia 0.2 0.5 
Central Rift 
Western Province 4.9 5.2 9.2 4.7 7.0 20.0 63.9 
Bungoma 2.3 1.4 6.8 3.3 5.0 7.3 29.6 
Busia 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 9.1 4.1 
Kakamega 2.5 3.7 2.4 1.2 1.9 3.6 30.2 
Nyanza Province 1.5 15.8 15.1 11.9 4.9 23.6 19.0 
Central 0.2 0.2 0.6 
South 1.3 11.7 13.0 7.5 4.0 10.0 6.8 
Kisii 3.9 2.1 3.8 12.9 11.9 
Siaya 0.9 0.5 0.3 
Kisumu 0.2 
Eastern Province 49.2 119.1 75.8 40.6 117.9 55.9 21.7 
Meru 6.5 73.1 38.9 30.8 79.2 34.9 16.0 
Embu 17.2 39.5 36.7 9.8 37.3 20.2 5.7 
Kitui 0.7 4.8 0.2 1.2 0.6 
Machakos 24.8 1.7 0.2 0.2 
Central Province 8.4 12.0 13.6 3.1 9.7 5.2 11.1 
Nyeri 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Kirinyaga 2.9 6.7 9.6 1.0 4.2 3.4 9.9 
Muranga 0.5 0.7 2.6 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.6 
Kiambu 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Nyandarua 4.9 4.2 1.0 0.6 3.9 0.1 0.4 
Ngong 





























































Sources: For the years 1970/71-1979/80, Maize and Produce Board, Annual Report, 1970/71-1979/80 (Nairobi: 
Government Printer, 1971-81); for 1981/82, National Cereals and Produce Board, personal communication. 
Note: One bag weighs 90 kilograms. The district figures for 1981/82 were not available. 
a The balance of 8,100 bags was produced in Coast Province. 
seed. Nor have other small seed companies 
shown any interest. Thus, a gap exists be-
tween the research station and farmer adop-
tion of the improved varieties. 
Although trials by the research stations 
have shown clearly the profitability of using 
fertilizer on improved varieties of beans, its 
adoption has been slow.155 As Table 36 
shows, fertilizer consumption has grown 
slowly for all crops in Kenya as the result of 
macroeconomic policy to minimize foreign 
exchange expenditures on fertilizer and 
other institutional factors. The gross retail 
margin given by the Kenya Farmers Associ-
ation and other importers is typically 2 
percent of the sales value, which does not 
155 National Horticultural Research Station, Grain Legume Project, "1980 Annual Report," Thika, 1980 (mimeographed); 
and National Horticultural Research Station, Grain Legume Project," 1981 Annual Report," Thika, 1981 (mimeographed). 
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Table 44—Total official purchases of grams in major purchasing districts, 1970/71-
1979/80 
Province/District 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 
(1,000 bags) 
Nyanza Province 2.0 1.4 2.1 0.7 
South 2.0 1.4 2.1 0.7 
Eastern Province 29.8 17.8 3.0 5.6 27.0 4.0 6.4 4.8 2.1 
Meru 0.4 1.6 7.1 1.5 1.0 2.7 
Embu 13.2 13.3 2.3 1.0 1.4 5.2 0.6 
Kitui 1.2 3.1 0.7 4.0 18.6 1.1 1.4 
Machakos 15.0 1.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 2.1 
Central Province 7.6 11.2 7.1 0.3 1.2 
Kirinyaga 7.6 11.0 7.1 0.3 1.2 
Muranga 0.2 
Total 39.4 30.4 12.2 6.3 27.0 4.3 7.6 4.8 2.1 
Source: Maize and Produce Board, Annual Report. 1970/71-1979/80 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971-80). 
Note: One bag equals 90 kilograms. 
cover costs of handling, storage, and sell-
ing.156 Also, prices of fertilizer specified to 
retailers in letters from the price controller 
appear to cover an area such as Machakos, 
but in fact refer to the town itself rather than 
the district as a whole. Thus, retailers are 
generally not aware that they may increase 
the price in rural markets above the urban 
retail price to cover legitimate road haulage 
and other costs. This has severely restricted 
fertilizer distribution outside major urban 
centers. Lateness of seasonal credit157 and 
lack of mobility of the extension staff158 are 
also constraints on rapid diffusion of yield-
increasing technological innovation for beans 
and probably also for grams. 
Horticultural Crops 
The substantial imports of nearly U.S. $400 
million in fruit and vegetables in oil-exporting 
countries in 1978 were highly concentrated 
in Iran and the Gulf States. An International 
Trade Centre study of the market for selected 
horticultural products in selected Persian 
Gulf countries in 1980 confirms that the two 
major fruits were oranges and apples and 
the major vegetables were potatoes and 
onions (Table 47).159 Kenya could success-
fully develop exports of fruits including 
apples, oranges, mangoes, and grapes or 
vegetables including onions, potatoes, to-
matoes, and garlic, based on demand growth 
in these countries. 
Kenya's horticultural exports are made 
up of a highly diversified group of fruit and 
vegetables, both fresh and processed. The 
five largest groups given by the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) 
code in the Kenya annual trade statistics for 
the period 1976-80 comprise about 75 percent 
of total horticultural exports, which amounted 
to nearly $35 million in 1980 (Table 48). The 
single largest item is tinned pineapple, which 
is processed in a single factory in Thika, but 
the major growth items are fresh tropical 
fruit and tinned fruit and vegetable juices. 
Fresh fruit and vegetables by airfreight are 
also a major item. 
The Horticultural Crops Development 
Authority statistics list 30 countries that 
import fresh fruit and vegetables from Kenya 
by order of importance. The top seven are all 
in Western Europe. In 1980 these accounted 
for more than 90 percent of total airfreight 
exports by weight. Five Gulf States appear in 
156 Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Central Development and Marketing Unit, Yields. Costs and Prices 1981 (Nairobi: 
Government Printer, 1981), p. 14 ff. 
157 Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Development Planning Division, "National Food Policy Seminar Summary Report," 
Nairobi, 1981. 
158 Leonard, "Administrative Issues in Implementing Kenya's Food Policy." 
159 International Trade Centre, The Market for Fresh Horticultural Products. 
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Table 45—Official prices for selected minor crops, 1970/71-1980/81 
Crop 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 
(KSh/bag) 
Dry edible beans 
Canadian Wonder 76.00 85.00 65.00 75.50 120.00 150.00 
Red Haricot 56.00 70.00 65.00 75.50 120.00 150.00 
Rosecoco 76.00 90.00 65.00 60.50 120.00 150.00 
Grams 
Black 73.00 73.00 60.00 65.50 70.00 70.00' 
Green 75.00 95.00 90.00 75.50 100.00 100.00' 
Yel low 90.00 90.00 65.00 90.50 100.00 100.00' 
Bixab 42.00 52.00 58.00 135.50 135.00 135.00' 
Cashew nuts, Grade I 75.00 75.50 87.00 96.50 98.40 98.40' 
Groundnuts, South Nyanza 106.00 ] 108.00 110.00 30.50 40.00 40.00' 
Bulrush millet 25.00 30.00 30.00 50.50 80.00 80.00' 
Crop 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 
(KSh/bag) 
Dry edible beans 
Canadian Wonder 170.00 170.00 170.00 190.00 300.00 
Red Haricot 170.00 120.00 120.00 150.00 250.00 
Rosecoco 170.00 170.00 165.00 185.00 300.00 
Grams 
Black 216.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00a 
Green 220.00 160.00 200.00 200.00 200.00a 
Yel low 164.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.003 
Bixab 240.00 370.00 370.00 370.00 370.00a 
Cashew nuts, Grade I 98.40a 98.40a 140.00 140.00 140.00a 
Groundnuts, South Nyanza 245.00 300.00 403.00 420.00 420.00a 
Bulrush millet 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.003 
Sources: Maize and Produce Board, Annual Report, 1970/71-1978/79 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971-79) and 
price lists issued by the National Cereals and Produce Board for 1979/80 and 1980/81. 
Notes: The dates that the prices were announced in the years be fore 1975/76 are not available. But the prices for 
1975/76 were announced on August 1, 1975. For 1976/77, the date was December 1, 1976. For 1977/78, it 
was July 1 1, 1977; for 1978/79, it was October 1, 1978; for 1979/80, it was February 12, 1979; and for 
1980/81, it was September 23, 1980. 
a As a price was not g iven in the price lists of the NCPB, it was assumed that no change occurred. 
b Bixa, also known as annatto, is a fruit from which a dye is made that is used as f ood color ing in cheese and 
margarine. 
the listing. The chief horticultural products 
of the 30 countries by weight in 1980 were 
green beans, pineapples, eggplants, chillies, 
and mangoes. Small amounts are airfreighted 
to the Gulf States. Exports to Saudi Arabia by 
airfreight, for example, were 324 tons in 
1980 and made up 2 percent of total air-
freighted horticultural crops by weight in 
that year.160 The major items being air-
freighted to Saudi Arabia were mangoes and 
pineapples, which together accounted for 
80 to 90 percent of total horticultural produce 
by weight airfreighted to Saudi Arabia in 
each year between 1978 and 1980.161 The 
major limiting factor is availability of air-
freight space to the Gulf. Owing to the lack 
of possible backloads, it is unlikely that this 
constraint can be lifted even in the medium 
term; most fruit and vegetables are relatively 
low value items and thus special charters 
are not viable. 
There is potential to transport fresh fruit 
and even certain vegetables to the Gulf by 
seafreight. The major constraint to the use 
160 These data are taken f rom the Horticultural Crops Deve lopment Authority export statistics for fresh fruit, 
vegetables, and cut f lowers airfreighted in 1980. 
161 Ibid. 
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Table 46—Indexes of price changes for pulses and some competing crops, 1970/71 -




1972/73 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/8 
Beans 
Canadian 
Wonder 100 160 199 226 226 226 226 399 439 439 
Rosecoco 100 167 209 237 237 230 230 418 460 460 
Sugar 100 126 182 213 259 271 271 271 306 347 
Maize 100 125 188 207 240 195 204 251 285 389 
Grams, green 100 115 115 253 184 230 230 230 n.a. n.a. 
Bulrush millet 100 217 217 163 163 163 163 163 n.a. n.a. 
Sources: Maize and Produce Board, Annual Report. 1970/71-1978/79 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971-79); price 
lists published by the National Cereals and Produce Board for 1979/80-1981/82; and for maize and sugar, 
Kenya, Ministry o f Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 
1982 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1983). The data for sugar are f rom the Kenya Sugar Authority. 
Note: Where n.a. appears, the f igure was not available. 
of refrigerated (reefer) seafreight for perish-
ables is the irregularity of the service, which 
in turn stems from inadequate demand for 
it. In the past some beef and horticultural 
crops have been shipped this way but not in 
sufficient quantities to justify frequent calls 
to Mombasa by the shipping lines. With the 
sharp fall in beef exports, the frequency of 
reefer sailings to the Gulf has dropped from 
every two weeks to every six weeks since 
1975.162 Thus, the freight space problem is 
really a problem of supply. For example, al-
though total production of mangoes is grow-
ing rapidly, production was still under 1,000 
tons in 1977,163 and Kenya's share of the 
Middle East countries' purchases of fresh 
mangoes was less than 5 percent in 1978. 
India, Pakistan, and Egypt were the main 
suppliers.164 There is also a lack of technical 
knowledge on how to store produce in re-
Table 47—Average values of selected fruit and vegetables imported by selected oil-
exporting countries, 1976-78 
Crop Gulf States North Africa Wes t Africa Iran Indonesia Total 
(U.S. $ mil l ion) 
Fruit 
Oranges, Clementines, 
and tangerines 34.6 0.1 66.6 2.4 103.7 
Apples 27.9 3.0 0.2 40.7 2.7 74.5 
Pears 0.7 0.7 4.7 1.0 7.1 
Grapes 3.3 1.2 4.5 
Lemons and limes 1.0 1.9 2.9 
Vegetables 
Potatoes 22.4 27.9 0.2 0.8 51.3 
Onions 17.6 0.1 2.8 0.2 20.7 
Tomatoes 7.4 7.4 
Total fruit and 
vegetables 114.9 31.6 0.6 117.5 7.5 272.1 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization o f the United Nations, "Trade Yearbook Tape," Rome, 1978. 
162 Dodwel l Shipping Agency, personal communication, October 1981. 
163 International Trade Centre, The Market for Fresh Horticultural Products. 
164 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Table 48—Kenya's exports of selected horticultural crops, 1976-80 




Tinned fruit and vegetable juices 































Tinned fruit and vegetable juices 


































Source: Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise Department, Annual Trade Report. 1976-
80 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1976-80). 
Note: The percentages these crops have in the exports of all horticultural crops are 76.4 for 1976, 76.6 for 1977, 
85.6 for 1978, 78.1 for 1979, and 75.2 for 1980. 
frigerated storage for the two- to three-week 
period required to seafreight it to the Gulf, 
which results in high losses even for mangoes 
and pineapples. This problem has been the 
subject of a specific study by the Interna-
tional Trade Centre.165 
There are several major problems with 
the supply of fresh fruit and vegetables for 
export. A major constraint is in the area of 
research. Apart from a small research station 
for potatoes at Tigoni, all research on hor-
ticultural crops is at the National Horticul-
tural Research Station at Thika or at the Coast 
Agricultural Research Station at Mtwapa, 
which is specifically for coastal crops. There 
has been steady growth in the share of re-
search in both recurrent and development 
expenditure allocations in the Ministry of 
Agriculture budgets. For example, recurrent 
expenditure allocations for research increased 
from 11 percent to 16.6 percent of the 
Ministry of Agriculture recurrent budget 
from 1980/81 to 1981/82,166 and develop-
ment expenditure allocations increased from 
3.2 percent to 5.7 percent.167 Nevertheless, 
research allocations for horticultural crops 
are far from the level required to sustain 
large increases in horticultural exports. 
The share of horticulture in the national 
agricultural research budget in 1979/80 was 
just 7.8 percent, although research expendi-
ture as a percentage of the value of marketed 
production is estimated by Omuse to be 
higher for horticultural crops than for any 
other commodity (Table 49).168 However, 
each horticultural crop—fruit or vegetable— 
has its own problems relating to varieties, 
resistance to pests and diseases, date of 
maturity, and so forth, which require long-
term research efforts to achieve sustained 
increases in yields. 
The diversity of Kenya's agroclimatic 
conditions, encompassing both temperate 
and tropical zones, makes it possible to grow 
a wide variety of fruit and vegetables. As 
many as 15 fruits and 10 major vegetables 
appear to offer commercial returns to a 
sustained research effort Fruits with apparent 
potential include apples, apricots, avocados, 
grapes, grapefruit, lemons, limes, mangoes, 
165 International Trade Centre, "Export Development and Diversification." 
166 Kenya, Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure of the Government of Kenya for the Year Ending June 1983 (Nairobi: Govern-
ment Printer, 1983). 
167 Kenya, Development Estimates for the Year 1981/82 of the Government of Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981). 
168 John K. Omuse, "A Review of Strategies for Research into Food Production," a paper presented at the Workshop on 
Food Policy Research Priorities, Nairobi, June 14-17, 1982. 
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Table 49—Estimated research expenditure compared to the value of the marketed 










as a Share of 







(KSh million) (percent) 
Co f fee 2,124.9 14.6 0.7 26.7 
Livestock (beef and milk) 9.9 
Range research 2.5 
Range research and livestock 1,237.8 1.0 22.8 
Other food crops 407.1 8.6 2.1 15.7 
Maize 187.2 4.6 2.5 8.4 
Oil and fiber crops 248.8 4.5 1.8 8.3 
Horticulture 85.7 4.3 5.0 7.8 
Tea 1,346.8 2.8 0.2 5.1 
Sugar 466.0 2.0 0.4 3.7 
Wheat 297.7 0.0 0.3 1.4 
Total 6,405.8 54.5 0.9 100.0 
Source: John K. Omuse, "A Review of Strategies for Research into Food Production," a paper presented to the 
Workshop on Food Policy Research Priorities, Nairobi, June 14-17, 1982. 
melons, oranges, passion fruits, peaches, 
pears, plums, and strawberries. A list of veg-
etables might include asparagus, cabbage, 
carrots, chillies, green beans, garlic, potatoes, 
onions, sweet peppers, and tomatoes. This 
list does not include flowers, despite sig-
nificant exports of cut flowers to Europe by 
airfreight, particularly roses and carnations. 
If the horticultural crop research budget of 
K Sh 4.3 million in 1978/79 had been equally 
divided between these 27 crops, less than 
KSh 160,000 or U.S. $21,000 at official ex-
change rates in 1978/79 would have been 
available for each crop. The setting of priori-
ties to concentrate research effort on one, or 
at most two, crops is particularly difficult in 
view of the provincial bias in the benefits 
from research introduced by such a concen-
tration of effort. 
Data were collected on apple production 
research in New York State in the United 
States to provide a comparison with research 
expenditures on mangoes in Kenya.169 Es-
timates from the New York State College of 
Agriculture showed 32.5 technical personnel 
working fulltime on research on apples in 
New York State in 1982, the majority on pest 
control. There was one professional working 
for every 16,000 tons of fruit in 1982, or for 
every U.S. $ 1 million of gross value. In Kenya, 
only two technicians were working on man-
goes, at a fraction of the cost of professionals 
in New York. Although the gross value of the 
crop is difficult to estimate, it is probably 
well below U.S. $1 million; thus, gross value 
of output per research worker is probably 
little different from that in New York State. 
However, if investment in fruit production 
depends on a critical minimum effort in re-
search to produce a viable technical package, 
the allocation of research personnel to 
mangoes in Kenya may well fall below the 
minimum required. 
One important consequence of the lack 
of research is a high degree of uncertainty 
about the size of returns in any large-scale 
investment in fruit production. Disease and 
pest problems are a particular problem in 
tropical and subtropical zones. For example, 
virus diseases are now widespread in citrus 
in Kenya with no known treatment. These 
diseases build up after 10 years, gradually 
reducing yields and limiting the life of the 
tree to 20 years. In the early stages it is not 
169 Cornell University, Department of Pomology and Agricultural Economics, Ithaca, N.Y., personal communication, 
July 1983. 
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possible to see the virus with the naked 
eye.170 Without extensive field trials and 
research into pests and diseases, a mango 
production project based on new varieties 
must be viewed as a high-risk venture, despite 
attractive market opportunities for fresh fruit. 
The only short-run option in the absence of 
research is to develop domestic production 
primarily for processing, using locally proven 
varieties, as one company in Western Kenya 
has done successfully with papayas. 
In addition to the lack of research, there 
is a major lack of improved planting material, 
especially fruit trees. It is estimated that as 
many as 700,000 citrus seedlings were sold 
from government nurseries in 1982, but only 
a small fraction were of improved stock, and 
some may in fact damage existing production 
by spreading disease.171 To illustrate the 
scarcity, the Mtwapa Research Station sold 
9,000 seedlings in 1977, of which 6,400 were 
citrus and 2,300 were mangoes,172 whereas 
in 1979, in the Coast Province alone, there 
was demand for more than 400,000 seed-
lings—62,000 citrus and 18,000 mangoes.173 
The problems of nursery production in 
Coast Province have been well documented 
by van Eijnatten.174 The land of some of the 
12 nurseries currently existing is too small 
to allow proper rotation, irrigation equipment 
is in poor repair, and the recurrent budget 
for employment of labor and purchase of 
seeds is low. Thepotential to increase output 
substantially is undoubtedly great, given the 
availability of improved mango varieties, 
such as the Apple, Boribo, and Ngowe vari-
eties, to graft onto local rootstock. The cost 
of a major scheme to meet the province's 
seedling requirements was estimated in 1980 
at U.S. $200,000-$300,000 per \ear for f ive 
years, but without a major export-based 
scheme such as the one described below.175 
Mangoes appear to offer the most attrac-
tive potential prospect for exports to the 
Gulf States and Iran. Improved varieties 
exist and seedlings can be made available in 
large numbers from existing rootstock by 
budding or grafting. Mangoes do not suffer 
from serious virus diseases, like citrus fruits, 
but they are susceptible to fungal diseases if 
there is heavy rain at the time of flowering.176 
With improved varieties and methods of 
cultivation, yields can increase from the 
current average of 250 fruits per tree to 
about 1,000 fruits per tree a year.177 In Coast 
Province there are two seasons of fruit pro-
duction, May to July and December to 
February, which correspond with the rains. 
Some local varieties produce fruit through-
out the year. Kenyan mango exports would 
face no competition from Indian suppliers 
in Gulf State markets during the period 
around the end of the year. 
A major source of difficulty is manage-
ment of fruit production when it is scattered 
among thousands of small farms in an area. 
Smallholders with only a few trees don't take 
the time to find out about pruning and spray-
ing for disease control. As a consequence, 
standards of husbandry are low. This points 
to the need for consolidating pieces of land 
and limiting the area to be put under fruit 
trees to a minimum of 1 hectare, as was 
required when smallholder tea production 
was initiated in Kenya. This would also facil-
itate collective transport and marketing ar-
rangements. A suitable area in Coast Province 
would probably be the settlement area be-
tween Mombasa and Malindi (close to the 
170 Mtwapa Research Station, Mtwapa, personal communication, July 1982. 
171 Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Horticultural Crops Development Division, Nairobi, personal communication, 
March 1982. 
172 Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Division of Scientific Research, Annual Report, Coast Province 1977 (Nairobi: 
Government Printer, 1978). 
173 C. L. M. van Eijnatten and S. J. Karisa, "Proposal for the Development of Nursery Activities in Coast Province and 
its Cost of Implementation," Coast Agricultural Research Station Communication 9, Mtwapa, March 1980 
(mimeographed). 
174 C. L. M. van Eijnatten, "Notes on Treecrop Nursery Activities in Coast Province," Coast Agricultural Research 
Station Communication 8, Mtwapa, October 1979 (mimeographed). 
175 Ibid. 
176 K. Mwangi, "Problems of Mango Growing in Coast Province," Coast Agricultural Research Station Quarterly Newsletter, 
March 1982. 
177 Mtwapa Research Station, Mtwapa, personal communication, July 1982. 
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research station at Mtwapa), where farmers 
have 5 hectares each and much of the land 
is left uncultivated at present. 
The horticultural industry in Kenya offers 
great potential to increase Kenya's exports 
to oil-exporting countries. Fruits offer greater 
potential than vegetables, because higher 
unit values lower freight costs as a proportion 
of the export parity value. However, most 
fruits are less labor-intensive than vegetables 
and thus create less employment. Pests and 
diseases in citrus fruits make mangoes the 
more promising crop, and underline the 
need for a greater allocation of research 
funds to one or two priority horticultural 
crops to provide a secure basis for future 
project funding. A mango project in Coast 
Province appears to be viable immediately. 
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WHO SHOULD PROCESS AND EXPORT? 
One of the major issues brought out by 
the commodity studies is the institutional 
problem of handling commodity exports. 
The high costs in the domestic cof fee mar-
keting chain, the choices of technology in 
sugar processing, and the lack of market 
information for pulses all raise questions 
about which is the most economically effi-
cient and socially desirable crop marketing 
system. In the medium term decisions about 
who should process and export will have to 
be made for each of these crops with export 
potential. Decisions will also be required on 
the balance between estates and smallholder 
production, especially since in Kenya the 
estates and large farms produce higher yields 
per hectare for coffee, tea, and sugar but not 
for maize and beans. 
Five major types of marketing institutions 
that are involved in the processing and 
export of these crops will be considered. 
Expatriate-controlled businesses, Asian-
owned businesses, and small African-owned 
businesses are usually all lumped together 
as "the private sector."178 But, these three 
major components of the private sector 
differ in their objective functions, their 
economic performance, and their social 
linkages. In general, all are economically 
efficient, but concern has been expressed in 
Kenya about the distribution of power and 
wealth that may result from these forms of 
ownership.179 Two more socially desirable 
institutions—parastatals and cooperatives— 
may not threaten the social fabric in the 
same way, but questions have been raised 
about their efficiency.180 The dilemma is 
this: there is no institution available to de-
velop export potential that combines effi-
ciency and social acceptability. 
Expatriate-Controlled Enterprise 
Expatriate-controlled enterprise includes 
all firms that are effectively controlled by 
those whose citizenship and residence are 
outside of Kenya. These are primarily local 
branches of large multinational companies. 
At present, the major agricultural export-
related activities in which such companies 
predominate are buying of co f fee and tea 
crops at auction; production of co f fee and 
tea on estates; management of the large 
sugar companies that are government-owned; 
and production, processing, and export of 
pineapples, the major horticultural crop. 
Often these international companies are the 
end-users of the commodity, so it is natural 
for them to want to move into production 
and processing. With such a high degree of 
concentration of Western manufacturers 
and distributors, it is often impossible to de-
velop agricultural exports without the direct 
participation of such companies in primary 
production and processing if they want it. 
Such companies offer technology, inter-
national marketing expertise, and oppor-
tunities for Africans to gain training and 
commercial and manufacturing experience in 
industrial production and agricultural exports. 
So why are they so unpopular in Kenya? 
Some suspicion surrounds the activities 
of expatriate-owned companies. The Inter-
national Labour Organisation Mission in 
1972 estimated that in 1967 foreign-owned 
manufacturing firms had a share in gross 
profits before taxes 1.28 times their share in 
the gross product.181 High capital require-
ments, small market size, and lack of com-
petition have led to high margins in Kenyan 
178 For example, see World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981). 
179 National Christian Council of Kenya, Who Controls Industry in Kenya? (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1968). 
180 Kenya, Working Party on Government Expenditures, Report and Recommendations; and Goran Hyden, Efficiency 
Versus Distribution in East African Cooperatives: A Study in Organizational Conflicts (Nairobi: East African Literature 
Bureau, 1973). 
181 International Labour Organisation, Employment, Incomes and Equality. A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employ-
ment in Kenya (Geneva: ILO, 1972), p. 442. 
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manufacturing. A second major problem is 
the outflow of foreign exchange associated 
with their activities through management 
fees and dividends, and also less legally 
through practices such as transfer pricing 
and overinvoicing.182 From dividend pay-
ments, management fees, and other forms of 
remittance alone, Leys estimates that these 
companies were responsible for a capital 
outflow of K Sh 2.4 billion from 1964 to 1970, 
or more than three times the private foreign 
investment during that period, including re-
investment of local profits.183 The exact 
amount of the outflow associated with such 
practices, however, is impossible to estab-
lish, which serves to exacerbate suspicion. 
But, the most significant negative aspect 
of these companies is perceived to be their 
effects on the social fabric of Kenyan society. 
Leys argues that Kenyanizing the ownership 
of shares in these companies and their highly 
paid management positions and director-
ships has led to an African elite, which has 
interests closely allied with those of the 
expatriates who control these companies.184 
This elite is said to have established long-term 
hegemony by buying heavily into land and 
property, using the income derived from it 
or the property itself as collateral for bank 
credit. Thus, social stratification among 
African Kenyans appears to be an inevitable 
consequence of the activities of expatriate-
controlled companies, whereas traditional 
societies in East Africa were characterized 
by a relative absence of elitism.185 
Non-African Local Companies 
The largest group of non-African citizens 
in Kenya are of Indian or Pakistani extraction. 
Although almost all of those who live there 
today were born in Kenya and thus have 
Kenyan citizenship, they have been referred 
to since 1947 as "Asians." The number of 
Asians has fallen from 139,000 in 1968 to 
78,000 in 1979,186 but their economic in-
fluence appears to have grown. Leys estimates 
that in 1971 Asians owned 65 percent of total 
private nonfarm assets in Kenya.187 They 
dominate both urban and retail distribution 
and manufacturing. In the agricultural export 
commodities their main activities have been 
in cof fee and tea exports, horticultural ex-
ports by airfreight, private slaughterhouses 
for meat products, and white sugar process-
ing. Cultural and religious affinity with the 
Arab world may give Asians some advantages 
in developing agricultural exports to oil-
exporting countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa. 
Despite their citizenship status, there is 
deep-rooted resentment among Africans 
against the Asian community. Marris and 
Somerset argue that Asian competition is 
more obtrusive than European competition, 
because in capital and range of activities it 
is closer to the level African businessmen 
can aim for.188 During an attempted coup in 
1982, it was the Asian community that suf-
fered most severely from looting of homes 
and businesses.189 As a consequence, many 
believe Asians are trying to take their assets 
out of the country. Newspaper stories refer 
to large amounts of cash found "under the 
bed" in describing thefts from Asian homes, 
and they frequently tell of Asians caught 
smuggling large amounts of foreign currency 
out of Kenya at the international airport. 
Charges of transfer-pricing, overinvoicing, 
nonpayment of local taxes, and other forms 
of "corruption" are also frequently levied 
against the Asian community. 
The dominance of the Asian community 
in trade and the high liquidity of their assets 
means they are likely to be the prime benefi-
ciaries of any liberalization of internal or 
external trade in agricultural commodities. 
However, it is precisely in agricultural trade 
182 When a company sells a product or service to its own foreign branch or subsidiary at an artificially low price, so 
that profits are made outside of the country, it is called transfer pricing. When a company buys a product or service 
from its foreign branch or subsidiary and prices it artificially high, that is overinvoicing. 
183 Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya (London: Heinemann, 1975), pp. 137-138. 
184 Ibid., p. 124. 
185 See, for example, Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (London: Martin, Seeker, and Warburg, 1938). 
186 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1981, p. 12. 
187 Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, p. 120. 
188 Peter Marris and Anthony Somerset, African Businessmen: A Study of Entrepreneurship and Development in Kenya 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 94-98. 
189 Weekly Review (Nairobi), August 6, 1982, pp. 3-17. 
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in rural areas that African businessmen 
have been able to compete most effectively— 
in the trading of potatoes and other horticul-
tural crops, for example. African business-
men will need to accumulate the resources 
necessary to handle higher volume com-
modities such as maize and beans, and they 
may also need safeguards to enable them to 
compete with the more experienced and 
financially secure Asian community. 
Parastatals 
The major parastatals involved in agri-
cultural exports of the commodities con-
sidered in this report and the proportion of 
public ownership are shown in Table 50. In 
addition, a large share of the equity of the 24 
tea factories of the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority is publicly owned, as well as much 
of the equity of other commodity boards, 
companies, and financial intermediaries 
directly involved in agricultural exports. 
These are listed in the report of the Working 
Party on Government Expenditures, called 
the Ndegwa Commission.190 The Kenya 
National Trading Corporation has sole re-
sponsibility for domestic sugar distribu-
tion, and it also exports coffee. The Agricul-
tural Development Corporation became a 
major horticultural exporter in 1981 and 1982. 
The key issues raised by the Ndegwa 
Commission about parastatals are those of 
economic efficiency. Regarding return on 
capital, the Commission points out that on 
cumulative investments exceeding KSh 900 
million by 1982, including the guaranteed 
debt of parastatals, at a rate of return of 10 
percent the government should be realizing 
KSh 90 million per year in dividends. Instead, 
in 1978/79 dividends paid to the Exchequer 
amounted to only KSh 2.2 million and were 
paid by only six parastatals.191 The Commis-
sion's report also refers to the increase in 
employment by parastatals and government-
owned companies from 114,000 to 230,000 
from 1971 to 1981 and the concentration of 
this employment at lower levels of skill. In 
March 1982, 90 percent of these employees 
were in lower skill categories. Meanwhile, 
there was an acute shortage of middle- and 
upper-level management staff. Vacancies 
were zero for the lower jobs, 32.2 percent for 
the upper-middle jobs, and 15.2 percent at 
the highest levels. There are 5,000 vacant 
posts in the higher cadres.192 
Lack of qualified accounting staff and 
other internal auditing and control systems 
result in a lack of accountability for man-
agement. This weakens incentives to achieve 
high levels of financial performance and 
often leads individuals to pursue personal 
rather than corporate goals. Thus, there are 
frequent charges of misappropriation of 
funds. Accurate and up-to-date accounting 
information, on which sound management 
depends, is not available. The monopsonist 
position of most parastatals means that 
there is no competitive pressure to keep 
operations efficient, whereas their political 
connections make them immune to the ul-
timate commercial sanction of bankruptcy 
and dissolution. 
The Cooperative Movement 
The cooperative movement in Kenya 
dates back to the 1930s, but it has expanded 
greatly since independence in 1963. Its two 
major activities are agricultural marketing 
and provision of urban and rural credit. It 
plays a major role in the processing of 
export crops—notably coffee, pyrethrum, 
and cotton—but not in the international 
sale of crops. The cooperatives handle most 
of the sugarcane and all of the milk produced 
by smallholders. In addition, they are the 
major agency for distribution of credit and 
inputs in the smallholder sector of the 
economy. The annual sales of the coopera-
tives handling cof fee alone were close to 
KSh 1.3 billion in 1981, and total turnover 
handled by cooperatives in 1981 was more 
than KSh 2.0 billion, including sales through 
cooperatives in 1981 of milk, KSh 274 mil-
lion; of pyrethrum, KSh 144 million; of 
cotton, KSh 78 million; and of sugarcane, 
KSh 38 million (Table 51). This is more than 
50 percent of the total value of smallholder 
marketed production of these crops. The ef-
190 Kenya, Working Party on Government Expenditures, Report and Recommendations, pp. 93-95. 
191 Ibid., p. 41. 
192 Ibid., pp. 71-78. 
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Table 50—Degree of public ownership in agricultural marketing institutions, 1982 
Government Share of 
Institutions Public 
Institution Participating Ownership 
(percent) 
Commodity Development Authorities 
Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation GOK 100.0 
Kenya Tea Development Authority GOK 100.0 
Horticultural Crops Development Authority GOK 100.0 
Kenya Meat Commission GOK 100.0 
Marketing Boards 
National Cereals and Produce Board GOK 100.0 
Kenya Cof fee Marketing Board GOK 100.0 
Sugar Companies 
Chemelil Sugar Company ADC 97.0 
East Africa Sugar Industries ADC 74.2 
Mumias Sugar Company GOK 82.8 
Nzoia Sugar Company IDB 3.0 
GOK 93.3 
South Nyanza Sugar Company GOK 91.3 
ICDC 5.1 
IDB 3.6 
Source: Kenya, Working Party on Government Expenditures, Report and Recommendations of the Working Party 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1982), pp. 93-95. 
Notes: GOK stands for Government of Kenya; ADC for Agricultural Development Corporation; IDB for Industrial 
Development Bank, and ICDC for Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation. 
ficiency of cooperative structures, though 
of little importance to the estates and large 
farms, is of critical importance to low-
income groups among smallholders in Kenya. 
The rationale for cooperative organiza-
tion is based on producer ownership of the 
cooperative's assets, producer control through 
democratic election procedures, and close 
government supervision through the Min-
istry of Cooperative Development. However, 
in practice, the owners (farmers) lack effec-
tive systems for holding cooperative man-
agers accountable. Since 1981 there has been 
much public discussion of the effects of 
Table 51—Role of cooperatives in the agricultural marketing system, 1981 
Cooperative Turnover 
Number of Number of Sales of Market by Type 
Cooperative Societies Members Farm Produce Share of Society 
(1,000) (KSh million) (percent) (KSh million) 
Cof fee 169 513 1,322 64 1,492 
Cotton 40 120 78 84 56 
Pyrethrum 54 76 144 60 71 
Sugarcane 64 30 38 6 77 
Dairy 103 80 274 54 89 
Multiproduce3 335 110 n.a. n.a. 
270 Other agricultural 332 58 n.a. n.a. 
Farm purchase 219 40 
Total 1,316 1,027 1,856 54 2,055 
Source: Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 1983 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1983), pp. 29-46. 
Note: Where n.a. appears, the figure was not available. 
3 Part of the sales of agricultural produce for a specific commodity such as pyrethrum or sugarcane go through 
multiproduce societies, which handle several commodities, rather than through societies specializing in just one. 
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cooperative inefficiencies on smallholder 
incomes. 
The cooperatives are faced with substan-
tial shortages of trained manpower. Out of 
an estimated 19,472 employees in 1979/80, 
cooperatives had only 197 university grad-
uates.193 This was approximately one grad-
uate for every U.S. $1 million of turnover at 
the official exchange rate in 1981. In 1981 
the Ministry of Cooperative Development 
had only one team of inspectors—six people 
for 2,400 societies and 36 unions. In part, the 
manpower shortages can be traced to re-
cruitment. Cooperatives find it difficult to 
pay competitive salaries, to provide adequate 
housing and other facilities, and to avoid 
remote locations. The Ministry of Cooperative 
Development faces long bureaucratic delays 
in making appointments and also cannot 
offer high salaries.194 
A second problem is management train-
ing. The Cooperative College of Kenya pro-
vides the main source of training for the 
movement, but in 1981 only 25 percent of 
agricultural cooperative managers had at-
tended even the short course for managers 
of 13 to 26 weeks and a much smaller pro-
portion the full two-year course.195 The Col-
lege's facilities are inadequate. For example, 
in 1981 the College was training just 15 people 
a year in cooperative banking, so that it would 
take 15 years to train all those dealing with 
savings and loans in one union alone.196 
The consequences of the lack of trained 
manpower are many. Hyden notes, "One of 
the fundamental weaknesses in cooperative 
societies has been the inadequate main-
tenance of proper records and books of ac-
counts. Inefficiency has to a considerable 
extent been facilitated by poor bookkeep-
ing."197 However, as Marris and Somerset 
note, it is not the qualifications of the book-
keeper but the quality of the bookkeeping 
that is crucial.198 This may be related as much 
to management motivation to obtain accurate 
records as to the training of personnel. 
Without bookkeeping records at the grass 
roots, local cooperative clerks and managers 
operate outside any effective system of 
financial accountability. The effects of this 
on society finances have been discussed in 
Kenya's press repeatedly since 1981. 
In seeking a longer-term framework within 
which to understand the efficiency problems 
of cooperatives, Hyden argues that it is only 
possible to secure a rational and hierarchical 
type of bureaucracy as long as kinship ties 
are relatively insignificant in determining 
social relations. The "mechanical solidarity" 
of clan and tribe has to give way to the "or-
ganic solidarity" of shared economic inter-
ests.199 Even if policymakers accept this 
change as desirable for the social structure, 
the problem remains of what time horizon is 
reasonable. While kinship ties still pre-
dominate, there are high short-term costs in 
imposing "organic" institutional forms, such 
as the cooperatives and parastatals, which 
are not built on traditional kinship loyalties. 
This cost can be measured in exports forgone 
and the slowing of industrial growth. 
Those closely involved in the cooperative 
movement recommend five ways to reform 
it for the medium term: 
1. Increase the number of trained book-
keepers. Much of the training provided by 
donors has concentrated on top-level man-
agement and credit disbursement, while the 
primary need is to train bookkeepers who 
handle crop payments at the grass roots. 
2. Separate the credit and marketing 
functions of the movement. This would 
mean channeling credit through a separate 
institutional network of savings and credit 
societies so that crop marketing is not com-
plicated by credit collection and disburse-
ment problems. The advantages of combin-
ing smallholder credit with marketing to 
ease loan recovery depend on the institu-
tional capacity to handle the complexities 
of loan disbursement and recovery pro-
193 Rex B. Schultz and Jack M. Gay, "Professional and Subprofessional Manpower Requirements for the Cooperative 
Sector in Kenya, 1988," Agricultural Cooperative Development International, Washington, D.C., 1980 (mimeo-
graphed), p. 16. 
194 Ibid., p. 10. 
195 Cooperative College of Kenya, personal communication, June 1981. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Hyden, Efficiency Versus Distribution in East African Cooperatives, p. 170. 
198 Marris and Somerset, African Businessmen, p. 220. 
199 Hyden, Efficiency Versus Distribution in East African Cooperatives, pp. 218-219. 
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cedures on top of more important crop-
handling functions. Cooperative loans to 
smallholders are less than KSh 100 million 
annually, with poor repayment records; the 
gross value of produce marketed is KSh 2 
billion.200 Scarce skilled manpower should 
not be diverted from the major task of effi-
cient crop marketing to the complex but 
relatively unimportant task of credit dis-
bursement. 
3. Allow cooperatives to go into liquida-
tion in cases of extreme financial misman-
agement, as in the early period of cooperative 
development. From 1932 to 1969, 443 of the 
1,894 societies registered went into liquida-
tion 201 Scarce capital resources can then be 
channeled to societies that have proven 
management capability. This would place 
cooperative managers in the same position 
as business managers. 
4. Allow farmers to sell to any cooperative, 
not only to the one where they are registered. 
This would be possible only if the credit 
function had already been removed, so that 
farmers would not change to another society 
to avoid repaying loans. Competition among 
cooperatives to obtain the farmers' produce 
would serve as an incentive to increase 
efficiency. 
5. Move toward a polyopsonistic market-
ing structure by licensing African business-
men to compete with cooperatives if they 
are able to offer better prices to the farmer. 
This would again require separating the 
credit and savings functions of the coopera-
tives from the marketing functions. 
The African Business Sector 
Both large, privately owned manufactur-
ing enterprises and small family businesses, 
such as retail shops and shoe repair stands, 
are included in the African business sector. 
Although the larger firms seldom involve 
kinship, the smaller businesses have high 
participation by the extended family net-
work.202 Manufacturing concerns are oper-
ated like Western capitalist firms, whereas 
the family firm "so allocates costs, benefits 
and risks as to maximise expected utility to the 
household, not profits to the enterprise."203 
Although the African business sector 
plays only a small role in agricultural pro-
cessing and exporting, its role in the economy 
as a whole is significant. In horticultural 
exports by airfreight, 10 African-owned bus-
inesses out of a total of about 30 (excluding 
the Agricultural Development Corporation) 
were active in 1982, but they accounted for 
only an estimated 10 percent of total ex-
ports.204 Nine percent of cof fee exports 
were handled by three African-owned pri-
vate exporters in 1982/83, and a further 2.5 
percent by the Kenya National Trading Cor-
poration, a parastatal205 In sugar processing 
almost all of the 120 jaggery factories are 
owned and operated by African businessmen; 
however, many of these factories were not 
built by Africans but taken over from Asian 
sugarcane growers. No white sugar factories 
are in private African ownership. In the local 
marketing of agricultural products, African 
businesses trade in horticultural crops; 
some, like potatoes, are major commodities 
in the domestic market. They are also in-
volved in transport of commodities handled 
by the NCPB and intradistrict trading in 
cereals. 
In the rest of the economy there are a 
small number of African owned and managed 
manufacturing ventures under the sponsor-
ship of the Kenya Industrial Estates, which 
is a government sponsoring agency to en-
courage the African business sector in manu-
facturing. In rural areas 20 percent of African 
businesses found by the ILO were tailoring 
businesses, sawmills, and maize mills.206 
Construction, transport, and hotelkeeping 
are other important activities. There were 
51,000 businesses in the rural nonagricultural 
200 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 1983. 
pp. 40-41. 
201 Hyden, Efficiency Versus Distribution in East African Cooperatives, pp. 24-25. 
202 Marris and Somerset, African Businessmen, pp. 132-150. 
203 Michael Lipton, "Family, Fungibility and Formality," a paper presented at the International Economics Association 
Conference, Mexico City, August 1980, p. 2. 
204 Horticultural Crops Development Authority, personal communication, August 1983. 
205 Cof fee Board of Kenya, "Kenya Cof fee Sales for Cof fee Year 1982/83 to 31.6.83," Nairobi, 1983 (mimeographed). 
206 International Labour Organisation, Employment, Incomes and Equality, p. 225. 
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sector in 1968, of which 75 percent were 
owned by farmers either individually or in 
partnership.207 
Why is African business participation 
relatively insignificant in agricultural pro-
cessing and exporting, despite this substantial 
small business activity? This is of special 
concern because agricultural processing 
provides opportunities to develop experience 
in management and more advanced tech-
nology. Small industries can be developed 
using local raw materials, such as milk, 
oilseeds, pulses, sugarcane, cotton, animal 
skins, and wheat. Technology for small-
scale production for such industries is avail-
able from Asia, and high costs of transport 
for agricultural raw materials give cost ad-
vantages to decentralized processing units. 
The processed product often has a ready 
market in the domestic economy, as well as 
export potential to neighboring states and 
beyond. 
There are f ive main barriers to entry into 
agricultural processing and exporting for 
African businessmen: legal barriers, bureau-
cratic requirements, start-up delays, access 
to technology, and existing large firms. 
First, the legal barriers are acute. For 
many commodities, marketing and process-
ing functions have been conferred by statute 
to either a parastatal or the cooperative 
movement. African businessmen may not 
legally buy from the farmer or process 
coffee, tea, dairy products, cereals, oilseeds, 
pulses, white sugar, or most spices. These 
commodities made up 80 percent of the 
estimated gross value of marketed agricul-
tural production in 1980.208 
Second, the maze of bureaucratic re-
quirements is a major barrier to entry. For an 
African businessman to initiate production 
and export of processed agricultural goods, 
he must obtain a manufacturer's license 
from the Ministry of Industry, an export 
license from the Central Bank, and a certifi-
cate of clearance from the Ministry of 
Health. In addition, he needs wholesaler 
and retailer licenses for local sales from the 
Ministry of Commerce and special licenses 
for specific commodities, such as sugar or 
coffee, generally issued by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. He must also comply with in-
dustrial standards of the Kenya Bureau of 
Standards, annual weights and measures 
inspections, and required statistical infor-
mation reporting. 
In order to export, he has to complete a 
large amount of documentation. These in-
clude "CD-3" forms, which show the value 
of goods and their destination. These have 
to be certified by a commercial bank. He 
must also complete the customs entry forms 
(six copies) and obtain a certificate of origin 
from the Chamber of Commerce, or statutory 
authority for the crop. For goods being 
exported to most Arab countries, invoices 
must also be certified by the embassy of the 
importing country. All these procedures are 
a formidable barrier to entry for the new 
African export business. 
In addition, the manufacturing or export-
ing businesses must pay a wide variety of 
taxes. These include an annual tax return, 
Pay as You Earn tax, contributions to the 
National Social Security Fund and the Na-
tional Hospital Insurance Fund, contribu-
tions for employees earning over KSh 1,000 
per month, sales tax on sales over KSh 
200,000 per month in the local market, a 
training levy if the firm employs more than 
50 employees, a levy to the Kenya Bureau of 
Standards, vehicle taxes, and a small tax on 
the invoiced value of export goods to the 
Port or Airport Authority. In addition, there 
are taxes relating to specific commodities, 
such as the cess on horticultural products 
payable to the Horticultural Crops Devel-
opment Authority. In summary, for most 
businesses there are licenses to be obtained 
from 6 different arms of government, 10 
different taxes to be paid, and a wide range 
of other forms to be completed. 
Many of the required documents and 
licenses can be obtained only in Nairobi, the 
capital, which is often up to 500 kilometers 
from the location of the plant. Lack of 
systems of accountability and difficulty in 
obtaining redress can lead to exaggerated 
payment demands by those issuing the 
required licenses and documents. This led 
the ILO to recommend a drastic reduction in 
the number of licenses required and the 
maintenance of standards by inspection of 
operations rather than by issuing licenses 209 
The Kenya External Trade Authority has also 
attempted to simplify export procedures but 
207 Ibid., p. 37. 
208 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1980 
209 International Labour Organisation, Employment. Incomes and Equality, p. 229. 
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their recommendations have not been im-
plemented.210 
Third, two major sources of delay affect 
the starting up of new agricultural projects. 
New, large-scale projects or those involving 
foreign capital must be approved by the New 
Projects Committee, an interministerial 
committee that meets quarterly to examine 
investment proposals. Approval often takes 
two years. And new firms often find it dif-
ficult to acquire land or a building. Sites for 
agricultural processing are scarce because 
there are often particular requirements for 
water and power. It may take up to f ive years 
to complete the procedures for acquiring an 
industrial site, even for companies already 
operating in the export sector, despite the 
priority attached to such industries in gov-
ernment planning documents. The final 
decisions are not made by local institutions, 
but by those in Nairobi; difficulties of 
communicating, especially by telephone, 
greatly exacerbate administrative delays. 
Fourth, the technological know-how to 
set up a plant for food processing—such as 
oilseed crushing, dairy products manufac-
turing, fruit juice canning, and so forth— 
would normally be obtained from work 
experience in an operating plant, from high-
level academic training, or from machinery 
suppliers. The bueaucratic barriers to entry 
for small-scale processors are so pervasive 
that machinery suppliers have not imported 
machinery with small-scale capacity, so 
there is little opportunity for Africans to 
obtain technological know-how through work 
experience. The applied academic training 
necessary to instill confidence to set up a 
production plant is hardly available in Kenya 
and only available overseas in conjunction 
with schemes to provide work experience. 
Thus, technological know-how is another 
major barrier to entry for African business-
men, even for the relatively low-technology 
processes involved in agricultural processing. 
And finally, for a number of products, 
large expatriate-owned firms, many of which 
existed prior to Independence, effectively 
block entry for the African businessman. For 
oilseed crushing, for example, the operations 
of large cpmpanies using imported raw 
materials have made it difficult for local 
sunflower-based oil extracting industries to 
compete. Large bakeries in Nairobi, with 
capital costs written off long ago and con-
siderable economies of scale, have made it 
difficult for local bakeries to compete, even 
with the substantial support of the Kenya 
Industrial Estates. The advantages of large 
firms often include easier access to import 
licenses for imported components, spare 
parts, and raw materials, and easier access to 
subsidized raw materials that must be pro-
vided by the government, such as wheat for 
bread or dry milk for babyfood. 
Marris and Somerset analyzed the prob-
lems faced by African businessmen in all 
sectors of the economy in 1970.211 They con-
cluded that the chief problems of business 
growth lay not in access to capital but in 
reconciling traditional expectations of work-
ing relationships with the demands of hier-
archical and bureaucratic management. In 
small businesses traditional relationship 
patterns serve well, but with growth bus-
inessmen "stood on a threshold of devel-
opment in organisation which they did not 
know how to cross."212 They conclude that 
the primary need is for management training 
services that emphasize the structure of 
internal and external relationships in bus-
iness rather than accounting techniques 213 
The strongest argument raised against 
encouraging African business is its contribu-
tion toward social stratification. Theoretically, 
the emergence of an elite is regarded as a 
greater problem for private businesses than 
for parastatals and cooperatives, although 
in practice an elite may emerge as readily 
from administrative or cooperative monop-
olies, as experience in Tanzania has dem-
onstrated 214 Leys theorizes that those with 
assets and relatively high incomes are the 
most likely to obtain commercial loans. In 
turn, they are able to acquire land, which 
gives them further access to credit. Gradually 
an elite emerges, which buys up and con-
solidates the land of smallholders, leading 
210 Kenya, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, External Trade Authority, Trade Facilitation in Kenya: Aligned Documents 
and Streamlined Procedures for Imports and Exports (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1979). 
211 Marris and Somerset, African Businessmen. 
212 Ibid., p. 107. 
2 , 3 Ibid., p. 235. 
214 See, for example, Jonathan Barker, "The Debate on Rural Socialism in Tanzania," in Towards Socialism in Tanzania. 
ed. Bismarck U. Mwansau and Cranford Piatt (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1979), pp. 95-124. 
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to a small but affluent bourgeoisie and a 
landless urban and rural proleteriat.215 
There are, however, several ways to 
prevent this cycle from emerging. One is to 
expand African business ownership from 
the individual to the extended family or clan. 
Although problems of financial account-
ability have occurred with clan ownership 
where this has been tried,216 there are many 
cases where extended family participation 
in both labor and capital provision has been 
highly successful. Greater control over the 
buying and selling of land also can play a 
major role, both in safeguarding the holdings 
of smallholders and preventing the all-too-
frequent drain of resources from successful 
African business enterprise into land as a 
more secure form of holding wealth. 
Research is needed to identify an insti-
tutional form that will encourage collective 
family ownership and yet meet the manage-
ment requirements of larger-scale economic 
enterprise. Partnership arrangements, for 
example, encourage annual distribution of 
earnings between all those who are classified 
as partners. It thus combines ownership and 
management in a way that cooperatives and 
limited liability companies fail to achieve. If 
the Partnership Act217 could be modified to 
allow limited liability, at least in regard to 
rural land, and taxes on partnerships could 
be made to conform to present corporate tax 
rates, this might be an ideal form for collec-
tive family enterprise. An alternative might 
be to establish "family associations" based 
on the Lebanese model.218 
This brief discussion illustrates the size 
of the institutional problems underlying 
development of Kenyan agricultural exports. 
None of the institutional categories satisfies 
all of the criteria: African ownership and 
control, access to international markets and 
technological know-how, economic efficiency, 
and social integration rather than divisive 
influence. The acute shortage of trained 
manpower and entrenched interest groups 
are problems that further complicate policy 
decisions on appropriate institutional forms. 
To achieve vigorous export performance, 
management of existing institutions will 
have to improve and the role of African 
business will have to be expanded by relaxing 
the regulatory structure, so as to encourage 
African businesses to participate in the 
domestic and international marketing of 
agricultural products. 
215 Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya. 
216 For example, Jan J. de Wolf, Differentiation and Integration in Western Kenya (The Hague: Mouton, 1977), p. 61. 
217 Kenya, Laws of Kenya, The Partnership Act, Chapter 86 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1972). 
218 Samir Khalaf, "Family Associations in Lebanon," Journal of Comparative Family Studies 2 (Autumn 1971): 235-250. 
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOOD EXPORTS 
Kenya's low level of food exports in the 
1970s must be attributed in part to govern-
ment policy. In 1975, the government pro-
hibited meat exports because the KMC was 
unable to obtain enough meat. In 1980, the 
government put a ban on all food exports 
(except horticultural products) following a 
severe shortage of maize. The National Food 
Policy Paper of 1981 mentions briefly the 
possibility of exports, but there was little 
discussion of food export potential in the 
national or provincial workshops held to 
discuss the paper.219 The goal of food policy 
was to achieve self-sufficiency, ending food 
imports. 
Senior and middle levels of the Civil 
Service may underestimate the importance 
of increasing export earnings for good rea-
sons. Although there was an acute shortage 
of foreign exchange in 1974, buoyant cof fee 
and tea prices in 1977 led to a buildup of 
reserves equal to six months of imports in 
1978 2 2 0 Since 1978 there have been rising 
inflows of aid into Kenya, which amounted 
to U.S. $700 million in 1981 221 Earnings from 
tourism have also risen, reaching U.S. $180 
million in 1981—25 percent higher than in 
1978 222 xhese factors have softened the 
effects of falling commodity prices. As a con-
sequence, there was little evidence until late 
in 1982 of a scarcity of imported goods avail-
able to consumers, either in direct imports, 
such as drugs or spare parts for vehicles, or 
indirectly through a shortage of raw materials 
and spare parts for domestic manufacturing 
industries. With adequate foreign exchange 
availability, increasing foreign exchange earn-
ings has seemed unimportant compared 
with the political and economic risks of 
encouraging increased food and beverage 
exports. 
Economic Risks in Expanding 
Beverage Exports 
Two main arguments are commonly used 
in Kenya against expanding cof fee and tea 
exports. Increased emphasis on just two 
commodities will further destabilize export 
earnings, and thus the whole economy. If 
petroleum products are excluded, on which 
domestic value-added is low, more than 50 
percent of gross foreign exchange earnings 
came from cof fee and tea in every year of 
the 1970s (Table 1). Prices of cof fee and tea 
fluctuated enormously in the period 1973/74 
to 1980/81. In 1977, prices for the Kenyan 
quality of cof fee were 95 percent higher than 
1980 prices and those for tea were 71 percent 
higher in real terms 223 The effects of such 
price instability have been to destabilize 
government revenues, private and public 
investment, and domestic rates of inflation. 
Because the short-run supply elasticities of 
cof fee and tea are high, production has also 
been unstable. This has been much discussed 
in Kenya 2 2 4 
It is also doubtful whether the terms of 
trade are favorable for beverage exports in 
the long run. The quantity of cof fee that 
Kenya must export to purchase one tractor 
is steadily rising. Coffee prices declined by 
219 Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Development Planning Division, "National Food Policy Seminar. Summary Report," 
Nairobi, October 1981 (mimeographed); Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Livestock Development, 
"Action Recommendations for Increasing Food Production in the Republic of Kenya. Summary Recommendations 
Drawn from the Provincial Workshops on Increasing Food Production Held in all Eight Provinces, November-
December 1981," Nairobi, 1982 (mimeographed). 
220 See Tony Killick and Maurice Thorne, "Problems of an Open Economy: The Balance of Payments in the Nineteen 
Seventies," in Papers on the Kenya Economy, ed. Tony Killick (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1981). 
221 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey. 1982, p. 30. 
222 Ibid., p. 6. 
223 World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends, pp. 36 and 38. 
224 See, for example, Kenya, National Assembly, Sessional Papers. 1982, Paper No. 4, "Development Prospects and 
Policies." 
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0.26 percent per year relative to the average 
of machinery prices during the period 1960-
72, but rose by 1.74 percent per year for the 
longer period 1960-77.225 However, the latter 
result is affected by the exceptionally high 
coffee prices in 1976/77. Tea prices fell by 
about 5 percent per year during both periods 
relative to machinery prices. As noted in the 
Kenya government's sessional paper on de-
velopment prospects and policies in 1982, 
Kenya's terms of trade fell by 27.5 percent 
from 1976 to 1982 "due largely to weakness 
in cof fee and tea prices since the cof fee 
boom of 1977, and the rising cost of oil."226 
The widespread belief that the terms of trade 
for beverage exports are adverse in the long 
run is an important factor in discouraging a 
focus on beverages in export policy. 
Political Problems in 
Expanding Food Exports 
The political risks of allowing urban 
populations to suffer food price inflation 
and food shortages are widely recognized. 
Kenya is no exception. The lack of adequate 
food storage capacity and the administrative 
difficulties associated with organizing rapid 
food imports make it politically hazardous 
for government policymakers to export food 
staples. In Kenya, the risks inherent in food 
exports were underlined by the food queues 
in 1980. Following a large maize surplus in 
1977/78, a decision was reached to export 
maize in early 1979, and 198,000 tons were 
exported from February to September 197 9 227 
By November, there was an acute domestic 
shortage, and it became clear that there had 
been some misjudgment about the size of 
the new crop and about the availability of 
stocks in the country. Official purchases 
of the 1979 crop from November 1979 to 
April 1980 were the lowest since 1964/65 
(Table 30). It took 6 to 12 months before suf-
ficient imports—some purchased commer-
cially and some provided by donors—arrived 
and were distributed. Since then, there has 
been reluctance to authorize food exports 
for any commodity with significant domestic 
demand. Also, administrative delays in ar-
ranging rapid imports and distribution of 
maize in 1980, in what amounted to a national 
emergency, undermined the confidence of 
policymakers that they could rely on food 
imports to alleviate domestic shortages. 
Political risks in liberalizing food exports 
also arise from the probability that consumer 
prices will increase. Two important groups 
may suffer: high- and middle-income urban 
consumers and rural consumers in regions 
that have a deficit of the product exported. 
Sheep and goat exports are a good example. 
It has been estimated that exports of just 7 
percent of the annual slaughtered stock 
would raise consumer prices in the short 
term by 5 percent 228 Because export parity 
prices are 40 percent above domestic border 
prices (Chapter 6), even with high supply 
elasticities, domestic prices would be unlikely 
to revert to earlier levels. Anticipation of a 
significant rise in meat prices, which make 
up an estimated 16 percent of the food 
expenditures of upper-income urban con-
sumers and 18 percent of middle-income 
consumers, may be a significant constraint 
on liberalizing exports 229 In addition, small-
holders who live in meat-deficit areas would 
pay a higher price for sheep and goat meat. 
Because such areas are occupied by eth-
nically identified populations, the political 
risks are increased. Quotas on exports initially 
could alleviate this problem by ensuring a 
gradual adjustment in the market. 
Price-policy and investment decisions 
also have regional effects, because the 
cropping pattern differs from region to 
region for agroclimatic reasons. This further 
complicates political decisions. For example, 
a rise in sheep and goat prices will raise the 
incomes of pastoral producers in Rift Valley 
and Eastern provinces and lower the incomes 
of consumers in urban areas and the rural 
deficit areas of Central Province. A rise in 
the maize price will benefit producers in the 
major maize-exporting districts (see Table 
31), but lower incomes in the maize-deficit 
225 Jabara, Terms of Trade for Developing Countries, pp. 9-10. 
226 Kenya, National Assembly, Sessional Papers. 1982, Paper No. 4, "Development Prospects and Policies," p. 3. 
227 Weekly Review (Nairobi), July 4, 1980, p. 5. 
228 Reusse, "Consultant's Report on the Potential Export of Kenyan Sheep and Goats," p. 9. 
229 The weights used by the government are given in Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 1981, pp. 280-281. 
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areas, which are mainly the cities of Nairobi, 
Mombasa, and Kisumu, and Central and 
Eastern provinces (Table 52). Also, a large 
investment in new processing facilities in 
sugar-producing zones will be of greater 
benefit to one region than another, which 
makes it difficult to maintain a regional 
balance in public investment, as discussed 
by Bigsten.230 
Exchange rate decisions also have the 
effect of redistributing incomes among ethnic 
groups. A devaluation of the currency benefits 
export crop producers, because it raises 
prices for those export crops with prices that 
are not set directly by the government. For 
both cof fee and tea, the payment to farmers 
is a residual after deducting marketing costs, 
so the full benefit of devaluation should 
automatically be passed on to the producer. 
Coffee production is concentrated in Central 
and Eastern provinces and tea production in 
Rift Valley and Central provinces (see Tables 
11 and 13). However, the total regional impact 
of exchange rate adjustments depends on 
the extent to which the government raises 
food prices to compensate for the rise in 
prices of imported inputs and for the general 
rise in inflation. The regional effects of price 
policy and exchange rate decisions is an 
issue that requires further research. 
Price and exchange rate policies also 
affect the distribution of income between 
the estates, the large farms, and the small-
holders, as the proportion of marketed pro-
duction from the smallholder sector differs 
among crops (Table 53). An increase in maize 
or pulse prices, for example, will shift income 
toward smallholders more than a price in-
crease for sugarcane. Similarly, cof fee prices 
are more critical to smallholder incomes 
than tea prices, because the value of total 
co f fee production is higher than that of tea 
and also because the proportion of cof fee 
production from smallholdings is greater 
than that of tea. 
In addition to the risks for political 
leaders, senior civil servants also take risks 
in authorizing the export of food products. 
Like all other agricultural commodities, food 
products suffer from sharply fluctuating 
prices in international markets, so that ex-
ports by parastatal institutions like the 
NCPB, which handles exports of maize, 
pulses, and spices, and the Kenya National 
Trading Corporation, which handles sugar 
distribution and exports, may sometimes be 
at a loss (see Table 25). If there are profits 
they are immediately channeled to the Trea-
sury, but if losses arise, a painful process of 
seeking additional funds from the Treasury 
must be followed. If sufficient funds are not 
forthcoming, the losses have to be made 
good out of the recurrent (operating) budget. 
This affects the running of the whole para-
statal, and makes life difficult for senior civil 
servant managers. Aside from the risks of cash 
losses, there are concerns attached to exports 
of specific commodities. In the case of 
sheep and goats, officials are concerned 
about possible loss of breeding stock. If 
there are either cash losses or shortages of 
breeding stock the civil servant who author-
ized the exports may be held accountable 
for the decision to export. 
The political and economic risks of food 
exports are reflected in the unwillingness of 
even senior civil servants to authorize ex-
ports of specific commodities within their 
jurisdictions. Permission to export has to go 
to the very highest levels of government for 
approval. Authorization to export even a 
single stud animal has to be signed by the 
highest civil servant in the Ministry of Live-
stock Development. The more vital the food-
stuff, the higher in the system must the 
decision be made, so that it is doubtful if any 
group but the Cabinet could approve exports 
of major foodstuffs like cereals, pulses, and 
meat, and such a situation is by no means 
unique to Kenya. The pressures on the time 
of senior politicians make for slow decisions, 
whereas the availability of the crop itself, 
and the international prices offered, may 
change rapidly. Often the decision is delayed 
to the point that losses result, and this only 
serves to discourage further exports. The 
government's experience with authorizing 
maize exports in 1978/79 is a case in point. 
Weak Agricultural Producer 
and Export Lobbies 
Several groups would benefit from export 
liberalization or from improvements in the 
efficiency of marketing channels for coffee. 
These major beneficiaries include a relatively 
230 A. Bigsten, Regional Inequality and Development: A Case Study of Kenya (Gothenburg, Federal Republic of Germany: 
University of Gothenburg, 1978). 
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Table 52—Sales of maize by the Maize and Produce Board, selected years, 1974/75-
1980/81 
province/District 1974/75 1975/76 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 
(1,000 bags) 
Each sale less than 1,000 bags 
Nyanza Province 115.5 93.0 19.0 93.7 284.1 341.4 
Kipkelion 9.7 4.2 0.8 3.3 4.8 2.9 
Kisumu, Yala, Kisii 86.3 67.1 14.9 86.2 250.8 290.0 
Kilgoris 2.9 1.6 0.2 0.4 0.8 
Homa, Kendu, Muhoro Bay 16.6 20.1 3.3 4.0 28.1 47.7 
Western Province 27.8 29.6 3.2 27.4 63.2 104.1 
Webuye, Lugazi 5.0 8.4 0.7 7.0 10.8 27.8 
Butere 8.9 10.9 1.1 11.2 23.0 28.1 
Malaba 1.5 0.4 0.1 1.5 7.1 38.0 
Myanga, Bungoma 12.4 9.9 1.3 7.7 24.3 10.2 
Eastern Province 297.7 429.3 12.7 28.3 149.3 292.0 
Kitui, Kibwezi, Mwingi 98.4 177.8 4.6 3.9 26.5 89.5 
Konza, Machakos 182.3 224.1 5.9 12.6 52.3 131.1 
Meru 17.0 27.4 2.2 11.8 70.5 71.4 
Coast Province 235.7 179.1 10.0 546.3 310.7 75.0 
Mombasa 179.1 116.0 6.2 545.2 303.4 67.2 
Voi 56.6 63.1 3.8 1.1 7.3 7.8 
Rift Valley Province 42.1 51.2 25.3 54.8 124.5 276.4 
Moi's Bridge, Kitale 3.7 0.1 7.7 16.8 40.9 13.4 
Kericho 0.2 1.1 0.6 4.0 15.4 58.4 
Turbo, Kipkarren 1.6 0.4 0.3 1.6 5.3 4.4 
Nanyuki 17.3 15.6 6.0 11.2 16.1 63.8 
Nakuru 12.4 15.9 7.2 14.3 41.3 132.3 
Eldoret 6.9 18.1 3.5 6.9 5.5 4.1 
Central Province 156.1 189.2 12.3 67.7 131.9 219.9 
Thika 49.4 74.4 3.0 12.3 47.5 66.9 
Sagana, Nyahururu 95.1 105.6 2.1 52.8 72.8 138.8 
Nairobi 11.6 9.2 7.2 2.6 11.6 14.2 
Each sale of 1,000 bags or more 
Nairobi 2,110.5 1,136.4 565.3 2,384.3 2,847.9 1,752.9 
Other credit sales 534.9 2,011.2 756.5 931.6 366.1 490.8 
Total 3,520.3 4,119.0 1,404.3 4,134.1 4,277.7 3,552.5 
Source: Data were provided by the National Cereals Produce Board from its book of accounts. 
Notes: The years used here run from August to July, whereas the crop year runs from July to June. For 1980/81, data 
were only available from August to June, so each total was multiplied by 12/11 to obtain annual estimates, as 
there is little seasonal change in demand. Sales of 1,000 bags and more are usually to millers. Sales of 
smaller amounts are usually for direct consumption. 
small group of large farmers, a large number 
of smallholder producers, and the pastoralists 
who are primarily producers of marketed 
food export items, rather than consumers. If 
exports were liberalized and a number of in-
stitutions were permitted to process and 
export, these groups would benefit primarily 
from higher prices but also potentially from 
improved marketing services such as trans-
port, payment, and information. 
Larger farmers protect their interests 
through the Kenya National Farmers Union 
(KNFU). Although they comprise less than 1 
percent of agricultural producers, in 1971/72 
they accounted for 50 percent of the member-
ship of the KNFU and paid more than 80 
percent of its subscriptions.231 This means 
the KNFU defends large farm concerns, like 
maize, wheat, and beef prices, more than 
pastoralist and smallholder concerns, like 
prices of pulses and sheep and goats. Although 
the KNFU was a powerful lobby in the mid-
1970s, internal problems have weakened its 
capacity to influence decisions since then; 
even large farmers have had a weak lobby in 
the early 1980s. 
231 Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa, pp. 93-95. 
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Table 53—Share of marketed output of 




Estates Share of 
and Large Small 
Crop Year Farms Farms 
(percent) 
Pulses 1974/75 17 83 
Maize 1974/75 20 80 
Cof fee 1981/82 26a 74 
Sugarcane 1982 43 571 
Tea 1982 58a 42 
Sources: Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Rural 
Survey 1974-75, Basic Report (Nairobi: Govern-
ment Printer, 1977); unpublished data provided 
by the Kenya Sugar Authority; unpublished 
data provided by the Kenya Tea Board; Kenya 
Tea Development Authority (KTDA), Annual 
Report and Statement of Accounts. 1980/81 
(Nairobi: KTDA, 1981); KTDA, Annual Report 
and Statement of Accounts. 1981/82 (Nairobi: 
KTDA, 1982); and Cof fee Board of Kenya, 
Annual Report. Balance Sheets, and Statement of 
Accounts for the Year Ending 30th September. 
1974-81 (Nairobi: CBK, 1975-82). 
Note: Small farms are defined as less than 5 hectares. 
a This refers entirely to production on estates. 
b Production by cooperative societies and settlement 
schemes is included. 
Smallholders and pastoralists have no 
institution safeguarding their interests, apart 
from their Members of Parliament, who 
generally have limited access to information 
governing civil service decisions. Moreover, 
for the members, the personal and political 
risks of raising price issues in election 
campaigns are often too great to justify the 
possible benefits.232 There are difficulties 
in organizing small farmers politically, be-
cause they are geographically scattered and 
do not have homogeneity of interests in 
food and cash crops produced. Lack of 
education and poor access to information 
add to the smallholders' inability to articulate 
their frustrations and make them vulnerable 
to policymaking that is contrary to their 
interests by those who control administrative 
decisions and marketing institutions. 
The weakness of the smallholder lobby 
relative to the industrial lobby was well il-
lustrated in June and July 1982. The decision 
to abolish the export rebate on manufactured 
exports in the budget, which had transferred 
KSh 200 million per year to industry, was 
widely protested in the press, but at the 
same time the decision to lower the price 
paid to the farmer for mixed beans from 
KSh 330 to KSh 170 per bag passed without 
a single comment in the press. This decision 
took away from smallholders an estimated 
K Sh 100 million on the basis of 600,000 bags 
purchased in 1982/83. 
The other major group to benefit from 
the liberalization of food exports would be 
the recipients of the increased imports paid 
for with increased foreign exchange earnings. 
Given the priority attached to oil, food, and 
defense imports, marginal imports arising 
from increased exports would probably be 
capital goods, industrial raw materials, and 
transport equipment. The share of industrial 
raw materials, machinery, and other capital 
and transport equipment declined from 64 
percent to 51 percent of total imports from 
1977 to 1981, when oil and food supplies 
were given priority.233 
No particular institution has specific 
responsibility for promoting agricultural 
exports in Kenya, so the agricultural export 
lobby is still weak. The Kenya External Trade 
Authority promotes all exports, but it is 
small in terms of manpower and financial 
resources, with a budget less than 3 percent 
that of major ministries. For 1981/82 the 
total approved estimates for Kenya External 
Trade Services, including the Kenya External 
Trade Authority, commercial attaches, and 
the External Trade Policy Relations Division 
of the Ministry of Commerce, was just 
KSh 15.6 million.234 The Central Bank of 
Kenya monitors both imports and exports, 
but its role does not include export expan-
sion. The Horticultural Crops Development 
Authority plays an important role in promot-
ing horticultural exports, but for many items 
like sheep and goats and pulses, which are 
directly controlled by parastatal institutions 
or government ministries, the civil servant, 
232 Ibid., p. 117. Bates discusses similar problems in Ghana. 
233 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey, 1982, 
Table 7.9. 
234 Kenya, Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure for the Year Ending June 1982, p. 417. 
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to limit the possibility of cash losses, may 
often be more interested in restricting ex-
ports than in promoting them. 
The Development Planning Division of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
Development could address issues of export 
promotion, but it does not have the staff to 
cope with the wide range of issues for which 
it is responsible. In 1982 the staff of the 
Development Planning Division of the Min-
istry of Agriculture numbered only 22, in-
cluding technical assistance personnel.235 
Among its responsibilities were the annual 
price review; daily monitoring of local prod-
uce markets; quarterly review of the food 
situation; monitoring of importation and dis-
tribution of seed, credit, and agricultural 
chemicals; allocation and monitoring of 
import licenses for fertilizers; monitoring of 
crop performance, including activities of 
related parastatals; individual commodity 
studies; and project preparation. 
Policy Implications 
Several implications may be drawn from 
this brief analysis for those concerned about 
promoting food and beverage exports. To 
strengthen the pro-export lobby, institutions 
like the Kenya External Trade Authority and 
the Development Planning Division of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock De-
velopment need to be enlarged so as to 
increase their analytical capacity to ex-
amine export potential. This should be done 
primarily at the regional level to prevent fur-
ther centralization of decisionmaking in 
Nairobi. High- and middle-income groups 
need to be educated about the potential 
benefits of exports, and informal channels 
need to be found to brief Members of Par-
liament from rural constituencies that stand 
to benefit substantially from proposed ex-
port liberalization schemes. Other groups 
that will need to be briefed about the benefits 
of exports are the large farmers' groups such 
as the Kenya National Farmers Union and 
the Agricultural Society of Kenya. 
Every effort must also be made to mini-
mize the genuine political and economic 
risks involved in exporting food products. 
To reduce the political risks on crops that 
can be easily stored, like maize and beans, 
the obvious solution is to increase strategic 
reserves to levels that allow adequate time 
for food to be imported, with generous 
allowances for administrative delays. Iron-
ically, a food export strategy requires an 
increase in the amount of domestic reserves. 
Schemes that call for restricted export quotas 
or licenses in the early stages are likely to be 
better received, as the political risks are 
reduced, and an important additional group 
of potential beneficiaries can identify the 
advantages of the policy. 
To reduce the risks of foreign exchange 
losses, minimum export prices need to be 
established for products like sheep and 
goats, so as to demonstrate clearly the size 
of benefits in foreign exchange earnings. 
Other ways to ensure that foreign exchange 
earnings are maximized could be considered, 
such as auctions for livestock at the port of 
exit, with the requirement of payment in 
foreign exchange. Donors could also assist by 
providing technical assistance to strengthen 
the monitoring capacity of the Central Bank on 
foreign exchange repatriation from exports. 
235 Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi, personal communication, 1982. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR KENYA'S 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
High-Value Versus High-Volume 
Agricultural Exports 
A major constraint on developing maize 
exports was found to be the relatively high 
road and rail transport costs in Kenya. High 
internal transport costs are also a problem 
with other commodities considered, such as 
sugar and pulses. Exports of low-value agri-
cultural products from countries like the 
United States probably represent as much a 
return to capital invested in the physical 
infrastructure as a return to resources em-
ployed on the farm. 
The issue this raises extends to the whole 
of agricultural export policy for countries 
that are landlocked or with major production 
areas far from the sea. The alternatives are 
either to concentrate attention on a broad 
range of high-value, low-volume agricultural 
commodities, often with relatively small 
international markets, or to seek to develop 
exports of lower-value, large-volume com-
modities with much larger markets. For 
specific commodities, the choice typically is 
between exports of beverages, meat, and 
processed horticultural products, on the 
one hand, and cereals, sugar, and oilseeds, 
on the other. Whereas low-cost, bulky items 
make large demands on physical infrastruc-
ture, and hence on capital availability, more 
diversified high-cost items make demands 
on resources such as trained manpower for 
research, production institutions, and export 
promotion. The more diversified product 
range also makes public ownership and 
control more difficult. Neither group of 
commodities is necessarily more labor-
intensive, as items in the low-value group, 
such as root vegetables and sugar, may 
sometimes be more labor-intensive than 
those in the high-value group, such as 
orchard fruits. 
To pursue an approach that encourages 
the development of more diversified, high-
value agricultural exports will place espe-
cially high demands on the agricultural 
research system. This issue was discussed 
chiefly in the context of the potential for 
increased horticultural exports (Chapter 8), 
and in the role research has played in sheep 
and goat production, which is clearly a major 
factor in its export potential today. The 
number and diversity of potential export 
crops in Kenya and the relatively low pro-
duction of many of these at present make it 
difficult to adequately fund research for any 
one crop. However, the large-scale production 
of commodities such as fruits and vegetables 
in Western countries has been achieved by 
sustaining a large research effort for each 
commodity. Given the additional disease 
problems in tropical or semitropical zones, 
this research effort is likely to be at least as 
critical in a developing country as in the 
West. 
To obtain the necessary allocations for 
research on minor crops, which have rela-
tively low priority owing to their small share 
of the value of total agricultural output, will 
require a large increase in the allocation of 
funds to agricultural research as a whole. 
Given the shortage of locally trained man-
power for research, the donors can play a 
particularly important role in facilitating the 
training of Kenyan research personnel and 
in providing expatriate specialists to fill the 
gap until enough Kenyans have completed 
their training. In summary, a high-value 
product approach to agricultural exports 
will require larger allocations to research 
and smaller allocations to physical infra-
structure. 
The Importance of Vertical 
Linkages 
Weak institutional linkages in the pro-
duction chain for individual commodities, 
between the research system at one end and 
the international buyer at the other, serve as 
a major constraint in realizing Kenya's food 
export potential. These weaknesses can be 
identified in the production system of several 
of the crops studied here. For pulses, grams, 
1 0 6 
and fruit crops, there is a major institutional 
gap between the research station and the 
farmer in Kenya. Seed companies are unwilling 
to multiply the improved seeds for grams 
and the established nurseries are inadequate 
to sufficiently increase the numbers of seed-
lings for improved or selected varieties of 
fruit trees. 
For pulses and meat, linkages are weak 
because the NCPB and the KMC are respon-
sible only for output marketing. Other in-
stitutions handle research, distribution of 
inputs, and teaching methods of cultivation 
to farmers. The NCPB has no institutional 
capacity to convey information about market 
size for different varieties, price movements, 
and quality specifications to the research 
station, the farmer, or the extension staff. 
Nor does the NCPB's price structure signal 
to the farmer the requirements of the do-
mestic or international markets. The research 
program on grain legumes has been carried 
out with no information about the export 
market, despite the large potential for exports 
of pulses. A similar absence of institutional 
links exists in the livestock industry, where 
the output marketing agency, the KMC, has 
no formal channel to feed back market in-
formation to the extension staff or directly 
to the livestock producer. 
Where vertical linkages have been strong 
in Kenya, crop production has improved 
markedly. Strong linkages have been limited 
so far to industries seeking a particular 
product. These industries undertake a formal 
contractual relationship with the farmer and 
provide credit and extension information to 
him. Examples include barley production 
for Kenya Breweries, tobacco production for 
the British-American Tobacco Company, tea 
production for the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority, and more recently sunflower pro-
duction for East African Industries. The 
vertical integration of these agencies is not 
the only secret of their success. The incen-
tives they offer and the persuasion they use 
to increase production are also a contribu-
tory factor. This emphasis on vertical linkages 
goes against the current vogue, particularly 
in extension, which stresses the adminis-
trative advantages of horizontal integration. 
For example, one extension agent is expected 
to convey information on all crops to the 
farmer.236 
Improved vertical linkages could be 
achieved in several ways. The role of crop 
parastatals like the NCPB could be expanded 
to include credit supply and extension. 
However, the lack of trained manpower and 
experienced management available to public 
institutions suggests that substituting the 
NCPB for the Ministry of Agriculture is un-
likely to produce a dramatic improvement 
over the present system. An alternative might 
be to license private agencies to export agri-
cultural products currently controlled by 
the NCPB on condition that they make con-
tracts with producers and are responsible 
for seeing that adequate credit, inputs, and 
information are supplied, either directly to 
the farmer or through the government agen-
cies responsible. The role of the NCPB for 
minor crops could then become supervisory 
rather than administrative, similar to that of 
the Horticultural Crops Development Au-
thority for horticultural crops. 
The Need for Input Supply Push 
Improved vertical linkages are in most 
cases a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for achieving rapid growth of high-value 
export crops. A second and related condition 
is the availability of the means to encourage 
farmers to increase the use of inputs to max-
imize production. Whereas the incentives 
provided by the output marketing agency 
aim to motivate the farmer to increase output 
or to improve quality, it is the persuasion 
applied by agencies that supply inputs or 
information that convinces farmers to raise 
productivity by such means as increasing 
fertilizer use or improving pruning methods. 
Although incentives affect farmers' willing-
ness to change input practices, Desai's work 
suggests that persuasion can be an important 
and independent means of increasing agri-
cultural production.237 
There are many examples in this report 
where the supply push for the commodities 
considered is absent. The lack of adequate 
supplies of fertilizers was noted for produc-
tion of maize and pulses. The Kenya Farmers 
Association, with 80 percent of the market in 
1981, can take the attitude that the farmer 
should come looking for fertilizer, rather 
236 For example, see Daniel Benor and James Q. Harrison, Agricultural Extension: The Training and Visit System (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 1977). 
237 Desai, "Fertilizer Use on India's Unirrigated Areas," pp. 10-11. 
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than trying to persuade him to use more. 
There is no advertising to promote fertilizer 
use in Kenya, while beer, soft drinks, soap, 
and cigarettes are promoted vigorously. It is 
the inadequacy of retail margins, the lack of 
field sales personnel for both seeds and fer-
tilizers, and the low levels of fertilizer im-
ports that have resulted in the absence of 
supply push for key yield-increasing inputs. 
Several mechanisms exist to increase 
input supply push and the amount of per-
suasion applied to the farmer. In other 
countries, availability of surplus fertilizer 
stocks has helped to boost consumption even 
in periods of unfavorable input/output price 
relationships. This is because large fertilizer 
stocks generate pressure on the distribution 
agencies to increase consumption through 
product promotion.238 Competition between 
input marketing agencies has been effective 
in creating persuasive pressure on farmers 
to increase consumption of pesticides in 
Kenya, so that imports increased 2.5 times in 
constant prices from 1972 to 1980, while 
chemical fertilizer imports stagnated 239 The 
Kenya Tea Development Authority is an 
example of how highly motivated manage-
ment, willing to set detailed production 
targets and follow them up, can put effective 
pressure to produce at the linkage point be-
tween the extension agent and the farmer. 
The successes of Kenya Breweries and British-
American Tobacco also seem to be related to 
their input supply services as much as to their 
output pricing and marketing systems. 
Specific recommendations, then, include 
building up large fertilizer stocks, increasing 
margins to both wholesalers and retailers in 
the fertilizer distribution chain, and budget-
ing for advertising and promotion in the 
setting of prices for fertilizer by the Min-
istry of Agriculture and the Price Controller. 
Unless fertilizers are more widely available 
to farmers and financial incentives are ade-
quate to distribution agencies, fertilizer con-
sumption in Kenya will continue to stagnate. 
The Need for Incentives 
and Demand Pull 
A recent and striking example of an at-
tempt to create demand pull in the produc-
tion chain was the change in the marketing 
arrangements for maize in 1980/81 in the 
face of an acute national shortage. As dis-
cussed earlier, not only was the price raised, 
but the NCPB undertook to bear all drying 
and transport costs and set up hundreds of 
additional buying centers closer to the 
farmer. These additional services effectively 
raised the price further. Clearly the aim was 
to increase demand pull on the crop, and 
production increased dramatically. There 
have been negative side effects of this strategy, 
however. The resulting collection costs and 
NCPB overheads have been so high that it 
has reduced the potential to export surplus 
maize without large losses to the Treasury. 
Demand pull should not be abandoned be-
cause of this experience, but its implemen-
tation should be reconsidered. 
On many crops other than maize, there is 
also an acute lack of demand pull. NCPB 
sees its role as mopping up surpluses rather 
than in generating them, and therefore it 
puts no pressure on the farmer, the extension 
personnel, or input supply agencies to in-
crease output. In fact, given its collection 
and handling costs and its lack of orientation 
toward export markets, NCPB purchases 
almost invariably result in losses. For these 
reasons NCPB's interests may lie in avoiding 
surpluses. Similarly, the lack of institutional 
linkages between KMC and the livestock 
producer and the lack of other livestock ex-
porters, due to license restrictions, weakens 
the demand pull for livestock. Perhaps most 
significantly in the short run, the delays in 
smallholder payments for cof fee and tea 
and the disproportionate and uncertain de-
ductions levied from coffee payments greatly 
weaken incentives to beverage producers. 
There are a number of ways greater de-
mand pull can be applied to the production 
system. Prices are clearly a major factor, and 
encouraging exports is a major way to raise 
prices for products like sheep and goats and 
pulses. Another way to increase demand 
pull is to allow competition between mar-
keting agencies so that the farmer can choose 
the agency he wants to sell his crop to. A third 
way is to allow higher profits to private 
output marketing agencies. This seems to 
have mobilized institutions like British-
American Tobacco and Kenya Breweries to 
provide effective services to farmers. 
238 ibid. 
239 Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 1981. 
p. 69; constant prices are derived from World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends, p. 30. 
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This analysis again points to the need 
for change. Sheep and goat products and 
pulses can be exported from Kenya in large 
quantities if the government provides at-
tractive prices to producers. This can only 
happen if exports are liberalized and business 
is able to develop long-term export markets 
in areas like the Gulf States and North Africa. 
The Importance of Food Security 
Export growth will require increased re-
gional specialization in production. For ex-
port crop and meat producers, this implies 
growing dependence on the market to meet 
basic food needs. The problem of maize 
availability and the rise in prices in informal 
markets in 1980 appear to have led to a fall 
in tea yields among smallholders as labor 
was diverted into food production. A single 
year of high maize prices in informal markets 
because availability is inadequate through 
formal channels may affect export produc-
tion for a number of years, as smallholders 
switch to food production to reduce income 
uncertainty. Similarly, reliable maize sup-
plies are critical if pastoralists in range areas 
are to increase herd and flock productivity 
by reducing the numbers of animals held for 
security. Even in the worst drought years, 
the supplies of basic foodstuffs must be 
plentiful. This is particularly difficult for 
Kenya to achieve when all the neighboring 
countries are likely to be hungry at the same 
time. 
In analyzing optimal stocking policies, 
the export factor needs to be explicitly taken 
into account. The high costs in export earn-
ings forgone for several years as the result of 
a single year of maize shortages raises the 
returns to high food stocks. An agricultural 
export strategy, ironically, may require larger 
food stocks than other forms of development 
strategy. 
Conclusions 
There is great potential for Kenya to 
increase agricultural exports to the selected 
oil-exporting countries, especially those in 
North Africa and the Gulf States. This is 
summarized in Table 54, which shows sig-
nificant negative nominal protection coef-
ficients even at the overvalued exchange 
rate during the period 1980-82 for sheep and 
goat meat, pulses, and sugar. This negative 
protection is due to the government restrict-
ing exports and pegging domestic prices 
below export parity prices for many food 
products. For coffee, tea, and horticultural 
crops, there is no protection, as variable pro-
ducer prices ensure that export parity prices 
are equal to domestic border prices at pre-
vailing exchange rates. 
The high cost of improving physical in-
frastructure suggests that Kenya should 
focus on low-volume, high-value items, and 
because man-land ratios are likely to be 
high in the long run, the focus should be on 
labor-intensive items in most provinces. 
The biggest obstacles are likely to be the 
political difficulties involved in permitting 
food exports and in allowing nongovernment 
agencies the opportunity to handle exports. 
The willingness to tackle these problems is 
only likely to develop as foreign exchange 
shortages strengthen the export lobby during 
the next few years. 
The success of a food export strategy will 
then depend on whether two critical con-
straints have been overcome. The first is the 
problem of arranging input delivery, crop 
collection, and producer payments to hun-
dreds of thousands of small peasant pro-
ducers in such a way that there is no dis-
incentive to production. Such an adminis-
trative task is daunting to the most highly 
trained public or cooperative bureaucracy, 
and points toward using the more flexible and 
motivated African business sector as the 
main institutional mechanism. 
The second key constraint is the difficulty 
of creating vertically integrated linkages in 
the agricultural production system, from the 
international market back to the farmer 
through marketing institutions, the extension 
system, and input supply agencies, in such a 
way as to create the incentives and persuasion 
required to maximize output from the limited 
resource and technology base. This again 
points to changes in the institutional struc-
tures as the most critical factor in enabling 
Kenya to produce the surpluses that are 
necessary to achieve export growth in highly 
competitive international markets. 
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Table 54—Nominal protection for Kenya's potential agricultural exports at official 
exchange rates, June 1982 
Domestic Export Nominal 
Commodity Border Price Parity Price Protection 
(KSh/metric ton) (percent) 
Sheep and goat meat3 
Chilled exotic-cross lambs 18,000 26,700 -32.6 
Chilled local-bred sheep 15,000 20,100 -25.4 
Frozen goat meat 15,000 16,300 -8.0 
Beans, Canadian Wonderb 4,367 5,628 -22.5 
Sugar, plantation white 3,282c 3,869d -15.0 
Beef, frozen6 
High grade 15,300 15,350 -0 .3 
Low grade 12,000 11,300 + 6.2 
Maize f 2,241g l,466h + 52.9 
Sources: Central Bank of Kenya, "Selected Foreign Exchange Mean Rates," Economic and Financial Review 14 (October-
December 1981); International Sugar Organization, Statistical Bulletin, various issues; Kenya Gazette, various 
issues; Kenya Meat Commission, unpublished data; Kenya Sugar Authority, unpublished data; National 
Cereals and Produce Board, unpublished reports; Schluter and Maack, market reports, Hamburg, various 
dates; and World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. World Bank Report 814/82, 5 vols. 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982). 
a These figures are for meat shipped by air to the Gulf States. 
b These prices are for March 1982. 
c This figure is for September 1981. 
d This is the World Bank's estimated long-term equilibrium price with constant 1981 prices. 
e These figures are for frozen meat shipped by sea to the Gulf States. 
f These are the prices of maize at Mombasa, which are the prices used to measure export potential in the long term. 
The domestic border price is higher and the export parity price is lower than the prices at Nairobi, the major center 
for consumption, which would be the better prices to use to measure protection on imports. 
g This figure is for white maize. It includes the transportation costs shown in Table 38. 




Acland, J. D. East African Crops. Nairobi: Longmans, 1971. 
Agricultural Finance Corporation. Personal communication, 1981. 
Aldington, T. J. "Domestic Resource Costs." Nairobi, 1979 (mimeographed). 
Allan, A. Y. "Early Planting of Maize—Essential for High Yields." Kenya Farmer, March 1980. 
Arab Organization of Agricultural Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations. "The Market for Livestock and Meat in the Arabian Peninsula and 
the Role of Supplies from Neighboring African Surplus Regions." FAO Near East Re-
gional Office, Cairo, November 1979 (mimeographed). 
Barker, Jonathan. "The Debate on Rural Socialism in Tanzania." In Towards Socialism in Tanzania. 
Edited by Bismarck U. Mwansau and Cranford Piatt. Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania 
Publishing House, 1979. 
Bates, Robert H. Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California 
Press, 1981. 
Benor, Daniel and Harrison, James Q. Agricultural Extension: The Training and Visit System. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1977. 
Bigsten, A. Regional Inequality and Development: A Case Study of Kenya. Gothenburg, Federal 
Republic of Germany: University of Gothenburg, 1978. 
Bruno, Michael. "Domestic Resource Costs and Effective Protection: Clarification and Syn-
thesis." Journal of Political Economy 80 (January-February 1972): 16-33. 
Central Bank of Kenya. "Selected Foreign Exchange Mean Rates." Economic and Financial Review 
14 (October-December 1981). 
Chemonics International, Consulting Division. "Livestock and Meat Industry Development 
Study, Final Report." Nairobi, March 1977 (mimeographed). 
Chopra, R. N. Evolution of Food Policy in India. Bombay: Macmillan, 1981. 
Coffee Board of Kenya. Annual Report, Balance Sheets and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ending 
30th September, 1974-82. Nairobi: CBK, 1975-83. 
"Kenya Coffee Sales for Coffee Year 1982/83 to 31.6.83." Nairobi, 1983 (mimeographed). 
Collinson, Michael. "Technological Potentials for Food Production—Eastern and Central 
Africa." A paper prepared for the Conference on Accelerating Agricultural Growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, August 29 to September 1,1983 (mimeo-
graphed). 
Connell, Rice and Co. World Sugar: Capacity, Cost and Policy. Westfield, N.J.: Connell, Rice and 
Co., 1977. 
Cooperative College of Kenya. Personal communication, June 1981. 
Cornell University, Department of Pomology and Agricultural Economics, Ithaca, N.Y. Personal 
communication, July 1983. 
Daily Nation, March 1, 1982-August 10, 1983. 
Dankowski, K.; Barth, R.; and Bruhns, Guntwen. Zuckerwirtschaftliches Taschenbuch 1979/80. 
Berlin: Verlag Dr. Albert Bartens, 1979. 
I l l 
Davis, Robert K. "Some I'ssues in the Evolution, Organization and Operation of Group Ranches 
in Kenya." Discussion Paper 93. Institute of Development Studies, Nairobi, 1970 
(mimeographed). 
De Boer, A. John. Sheep and Goat Development Project, Kenya: Production Economics. Rome: Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and United Nations Development 
Programme, 1981. 
Desai, Gunvant M. "Fertilizer Use on India's Unirrigated Areas: A Perspective Based on Past 
Record and Future Needs." A paper presented at the seminar of the International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics on Technology Options for 
Dryland Agriculture: Potential and Challenge. Patancheru, Andhra Pradesh, India, 
August 22 to 24, 1983 (mimeographed). 
Sustaining Rapid Growth in India's Fertilizer Consumption: A Perspective Based on Com-
position of Use. Research Report 31. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute, 1982. 
Desai, Gunvant M. and Schluter, Michael. "Generating Employment in Rural Areas." In Seminar 
on Rural Development for the Weaker Sections. Bombay: Indian Society of Agricultural 
Economics, 1973. 
Dodwell Shipping Agency. Personal communication, October 1981. 
Doherty, Deborah. Factors Inhibiting Economic Development on Rotian Almarcongo Group Ranch. 
Working Paper 356. Nairobi: Institute of Development Studies, 1979. 
East Africa Bag and Cordage Co. Personal communication, November 1982. 
Economist, March 6, 1982, p. 12. 
Eijnatten, C. L. M. van. "Notes on Treecrop Nursery Activities in Coast Province." Coast Agri-
cultural Research Station Communication 8. Mtwapa, October 1979 (mimeographed). 
Eijnatten, C. L. M. van and Karisa, S. J. "Proposal for the Development of Nursery Activities in 
Coast Province and its Cost of Implementation." Coast Agricultural Research Station 
Communication 9. Mtwapa, March 1980 (mimeographed). 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. "Trade Yearbook Tape." Rome, 1978. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Agricultural and Rural Development 
Review and Programming Mission for Kenya. Mission Findings and Recommendations. 
Rome: FAO, 1981. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Small Ruminants Project. Personal 
communication, October 1981. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/World Bank. The Outlook for Meat 
Production and Trade in the Near East and East Africa. Livestock Development Country 
Studies, vol. 2. Rome: FAO, 1977. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The World Market for Bovine Beef at 16 December 1981. 
Geneva: GATT, 1982. 
Hesselmark, Olof. The Marketing of Maize and Beans in Kenya—A Proposal for Improved Effective-
ness. Working Paper 300. Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, 1977. 
"The Relation between Rainfall and Maize Marketing in Kenya." A paper prepared for 
the Maize and Produce Board, Nairobi, May 1975 (mimeographed). 
Horticultural Crops Development Authority. Personal communication, August 1983. 
Unpublished data. 
1 1 2 
Hyden, Goran. Efficiency Versus Distribution in East African Cooperatives: A Study in Organizational 
Conflicts. Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973. 
India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Department of Economics and Statistics. Esti-
mates of Area and Production of Principal Crops in India, 1978/79. New Delhi: Controller of 
Publications, 1980. 
Industrial Market Research. The Potential for Increasing Kenyan Exports to Selected Middle East 
Countries. London: I MR, 1980. 
International Cof fee Organization. Coffee in Kenya, 1977. London: ICO, 1978. 
International Food Policy Research Institute. Food Needs of Developing Countries: Projections of 
Production and Consumption to 1990. Research Report 3. Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 1977. 
International Labour Organisation. Employment, Incomes and Equality. A Strategy for Increasing 
Productive Employment in Kenya. Geneva: ILO, 1972. 
International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1981. Washington, 
D.C.: IMF, 1981. 
International Sugar Organization. Statistical Bulletin, various issues, 1980 and 1981. 
International Tea Committee. Annual Bulletin of Statistics. London: ITC, 1981. 
International Trade Centre. "Export Development and Diversification. Packaging and Trans-
portation of Perishable Produce by Sea from Kenya with Special Reference to Selected 
Vegetables, Pineapples and Mangoes." Project No. KEN/05/60. Geneva, March 1978 
(mimeographed). 
The Market for Fresh Horticultural Products in Selected Gulf Countries. Geneva: ITC, 1980. 
Jabara, Cathy L. Terms of Trade for Developing Countries. Foreign Agricultural Economic Report 
161. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, November 1980. 
Josling, Timothy E.; Langworthy, Mark; and Pearson, Scott. Options for Farm Policy in the European 
Community. Thames Essays 27. London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1981. 
Karue, C. "Livestock Production Trends in Kenya: Meat Production." A paper presented at the 
National Council of Science and Technology Workshop on Food Policy Research 
Priorities, Nairobi, June 1982 (mimeographed). 
Katumani Research Station, Katumani. Personal communication, March 1982. 
Keesing, Donald B. Trade Policy for Developing Countries. World Bank Staff Working Paper 353. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979. 
Kenya. Development Estimates for the Year 1981/82 of the Government of Kenya. Nairobi: Govern-
ment Printer, 1981. 
Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure of the Government of Kenya for the Year Ending June 
1982. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1982. 
Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure of the Government of Kenya for the Year Ending June 
1983. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1983. 
First Report of the 1980-83 University Grants Committee, University Education in Kenya. 
Nairobi: Government Printer, March 1981. 
Kenya, Laws of Kenya. The Kenya Meat Commission Act, Chapter 363. Nairobi: Government 
Printer, 1972. 
The Maize Marketing Act, revised ed„ Chapter 338. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1972. 
1 1 3 
The Partnership Act, Chapter 86. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1972. 
Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi. Personal communication, 1982. 
Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Central Development and Marketing Unit. Yields, Costs and 
Prices 1981. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981. 
Yields, Costs and Prices 1982. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1982. 
Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture/Development Planning Division. "National Food Policy Seminar 
Summary Report." Nairobi, October 1981 (mimeographed). 
Summary Report of the National Food Policy Seminar of July 1981. Nairobi: Government 
Printer, 1981. 
Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Division of Scientific Research. Annual Report, Coast Province 1977. 
Nairobi: Government Printer, 1978. 
Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Horticultural Crops Development Division, Nairobi. Personal 
communication, March 1982. 
Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Marketing Development Project. Background Marketing Briefs for 
the Agricultural Price Review 1981/82. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981. 
Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Livestock Development. "Action Recommen-
dations for Increasing Food Production in the Republic of Kenya. Summary Recom-
mendations Drawn from the Provincial Workshops on Increasing Food Production 
Held in all Eight Provinces, November-December 1981." Nairobi, 1982 (mimeographed). 
Kenya, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, External Trade Authority. Trade Facilitation in Kenya: 
Aligned Documents and Streamlined Procedures for Imports and Exports. Nairobi: Kenya 
Literature Bureau, 1979. 
Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Central Bureau of Statistics. Directory 
of Industries. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1974. 
Economic Survey, 1979-83. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1979-83. 
Integrated Rural Survey 1974-75. Basic Report. Nairobi: Government Printer, March 1977. 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues for 1977-82. 
Statistical Abstract, 1979-82. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1980-83. 
Kenya, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Branch, Customs and Excise Department. Annual Trade 
Report, 1970-80. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970-80. 
Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics. Integrated Rural Survey 
1974-75. Basic Report. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1977. 
Kenya, Ministry of Livestock Development. National Livestock Development Policy. Nairobi: 
Government Printer, 1980. 
Unpublished data. 
Kenya, Ministry of Livestock Development, Animal Production Division. Annual Report for 
1979. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1980. 
Costs-Prices 1982 for Livestock. Nairobi: Government Printer, January 1982. 
Kenya, Ministry of Livestock Development, Development Planning Division, Nairobi. Personal 
communication with the head of the division, March 1982. 
1 1 4 
Kenya, Ministry of Livestock Development, Sheep and Goat Development Project. Unpub-
lished data. 
Kenya, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Meteorological Department. Unpublished 
data. 
Kenya, National Assembly. Sessional Papers, 1981. Paper No. 4, "National Food Policy." 
Sessional Papers, 1982. Paper No. 4, "Development Prospects and Policies." 
Kenya, National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policies. Report of the National 
Committee on Educational Objectives and Policies. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1976. 
Kenya, Working Party on Government Expenditures. Report and Recommendations of the Working 
Party. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1982. 
Kenya Farmers Association. "Input Supply Systems." A paper prepared for the National Council 
on Science and Technology Workshop on Food Policy Research Priorities, Nairobi, June 
14-17, 1982. 
Kenya Gazette, various issues. 
Kenya Gazette Supplements. June 1978, June 1979, June 1980, and June 1981. 
Kenya Meat Commission. Personal communication, June 1982. 
Unpublished data. 
Kenya Ports Authority. "Tariffs of Rates and Charges for Wharfage Handling and General Ser-
vices." Tariff Book No. 2, Effective 1 July 1982. Nairobi: Kenya Ports Authority, 1982. 
Kenya Seed Company. Unpublished data. 
Kenya Sugar Authority. Personal communication. 
Unpublished data. 
Kenya Tea Board. Unpublished data. 
Kenya Tea Development Authority. Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1980/81. Nairobi: 
KTDA, 1981. 
Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1981/82. Nairobi: KTDA, 1982. 
Kenyan Fuelwood Project, Steering Committee. Energy Development in Kenya:Problems and Op-
portunities. Stockholm: Beijer Institute, 1981. 
Kenyatta, Jomo. Facing Mount Kenya. London: Martin, Seeker, and Warburg, 1938. 
Khalaf, Samir. "Family Associations in Lebanon." Journal of Comparative Family Studies 2 
(Autumn 1971): 235-250. 
Killick, Tony and Thome, Maurice. "Problems of an Open Economy: The Balance of Payments 
in the Nineteen Seventies." In Papers on the Kenya Economy. Edited by Tony Killick. 
Nairobi: Heinemann, 1981. 
Leonard, David K. "Administrative Issues in Implementing Kenya's Food Policy." A paper pre-
sented at the National Food Policy Seminar, Nairobi, July 1982. 
Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1977. 
1 1 5 
Lewis, W. Arthur. "The Slowing Down of the Engine of Growth." The American Economic Revipu 
70 (September 1980): 555-564. ™ 
Leys, Colin. Underdevelopment in Kenya. London: Heinemann, 1975. 
Lipton, Michael. "Family, Fungibility and Formality." A paper presented at the International 
Economics Association Conference, Mexico City, August 1980. 
Maize and Produce Board. Annual Report, 1959/60-1979/80. Nairobi: Maize and Produce Board 
1960-80. 
Marris, Peter and Somerset, Anthony. African Businessmen: A Study of Entrepreneurs hip and De-
velopment in Kenya. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972. 
Massow, V. von, Gottingen, Federal Republic of Germany. Personal communication, May 1982. 
Mellor, John W. The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Developing World. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. 
Mtwapa Research Station, Mtwapa. Personal communication, July 1982. 
Mukherji, J. P. and Assistants. "Feasibility Study on Mini Sugar Plants in Kenya." A study 
undertaken for the Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi, 1977 (mimeographed). 
Mwangi, K. "Problems of Mango Growing in Coast Province." Coast Agricultural Research Station 
Quarterly Newsletter, March 1982. 
National Cereals and Produce Board. Personal communication. 
Unpublished reports. 
National Christian Council of Kenya. Who Controls Industry in Kenya? Nairobi: East Africa Pub-
lishing House, 1968. 
National Horticultural Research Station, Thika. Personal communication, 1982. 
National Horticultural Research Station, Grain Legume Project." 1980 Annual Report." Thika, 
1980 (mimeographed). 
"1981 Annual Report." Thika, 1981 (mimeographed). 
National Seed Quality Control Service, Nakuru. Personal communication, 1982. 
Nayyar, Deepak. India's Exports and Export Policies in the 1960's. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976. 
Ngugi, D. N. "Agricultural Research to Increase Food Production." A paper presented at the 
Food Research Priorities Conference of the National Council of Science and Tech-
nology, Nairobi, June 2, 1982 (mimeographed). 
"Research Priorities for Increased Food Production." A paper presented at the Food 
Research Priorities Conference of the National Council of Science and Technology, 
Nairobi, June 2, 1982 (mimeographed). 
Nyeri, District Agricultural Officer. Nyeri District Annual Report, 1980. Nairobi: Ministry of Agri-
culture, 1980. 
Olayide, Samson Olajuwon and Idachaba, Francis Sulemanu. "Input Supply and Food Market-
ing Systems for Agricultural Growth: A Nigerian Case Study." A paper presented at the 
Conference on Accelerating Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, Victoria Falls, 
Zimbabwe, August 29 to September 1, 1983 (mimeographed). 
Omuse, John K. "A Review of Strategies for Research into Food Production." A paper presented 
at the Workshop on Food Policy Research Priorities, Nairobi, June 14-17,1982 (mimeo-
graphed). 
Oniango, Ruth. "Nutrition and Food Consumption Policies." A paper presented at the Food 
Research Priorities Conference of the National Council for Science and Technology, 
Nairobi, June 2, 1982 (mimeographed). 
Parkin, David. The Cultural Definition of Cultural Response: Lineal Destiny among the Luos. London: 
Academic Press, 1978. 
Ram, C. S. Venkata. "Tea in the Small Grower's Sector—A Study in Kenya." Planter's Chronicle 
(Calcutta), 1981, pp. 203-206. 
Reusse, E. "Consultant's Report on the Potential Export of Kenyan Sheep and Goats to Arabian 
Markets." Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1980 
(mimeographed). 
Sackett, Michael and Schluter, Michael. Estimates of the 1981/82 Import Requirements for the 
Production, Processing and Marketing of Major Crops in Mainland Tanzania. Dar-es-Salaam: 
Marketing Development Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Tanzania, 1981. 
Scandizzo, Pasquale L. and Bruce, Colin. Methodologies for Measuring Agricultural Price Interven-
tion Effects. World Bank Staff Working Paper 394. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980. 
Schaefer-Kehnert, W. "Economic Aspects of Intensive Beef Cattle Feeding in Kenya." Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development/Regional Mission in East Africa, 
Nairobi, March 1981 (mimeographed). 
Schluter, Michael. "Rural Development in the Diocese of Mount Kenya East." A report prepared 
for the Diocese of Mount Kenya East, Embu, June 1977 (mimeographed). 
Schluter and Maack GmbH. Market reports. Hamburg, various dates. 
Schmidt, Guenter. Maize and Beans Marketing in Kenya—The Interaction and Effectiveness of the 
Informal and Formal Marketing Systems. Occasional Paper 31. Nairobi: Institute of De-
velopment Studies, 1979. 
Schultz, Rex B. and Gay, Jack M. "Professional and Subprofessional Manpower Requirements 
for the Cooperative Sector in Kenya, 1988." Agricultural Cooperative Development 
International, Washington, D.C., 1980 (mimeographed). 
Tyler, C.P. "The Interests of East Africa in an International Tea Agreement." Discussion Paper 
25, Institute of Development Studies, Nairobi, March 1977 (mimeographed). 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economics and Statistics Service, Washington, D.C. Personal 
communication, June 1982. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Statistical Reporting Service, Crop Reporting Board. "Crop 
Production." Washington, D.C., December 1981. 
Weekly Review (Nairobi), November 30, 1979; July 4, 1980; and August 6, 1982. 
White, J. M. and Meadows, S. J. An Estimate of the Supply of Immatures from Kenya's Northern 
Rangelands. Livestock Development Project, Report 193a KE, Phase II, forecast 1980. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1974. 
Evaluation of the Contribution of Group and Individual Ranches in Kajiado District to Eco-
nomic and Social Development. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981. 
Wolf, Jan J. de. Differentiation and Integration in Western Kenya. The Hague: Mouton, 1977. 
World Bank. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981. 
Commodity Trade and Price Trends. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 
Kenya Sugar Rehabilitation Project Appraisal Report. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, July 
1977. 
Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. World Bank Report 814/82,5 vols. Wash-
ington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982. 
World Bank, Regional Mission for East Africa, Nairobi. Personal communication, November 
1981. 
